On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
In his anxiety to explain the transcendent excellence of Deity, the superlative exaltation above the contingent and the mutable, Erigena seems in the opinion of his critics to have over-reached the truth and reduced the Deity to an abstraction in which perfection and nothingness are identified.
Erigena’s conclusion raises in reality the all important problem so constantly debated in modern thought, whether the Absolute is the proper conception of Deity, and whether the God of religion and of fact is not rather spirit, self-consciousness, and perfect personality. The teaching of Dionysius in the exposition of Erigena became scarcely distinguishable from Pantheism.
Christlieb finds a similar unsatisfactoriness in Erigena’s theory of the Trinity.
It will be remembered that, after maintaining as his fundamental position that Deity cannot be defined because it cannot be comprehended, and that nothing whatever can be affirmed concerning it beyond the fact of its being, Erigena went on to justify the theologians of the Church in affirming the Unity and the Trinity. But the grounds on which Erigena justified the authorities of the Church are significant. He did not justify the doctrine on the ground that it was a truth revealed, or because it was an inference demanded of the fact and claim of Christ. It is remarkable how obscure a place Christ occupies in Erigena’s conception of Deity. The ground on which Erigena would justify the doctrine is that Unity and Multiplicity may fairly be ascribed to the First Cause of all things, because Deity can be regarded in its simplicity as one and then regarded as extended into multiplicity.
But it is impossible to avoid the criticism that this ascription of Unity and Multiplicity to Deity is not the same thing as the doctrine of the Trinity. Nor is it obvious why Trinity should be substituted for Multiplicity. Moreover, this Multiplicity exists subjectively in the human mind rather than in the being of Deity: since it is expressly forbidden by the author’s fundamental principle to say anything whatever concerning Deity beyond the fact that it exists. And further still, on the author’s principles neither Unity nor Multiplicity can be strictly ascribed to Deity. Both must be merged in something else which is neither the one nor yet the other, and which escapes all possible definition.
In his anxiety to explain the transcendent excellence of Deity, its superlative exaltation above the contingent and the mutable, Erigena seems, in the opinion of his critics, to have overreached the truth and reduced the Deity to an abstraction in which perfection and nothingness are identified.
Erigena’s conclusion in fact raises the all-important problem so constantly debated in modern thought: whether the Absolute is the proper conception of Deity, and whether the God of religion and of fact is not rather spirit, self-consciousness, and perfect personality. In Erigena’s exposition, the teaching of Dionysius became scarcely distinguishable from Pantheism.
Christlieb finds a similar unsatisfactoriness in Erigena’s theory of the Trinity.
It will be remembered that Erigena maintained as his fundamental position that Deity cannot be defined, because it cannot be comprehended, and that nothing whatever can be affirmed about it beyond the fact that it is. He then went on to justify the theologians of the Church in affirming the Unity and the Trinity. But the grounds on which he justified the authorities of the Church are significant. He did not defend the doctrine on the ground that it was a revealed truth, or because it was an inference required by the fact and the claim of Christ. It is remarkable how obscure a place Christ occupies in Erigena’s conception of Deity. The ground on which Erigena would justify the doctrine is that Unity and Multiplicity may fairly be ascribed to the First Cause of all things, because Deity can be regarded in its simplicity as one, and then regarded as extended into multiplicity.
But one cannot avoid the criticism that ascribing Unity and Multiplicity to Deity is not the same thing as the doctrine of the Trinity. Nor is it obvious why Trinity should be substituted for Multiplicity. Moreover, this Multiplicity exists subjectively in the human mind rather than in the being of Deity, since the author’s fundamental principle expressly forbids saying anything whatever about Deity beyond the fact that it exists. Further still, on the author’s own principles neither Unity nor Multiplicity can strictly be ascribed to Deity. Both must be merged in something else which is neither the one nor the other, and which escapes all possible definition.