The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Are we, then, to say that it is prudence that opposes desire [in those cases when we blame a man for yielding] ? For it is the strongest form of belief. Surely that would be absurd : for then the same man would be at once prudent and incontinent ; but no one would maintain that a prudent man could voluntarily do the vilest acts. Moreover, we have already shown that prudence is essentially a faculty that issues in act ; for it is concerned with the ultimatep. 212 thing [the thing to be done], and implies the possession of all the moral virtues.

Again, if a man cannot be continent without 6 having strong and bad desires, the temperate man will not be continent, nor the continent man temperate ; for it is incompatible with the temperate character to have either very violent or bad desires.

They must, however, be both strong and bad in the continent man : for if they were good, the habit that hindered from following them would be bad, so that continence would not be always good ; if they were weak and not bad, it would be nothing to respect ; and if they were bad, but at the same time weak, it would be nothing to admire.

Again, if continence makes a man apt to abide by 7 any opinion whatsoever, it is a bad thing — as, for instance, if it makes him abide by a false opinion : and if incontinence makes a man apt to abandon any opinion whatsoever, there will be a kind of incontinence that is good, an instance of which is Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles ; for he merits praise for being prevented from persevering in the plan which Ulysses had persuaded him to adopt, by the pain which he felt at telling a lie.

Again, the well-known argument of the sophists, 8 tnough fallacious, makes a difficulty : for, wishing to establish a paradoxical conclusion, so that they may be thought clever if they succeed, they construct a syllogism which puzzles the hearer ; for his reason is fettered, as he is unwilling to rest in the conclusion, which is revolting to him, but is unable to advance, since he cannot find a hole in the argument. Thus it

2, 6-12.] INCONTINENCE. 213

9 may be argued * that folly combined with incontinence is virtue: — by reason of his incontinence a man does the opposite of that which he judges to be good ; but he judges that the good is bad and not to l:>e done ; the result is that he will do the good and not the bad.

10 Again, he who pursues and does what is pleasant from conviction, and deliberately chooses these things, would seem [if this doctrine be true] to be better than he who does so, not upon calculation, but bj'' reason of incontinence. For the former is more curable, as his convictions might be changed ; but to the incontinent man we may apply the proverb which says, " K water

11 chokes you, what will you wash it down with ? " For >/ if he were not convinced that what he does is bad, a change in his convictions might stop his doing it ; but, as it is, though he is convinced that a certain thing is good, he nevertheless does something else.

Again, if incontinence and continence may be displayed in anything, who is the man whom we call incontinent simply ? For though no one man unites all the various forms of incontinence, there yet are people to whom we apply the term without any qualification. 1'2 Something of this sort, then, are the objections that sucrcrest themselves : and of these we must remove some and leave others ; t for the resolution of a difficulty is the discovery of the truth.

* This is the sophistical paradox alluded to.

t Of these objections, as well as of the opinions which called them forth, it is to be expected that some shoald prove groundless, and that others should be established and taken up into the

214 NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE. [Bk. VII.

Solution: to 3. We havG, then, to inquire (1) whether the inwan v sense*,- continent man acts with knowledge or not, and what