On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Mysteries. But, indeed, ’tis not the suffering of the punishment that is evil but the being worthy thereof; nor yet is a just exclusion from the sacrifices evil, but to be guilty and unholy and unfit for those pure mysteries is evil.
23. Nor are the devils naturally evil. For, were they such, they would not have sprung from the Good, nor have a place amongst existent creatures, nor have fallen from Goodness (being by their very nature always evil). Moreover, are they evil with respect to themselves or to others? If the former! they must also be self-destructive ; if the latter, how do they destroy, and what do they destroy?? Do they destroy Essence, or Faculty, or Activity?? If Essence, then, first, they cannot destroy it contrary to its own nature; for they cannot destroy things which by their nature are indestructible, but only the things which are capable of destruction. And, secondly, destruction itself is not evil in every case and under all circumstances. Nor can any existent thing be destroyed so far as its being and nature act ; for its destruction is due to a failure of its natural order, whereby the principle of harmony and symmetry grows weak and so cannot remain unchanged.4 But the weakness is not complete; for, were it complete, it would have annihilated both the process of destruction and the object which suffers it: and such a destruction as this must be self-destructive. Hence such a quality is not evil but imperfect good ; for that which is wholly destitute of the Good can have no place among things that have being.t And the same is true of destruction when it works upon a faculty or activity. Moreover, how can the devils be evil since they are sprung from God? For the Good produceth and createth good things. But it may be said that they are called evil not in so far as they exist (for they are from the Good and had a good existence given them), but in so far as they do not exist, having been unable (as the Scripture saith) to keep their original state. For in what, pray, do we consider the wickedness of the devils to consist except their ceasing from the quality and activity of divine virtues? Otherwise, if the devils are naturally evil, they must be always evil. But evil is unstable? Hence if they are always in the same condition, they are not evil; for to remain always the same is a property of the Good. But if they are not always evil, then they are not evil by their natural constitution, but only through a lack of angelic virtues.3 Hence they are not utterly without the Good, seeing that they exist and live and form intuitions and have within them any movement of desire at all; but they are called evil because they fail in the exercise of their natural activity. The evil in them is therefore a warping, a declension from their right condition; a failure, an imperfection, an impotence, and a weakness, loss and lapse of that power which would preserve their perfection in them. Moreover what is the evil in the devils? Brutish wrath, blind desire, headstrong fancy. But these qualities, even though they exist in the devils, are not wholly, invariably, and essentially evil. For in other living creatures, not the possession of these qualities but their loss is destructive of the creature and hence is evil; while their possession preserves the creature and enables the creature possessing them to exist. Hence the devils are not evil in so far as they fulfil their nature, but in so far as they do not. Nor hath the Good bestowed complete upon them been changed; rather have they fallen from the completeness of that gift. And we maintain that the angelic gifts bestowed upon them have never themselves suffered change, but are unblemished in their perfect brightness, even if the devils themselves do not perceive it through blinding their faculties of spiritual perception! Thus, so far as their existence is concerned, they possess it from the Good, and are naturally good, and desire the Beautiful and Good in desiring existence, life, and intuition, which are existent things. And they are called evil through the deprivation and the loss whereby they have lapsed from their proper virtues. And hence they are evil in so far as they do not exist ; and in desiring evil they desire that which is non-existent.
3e. If totally and essentially by very nature evil with respect to themselves. In so far as they continue to exist they are good with respect to themselves.
2 Evil is the contrary of the Good. Hence since the Good is by Its very nature productive, evil must be destructive. Hence the devils, if essentially evil, must be essentially destructive. Now they are not essentially self-destructive, for, were they such, they could not exist. Therefore, if essentially evil, they must under all circumstances be destructive of other things.
3 The essence of (e. g.) an apple-tree is self-identity ; its faculty is its latent power of producing leaves, apples, etc. ; its activity is the actual production of the leaves, apples, etc.
4 (1) The devils do not destroy all things (e. g. they do not annihilate the human soul). Therefore they are not essentially evil. Evil passions are good things misdirected. (2) Often the destruction of a thing is beneficial (e. g. the falling of the faded leaf). In fact, nothing could be
Mysteries. But in fact it is not suffering the punishment that is evil, but deserving it; nor is a just exclusion from the sacrifices evil, but to be guilty, unholy and unfit for those pure mysteries is evil.
23. Nor are the devils evil by nature. For if they were, they would not have sprung from the Good, nor have a place among existent creatures, nor have fallen from Goodness (being by their very nature always evil). Moreover, are they evil with respect to themselves or to others? If the former,1 they must also be self-destructive; if the latter, how do they destroy, and what do they destroy?2 Do they destroy Essence, or Faculty, or Activity?3 If Essence, then, first, they cannot destroy it contrary to its own nature; for they cannot destroy things that are by nature indestructible, but only things capable of destruction. And secondly, destruction itself is not evil in every case and under all circumstances. Nor can any existent thing be destroyed in so far as its being and nature are active; for its destruction is due to a failure of its natural order, by which the principle of harmony and symmetry grows weak and so cannot remain unchanged.4 But the weakness is not complete; for if it were complete, it would have annihilated both the process of destruction and the object that suffers it, and such a destruction as this must be self-destructive. Hence such a quality is not evil but imperfect good; for that which is wholly destitute of the Good can have no place among things that have being.1 And the same is true of destruction when it works upon a faculty or an activity.
Moreover, how can the devils be evil, since they are sprung from God? For the Good produces and creates good things. But it may be said that they are called evil not in so far as they exist (for they come from the Good and were given a good existence), but in so far as they do not exist, having been unable (as the Scripture says) to keep their original state. For in what, after all, do we consider the wickedness of the devils to consist, except in their ceasing from the quality and activity of divine virtues? Otherwise, if the devils are evil by nature, they must always be evil. But evil is unstable.2 Hence if they are always in the same condition, they are not evil; for to remain always the same is a property of the Good. But if they are not always evil, then they are not evil by their natural constitution, but only through a lack of angelic virtues.3 Hence they are not utterly without the Good, since they exist and live and form intuitions and have within them some movement of desire; but they are called evil because they fail in the exercise of their natural activity. The evil in them is therefore a warping, a declension from their right condition: a failure, an imperfection, an impotence, and a weakness, loss and lapse of the power that would preserve their perfection in them.
Moreover, what is the evil in the devils? Brutish wrath, blind desire, headstrong fancy. But these qualities, even though they exist in the devils, are not wholly, invariably and essentially evil. For in other living creatures it is not the possession of these qualities but their loss that destroys the creature and is therefore evil, while their possession preserves the creature and enables it to exist. Hence the devils are not evil in so far as they fulfil their nature, but in so far as they do not.
Nor has the Good bestowed on them in completeness been changed; rather, they have fallen from the completeness of that gift. And we maintain that the angelic gifts bestowed on them have never themselves suffered change, but remain unblemished in their perfect brightness, even if the devils themselves do not perceive it, having blinded their faculties of spiritual perception.1 Thus, so far as their existence is concerned, they possess it from the Good, and are naturally good, and desire the Beautiful and Good in desiring existence, life and intuition, which are existent things. And they are called evil because of the deprivation and loss by which they have lapsed from their proper virtues. And so they are evil in so far as they do not exist; and in desiring evil they desire what is non-existent.
3 i.e. If totally and essentially evil by very nature with respect to themselves. In so far as they continue to exist, they are good with respect to themselves.
2 Evil is the contrary of the Good. So, since the Good is by Its very nature productive, evil must be destructive. Hence the devils, if essentially evil, must be essentially destructive. Now they are not essentially self-destructive, for if they were, they could not exist. Therefore, if essentially evil, they must under all circumstances be destructive of other things.
3 The essence of (e.g.) an apple-tree is its self-identity; its faculty is its latent power of producing leaves, apples, etc.; its activity is the actual production of the leaves, apples, etc.
4 (1) The devils do not destroy all things (e.g. they do not annihilate the human soul). Therefore they are not essentially evil. Evil passions are good things misdirected. (2) Often the destruction of a thing is beneficial (e.g. the falling of the faded leaf). In fact, nothing could be