The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

However, we shall have to make some mention of this disposition further on, J and we have already discussed vice ; so we will now speak of incontinence and softness and luxuriousness, and also of continence and hardiness — for we must regard these as the names of states or types of character that are neither identical with virtue and vice respectively, nor yet generically different.

And here we must follow our usual method, and, after stating the current opinions about these affections, proceed first to raise objections, and then to establish, if possible, the truth of all the current opinions on the subject, or, if not of all, at least of the greater number and the most important. For if the difficulties can be resolved and the popular notions thus confirmed, we shall have attained as much certainty as the subject allows.

It is commonly thought (1) that continence and hardiness are good and laudable, while incontinence and softness are bad and blamable ; and, again (2),

* <r(7os is a dialectical variety for 6uos.

t (1) Some men are born brutal; (2) others are made so; (3) others make themselves so. J Infra, cap. 5.

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p. 210

that a continent man is identical with one who abides by his calculations, and an incontinent man with one who swerves from them ; and (3) that the incontinent man, knowing that an act is bad, is impelled to do it by passion, while the continent man, knowing that his desires are bad, is withheld from following them by reason. Also (4) it is commonly thought that the temperate man is continent and hardy : but while some hold that conversely the latter is always temperate, others think that this is not always so ; and while some people hold that the profligate is incontinent, and that the incontinent man is profligate, and use these terms indiscriminately, others make a distinction between them. Again (5), with ' regard to the prudent man, sometimes people say it is impossible for him to be incontinent; at other times they say that some men who are prudent and clever are incontinent. Lastly (6), people are called incontinent even in respect of anger and honour and gain. statement of 2. Thcsc, then, are the common sayings or current diMcultiesas to how one OpiUlOnS.

riffhi^anddo But in what sense, it may be objected, can a man wrong. judge rightly when he acts incontinently ?

Some people maintain that he cannot act so if he has a scientific knowledge of what is right ; for it would be strange, thought Socrates, if, when real knowledge were in the man, something else should master him and hale him about like a slave. Socrates, indeed, contested the whole position, maintaining that there is no such thing as incontinence : when a man acts contrary to what is best, he never, according

1, 7-2, 5.] IXCONTIXEXCr. 211 to Socrates, has a right judgment of the case, but acts so by reason of ignorance.

Xow, this theory evidently conflicts with the popular belief; and with regard to the passion which sways the incontinent man, if it really is due to ignorance, we must ask what kind of ignorance it is due to. For it is plain that, at any rate, he who acts incontinently does not fancy that the act is good till the passion is upon him.

There are other people who in part agree and in part disagree with Socrates. They allow that nothing is able to prevail against scientific knowledge, but do not allow that men never act contrary to what seems best; and so they say that the incontinent man, when he yields to pleasure, has not scientific knowledge, but only opinion.

But if, in truth, it be only opinion and not scientific knowledge, and if it be not a strong but a weak belief or judgment that opposes the desires (as is the case when a man is in doubt), we pardon a man for not abiding by it in the face of strong desires ; but, in fact, we do not pardon vice nor anything else that we call blamable.