On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
! Having just given a metaphysical argument for the non-existence of evil, D. now gives an argument drawn from the actual nature of the universe and of God’s creative activity. This argument is not so satisfactory as the metaphysical one, for, under all the harmony of the world, there is perpetual strife, and the Cross of Christ reveals God as suffering pain. ‘‘ Christ is in an agony and will be till the end of the world ” (Pascal). The metaphysical argument is sound because metaphysics deal with ultimate ideals, and evil is ultimately or ideally non-existent. The argument from actual facts is unsound because evil is actually existent. Much wrong thinking on the subject of evil is due to a confusion of ideal with actual non-existence. D. here seems to fall into this mistake. 2 D. here uses the name “God” because he is thinking of the Absolute or the Good, not in Its ultimate Nature, but in Its emanating or creative activity, in which the Personal Differentiations of the Trinity appear. See II. 7.
3 i.e. Evil does not arise through the passage of the Good from Super-Essence into Essence. It is not in the Good through the Good submitting to the conditions of existence (D. has already shown that evil has no place in the ultimate Super-Essential Nature of the Good).
1 Having just given a metaphysical argument for the non-existence of evil, D. now gives an argument drawn from the actual nature of the universe and of God’s creative activity. This argument is not as satisfactory as the metaphysical one, for beneath all the harmony of the world there is perpetual strife, and the Cross of Christ reveals God as suffering pain. “Christ is in agony and will be until the end of the world” (Pascal). The metaphysical argument is sound because metaphysics deals with ultimate ideals, and evil is ultimately or ideally non-existent. The argument from actual facts is unsound because evil actually exists. Much wrong thinking about evil comes from confusing ideal non-existence with actual non-existence. D. seems to fall into this mistake here. 2 D. uses the name “God” here because he is thinking of the Absolute or the Good not in Its ultimate Nature but in Its emanating or creative activity, in which the Personal Differentiations of the Trinity appear. See II. 7.
3 i.e. Evil does not arise through the passage of the Good from Super-Essence into Essence. It is not in the Good through the Good’s submitting to the conditions of existence (D. has already shown that evil has no place in the ultimate Super-Essential Nature of the Good).