On the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology — trans. C. E. Rolt
The translator’s English as printed (C. E. Rolt). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
thereof), yet it depends for its existence on another kind of good and, to that extent, is good itself. For things of the same kind cannot1 be wholly contradictory to one another in the same respects.2 Hence evil is Non-Existent. 21. Neither inhereth evil in existent creatures.3 For if all creatures are from the Good, and the Good is in them all and embraces them all, either evil can have no place amongst the creatures, or else it must have a place in the Good.4 Now it cannot inhere in the Good, any more than cold can inhere in fire ; just so the quality of becoming evil cannot inhere in that which turns even evil into good. And if evil doth inhere in the Good, what will the mode of its inherence be? If you say: It cometh of the Good, I answer: That is absurd and impossible. For (as the infallible Scriptures say), a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor yet is the converse possible. But if it cometh not of the Good, it is plainly from another origin and cause. Either evil must come from the Good, or the Good from evil, or else (if this is impossible) both the Good and evil must be from another origin or cause. For no duality can be an origin : some unity must be the origin of all duality. And yet it is absurd to suppose that two entirely opposite things can owe their birth and their being to the same thing. This would make the origin itself not a simple unity but divided, double, self-contradictory and discordant. Nor again is it possible that the world should have two contradictory origins, existing in each other and in the whole and mutually at strife. For,1 were this assumed, God2 cannot be free from pain, nor without a feeling of ill, since there would be something causing Him trouble, yea, all things must in that case be in a state of disorder and perpetual strife ; whereas the Good imparts a principle of harmony to all things and is called by the Sacred Writers Peace and the Bestower of Peace. And hence it is that all good things display a mutual attraction and harmony, and are the offspring of one Life and are disposed in fellowship towards one Good, and are kindly, of like nature, and benignant to one another. And so evil is not in God,3 and is not divine. Nor cometh it of God. For either He is not good, or else He worketh goodness and bringeth good things unto existence. Nor acts He thus only at some times and not at others, or only in the case of some things but not of all. For were He to act thus, He must suffer a change and alteration, and that in respect of the divinest quality of all—causality. And if the Good is in God as His very substance, God must, in changing from the Good, sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. Doubtless if you feign that He hath the Good by mere participation therein, and derives It from another, in that case He will, forsooth, sometimes possess It and sometimes not possess It.1 Evil, therefore, doth not come from God, nor is it in God either absolutely or temporally.”
1 Exuberant vitality is per se a good thing and the more exuberant the better, though, like all good things, it is dangerous, and unless properly directed is disastrous.
2 If good and evil are both existent, they are, to that extent, both of the same kind ; which is impossible.
3 So far D. has been showing that evil is not an w//imate principle, being neither (1) identical with the Good, nor (2) self-subsistent. Now he argues that it is not a necessary element in any created thing: neither in their existence as such, nor in any particular kind of creature.
4 D. rambles characteristically, but the general argument is plain. All existence is from the Good. Hence, if evil is inherent in the nature of existence, evil is from the Good. Thus D. meets again and proceeds to lay the ghost of a theory which he has already elaborately slain in the previous section.
thereof), yet it depends for its existence on another kind of good and, to that extent, is itself good. For things of the same kind cannot1 be wholly contradictory to one another in the same respects.2 Hence evil is Non-Existent.
21. Nor does evil inhere in existent creatures.3 For if all creatures come from the Good, and the Good is in them all and embraces them all, then either evil can have no place among the creatures, or else it must have a place in the Good.4 Now it cannot inhere in the Good, any more than cold can inhere in fire; just so the quality of becoming evil cannot inhere in that which turns even evil into good. And if evil does inhere in the Good, what will be the mode of its inherence? If you say: It comes from the Good, I answer: That is absurd and impossible. For (as the infallible Scriptures say) a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor is the converse possible. But if it does not come from the Good, it plainly comes from another origin and cause.
Either evil must come from the Good, or the Good from evil, or else (if this is impossible) both the Good and evil must come from another origin or cause. For no duality can be an origin: some unity must be the origin of all duality. And yet it is absurd to suppose that two entirely opposite things can owe their birth and their being to the same thing. This would make the origin itself not a simple unity but divided, double, self-contradictory and discordant. Nor again is it possible that the world should have two contradictory origins, existing in each other and in the whole and mutually at strife. For,1 were this assumed, God2 could not be free from pain, nor without a feeling of ill, since there would be something causing Him trouble; indeed, all things would in that case be in a state of disorder and perpetual strife. Yet the Good imparts a principle of harmony to all things and is called by the Sacred Writers Peace and the Bestower of Peace. And so it is that all good things show a mutual attraction and harmony, are the offspring of one Life, are disposed in fellowship toward one Good, and are kindly, alike in nature, and benign toward one another.
And so evil is not in God,3 and is not divine. Nor does it come from God. For either He is not good, or else He works goodness and brings good things into existence. Nor does He act in this way only at some times and not at others, or only in the case of some things and not of all. For if He acted thus, He would have to undergo change and alteration, and that in respect of the most divine quality of all—causality. And if the Good is in God as His very substance, then God, in changing from the Good, must sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. No doubt, if you imagine that He has the Good by mere participation in It, deriving It from another, then He will indeed sometimes possess It and sometimes not possess It.1 Evil, therefore, does not come from God, nor is it in God, either absolutely or temporally.”
1 Exuberant vitality is per se a good thing, and the more exuberant the better; though, like all good things, it is dangerous, and unless properly directed it is disastrous.
2 If good and evil both exist, then to that extent they are both of the same kind; which is impossible.
3 So far D. has been showing that evil is not an ultimate principle, being neither (1) identical with the Good nor (2) self-subsistent. Now he argues that it is not a necessary element in any created thing: neither in their existence as such, nor in any particular kind of creature.
4 D. rambles in his characteristic way, but the general argument is plain. All existence is from the Good. So if evil is inherent in the nature of existence, evil is from the Good. Here D. meets again, and proceeds to lay, the ghost of a theory he has already elaborately slain in the previous section.