78. So that I here‘ notice some of their much inconsistency and disconnection, for informing the judgment of new learners, (79) for the reason that when the writings of the learned ancients have specially minutely and reverently® discoursed of
* That is, they are called 4shmég (Av. ashemaogha, ‘perplexing righteousness’).
? The Greeks of the eastern empire of the Romans.
§ Paz. andst may be either ‘irreverent, or else stand for Pahl. arast, ‘untruthful.’ Sans. has ‘atheistical.’
‘ In the next chapter.
* Or, perhaps, ‘modestly’ (see Chap. VIII, 137 n).
CHAPTER X, 72-XI, 8. 173
what 7s most astute in evil, to impel one to good knowledge, (80) you should observe with kind regards what ts ordered.
CHAPTER XI.
1. Henceforth I write! of the inconsistency of their twaddle, and of just observations (2) you should estimate with wise regard.
3. First, as zo the full consideration of that one original evolution (4) which they state thus: ‘The sacred being is one, doing good works, wise, powerful, compassionate, azd merciful, (5) so that good works and crime, truth and falsehood, life avd death, good and evil are* owing to him’
6. Now do ye ask of them (7) thus: ‘Is the sacred being always compassionate avd showing mercy, doing good works azd judicious, and does he know all shat is, was, and will be; and is he advancing the desire of one’s wishes in everything, even zz this where judiciousness is interference, or when such is not so ?
8. Because, if 4e de compassionate, doing good works, and showing mercy, why then are Aharman and the demons and all these evil faiths* of hell admitted ®
1 Paz. ‘I have written.’
® Sans. and JE insert ‘all.’
5 Most of this statement can be found in the Qur’&n in isolated texts, such as ‘God there is no god but he . . . He knows the unseen and the visible; the mighty, the wise . . . verily God is forgiving, compassionate . . . It is God who created you... and then will make you die.’ (Qur'an LXIV, 13, 18,14, XXX, 39; SBE. vol. ix.)
* Assuming that Paz. virésaa (Sans. 4mndya) is a misreading of Pahl. viréy4k.
5 Tracing Paz, awagad (Sans. avakirat) to Av. aiwi+ gata,
p. 174
by him to his own creatures, through his own compassion, doing of good works, axd showing of mercy ? 9. If not known by him, where are that knowledge and omniscience of his? 10. If he did not wish to keep misery and evil away from the creatures, and to produce only happiness for every one, where are that judiciousness and interference of his? 11. If it were not possible that it should not be produced by him, for what is that omnipotence of his (12) which we! every one, as z¢ were, observe and well consider ?’
11. If it were not possible that it should not be produced by him, for what is that omnipotence of his (12) which we! every one, as z¢ were, observe and well consider ?’
13. Whenever they say ¢hat every good and evil has arisen from the sacred being—except when they separate from him these four attributes (hfinar), requisite for divinity, which are omniscience, omnipotence, goodness, azd mercifulness—(14) there is then no possibility of it. 15. When, indeed, they separate from him oz/y one of these four attributes, even then he is not complete in divinity. 16. For if a sacred being be he who zs omniscient, omnipotent, good, and merciful, then he who is not omniscient, or not omnipotent, ov not good, ov not merciful is not a sacred being.
17. Again, odserve this, that when 4e zs a ruler, advancing desires in every person and thing, why are that country and empire of his own not so kept, without help, from every enemy and adversity apart from his own work, so that ¢heve would not be anything whatever of distress, oppression, injustice, and complaint for any one in his empire? 18. Since the
1 So in Sanskrit; but, as the two Paz. verbs end in -uz, the original Pahlavi termination may have been -yén (3d pers. optative), and we might read ‘ which every one may, as z/ were, observe.’
CHAPTER XI, 9-28. 175
rule and empire of a man, who zs ruler and emperor, are then commendable when 2¢ is possible for him so to protect amd keep his own country azd empire, through his own wisdom, that they may not assist his enemy to detract from his work, and to produce sin and harm. 19. Or, when his enemy covets some of his work, he is enabled to keep him away from his own thoughtful friends, avd to make every one free from distress.
20. Again, odserve this, that when 4e zs triumphant, victorious, and prevailing, (21) over whom are that triumph, victory, and prevailing of his? 22. Since triumph and victory are over enemies, a competitor exists. 23. It is not expedient! to become himself a competitor azd enemy to his own; (24) while when there is no enemy azd competitor of his, over whom does he become triumphant and victorious? 25. That sort of triumph and victory is not spoken about, (26) because even cattle and sheep, when they have no opponent and injurer, are victorious and triumphant over themselves.
27. Again, observe this, is a wise dezmg contented with his own divinity and grandeur, or not? 28. If the wise decmg be contented, then he-as become contented to produce an enemy and criminal, azd to admit all ¢a¢ zs devastating into a country, through his own knowledge and will, for the benefit of the
28. If the wise decmg be contented, then he-as become contented to produce an enemy and criminal, azd to admit all ¢a¢ zs devastating into a country, through his own knowledge and will, for the benefit of the
1 K28 inserts shAyad, ‘and possible,’ and JE inserts Paz. tva, which has the same meaning; but these insertions have probably originated in a blunder of the writer of AK, who first wrote Sans. saknoti, the usual equivalent of Paz. shayad, but afterwards interlined Sans. samyugyate to correspond with sazed, ‘it is expedient, the word he had written in the Paz. text. ;
p. 176
country and creatures. 29. But why’? is it expedient to seek a disposition of crime azd evil, to become himself an enemy azd curser as regards them, and to provide a hellish ex7stence, becoming the misery of mankind ?
30. Again, odserve this, as to whatever he says, does he speak truly avd credibly, or not? 31. If he speaks that truly azd credibly which he states thus: ‘I ama friend of good works and an enemy of crime,’
(32) and always produces more crime and criminals than good works and doers of good works, (33) where is that truthful speaking of his ? .
34. Again, observe this, is his desire goodness, or vileness ? 35. If his desire de vileness, whence is that divinity of his? 36. If his desire de goodness, then why are the vile and vileness more than the good and goodness ?
37. Again, observe this, is he merciful, or not? 38. If he de not merciful, whence is that divinity of his ?
39. If he de merciful, then why does he speak thus: ‘The hearts, ears, azd eyes of mankind are bent about by me, so that it is not possible for them to think, speak, 07 do anything but that which is wanted by me?; (40) be it what 4as made them great and noble, through Jeng without want; (41) or be it what as admitted them to eternal hell, slain and exterminated by death of many kinds. 42. So that while those whom I force back become good and more active in good works, (43) yet still those who
1 Assuming that Paz. 4i, ‘what?’ stands for im. Sans. has ‘how?’ (Paz. £uz.)
2 ¢Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day’ (Deut. xxix. 4).
CHAPTER XI, 29-52. 177
are forced back do only a little’, (44) ad are much more criminal azd more sinful than those who are forward.’
Sans. has ‘how?’ (Paz. £uz.)
2 ¢Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day’ (Deut. xxix. 4).
CHAPTER XI, 29-52. 177
are forced back do only a little’, (44) ad are much more criminal azd more sinful than those who are forward.’
45. Again, observe this, that if, whatever he does, he does wisely and for a purpose, (46) then, when no opponent and adversary of his existed, why aid the first achievement which was prepared by him become servants to demoniacal disobedience, who are perverted thereby, among mankind, to wickedness and a hellish exestence?? 47. If tt were not known by him that they would become perverted, it was expedient (sazitd) for him to order the making of a trial of them, (48) because now many thousands and myriads who ave prepared by him, so that they may serve him and exhilarate (mastend) his rule, have become in every mode disobedient amd unhappily advised. 49. For with that scanty knowledge that mankind Zossess, which is not so prepared and organized as is the wish of mankind, (50) if even anything arises, that they construct avd prepare, which does not so come on azd become? as is their wish, they do not stop again, a second “me, for the preparation of that thing, dv¢ they refrain from it.
51. As to him, that omnipotent axzd omniscient ruler, of the abundant ad innumerable things e has hitherto made and prepared not even one comes on and becomes such as is his wish, yet still he never refrains from the preparation avd production of many new ¢hings. 52. Just as when he was the creator of
1 Assuming that Paz. khvazar stands for khfigdrak; but, as Sans. has ‘injury,’ the Pazand may be a misreading of 4z4r.
? Referring probably to the fall of man, detailed in §§ 61-77.
5 So in Sans. and JE, as in § 51; but AK and MHrg have ‘go’ here. .
[24] . Np. 178 that one of his first angels whom, on account of affection, he prepared out of fire, axd for several thousand years, (53) as they say, ¢hey always performed his worship ; (54) at last ¢ia¢ one was undone by one command that was given by him (the creator) thus: ‘Offer homage to this first of mankind, who is prepared by me out of clay. 55. And deliverance, as to what is not expedient to offer, was expressly mentioned by him. 56. Then ¢hat ome acted scornfully azd contemptibly as to his clay and curse and wrath ; (57) and, decmg perverted to devilry and fiendishness, Ze was forced out of heaven, (58) and was given a life of millenniums azd an eternal dominion, (59) so that he sazd,‘I well go and make my servants and worshippers astray azd deluded?’ 60. And he was made an injurer and adversary at his own will.
61. A?é last also that man, to whom he, the supreme angel, was ordered to offer homage with many worshippers, for the sake of affection and respect, (62) is appointed to the garden of paradise (vahist), (63)
And he was made an injurer and adversary at his own will.
61. A?é last also that man, to whom he, the supreme angel, was ordered to offer homage with many worshippers, for the sake of affection and respect, (62) is appointed to the garden of paradise (vahist), (63)
1 “And we did create man from crackling clay of black mud wrought in form. And the ginns had we created before of smokeless fire. And when thy lord said to the angels, “Verily I am creating a mortal from crackling clay of black mud wrought into shape; and when I have fashioned it, and breathed into it of my spirit, then fall ye down before it adoring.” And the angels adored all of them together, save Iblis, who refused to be among those who adored. ... He said, “Then get thee forth.” ... Said he, “O my lord ! respite me until the day when they shall be raised.” He said, “Then, verily, thou art of the respited.” ... He said, “O my lord! for that thou hast seduced me I will surely make it seem seemly for them on earth, and I will surely seduce them all together, save such of thy servants amongst them as are sincere.”’ (Qur'an XV, 26-40; SBE, vol. vi.)
CHAPTER XI, 53-77. 179
so that he may cultivate z¢ and eat all the fruit, (64) except of that one tree of which 2z¢ is ordered thus: ‘Ye shall not eat of 2#4’ 65. And with them (mankind) the deceiver, who is the deluder prepared by him (the creator), (66) is let into the garden. 67. There are some who say he ts a serpent?, and there are some who say hezs Aharman*. 68. And an inclination for eating and greediness is given by that same ove himself to mankind. 69. Then, being deceived dy that deluder sayzng: ‘ Eat of that tree’— (70) there are some who say he spoke to Adam—(71) they ate through that inclination for eating +.
72. After eating they became so imbued with knowledge that good and evil weve understood and known by them’. 73. Deprived of that so-great respect and affection, through that one injunction which was forgotten by them—(74) and that forgetfulness dezng likewise owing to that cause—(75) they are forced out of the garden of paradise*—ze with his wife—by grievous wrath and disrespect, (76) and are delivered into the hand of that enemy who is a deceiver and deluder ; (77) so that he as propagated
1 «And the Lord God took the man, and put him into the garden of Eden, to dress it and to keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, “Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it”’ (Gen. ii. 15-17).
? “Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made’ (Gen. iii. 1).
5 «That old serpent, called the Devil and Satan’ (Rev. xii. 9, XX. 2).
* Compare Gen. iii. 1-6.
5 «And the eyes of them both were opened ’ (Gen. iii. 7)s
* «Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man’ (Gen. iii. 23, 24).
N 2
xii. 9,
XX. 2).
* Compare Gen. iii. 1-6.
5 «And the eyes of them both were opened ’ (Gen. iii. 7)s
* «Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from whence he was taken. So he drove out the man’ (Gen. iii. 23, 24).
N 2
p. 180
his own will among them, avd has fashioned z¢ upon them.
78. Now which was unjust, the unreasonable command, the after-wisdom, or the scanty knowledge that was more faulty and more mischievous than these? 79. Also this, that is, why was that garden not made by him fortified and strong, so that that deluder could not have gone into z¢ ?
80. Even now he (the deceiver) has made and makes multitudes of his (the creator's) servants azd worshippers deluded; (81) and, for the same reason, multitudes of apostles and prophets (vakhshvardan) are appointed by him (the creator) for the worldly existence at various times, (82) so that, as he says: ‘They may save my servants from the hand of that deluder, (83) azd bring ¢hem into the true path and way'.’ 84. And even those worshippers of his, 7 every way through their own will, have slain and subdued (khvaft), by a wretched.death, his own apostles’, whose diligence had brought mankind into the proper path and doctrine.
85. That original deluder and misleader is allowed an eternal life. 86. Azd, even till now, his will is more triumphant azd absolute than that of the sacred being, through deluding and misleading, (87) because those deluded and astray are much more numerous than those zz the true path azd undeluded.: ~
88. Again, observe this, does he do whatever he
‘For the Lord will not forsake his people for his great name’s sake; because it hath pleased the Lord to make you his people... but I (Samuel) will teach you the good and the right way’ (1 Sam. xii. 22, 23).
_ * ‘I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute’ (Luke xi. 49).
CHAPTER XI, 78-102. 18t
does for a purpose, or not? 89. If he does z¢ without a purpose, #e is working foolishly ; (90) and it is not proper to praise him who is working foolishly as a sagacious divinity. 91. If he does z¢ for a purpose, (92) then, when no opponent and adversary of his existed, why is the production of all these creatures which are even like demons, disobedient men wz¢h the opposing will of that contentious deluder, and innumerable unprofitable creatures ?
93. Again, observe this, that, if he knows all ¢hat is, was, and will be, it was not expedient for him to produce, through his own knowledge and will, anything of that of which he may de sorry, and which remains opposing his will and command, (94) and becomes an adversary of his apostles amd the doers of Azs will.
95. If they say that this adversary was produced good and virtuous from the beginning, avd afterwards became an evil and a misleading of the creatures, (96) that zmpies, you should say, that, when he is all-powerful, the purpose azd will of the adversary, in changing into an evil and a misleading of the creatures, are more successful and more powerful than those of the sacred being;
(97) because the evil in ay period is stronger than the good. .
98. Again, observe this, that when a criminal arses wholly through his will!, (99) and the minds of criminals are defiled by him himself, (100) and the seed of crime is sown by him himself, (101) when ? z¢ has grown who has maintained z¢s origin? 102.
1 The will of the adversary is probably meant (see § 95). ? So in Sans. and JE, but AK has ‘so that.’
p. 182
And by what power of adjudication is one executed and one rewarded! ?
‘T03. Again, odserve this, was this world made and created by him (the creator) for a purpose, for his own pleasure avd for the sake of the comfort and happiness of mankind, or without a purpose, for his own discomfort and the hurry, trouble, pain, axd death of mankind? 104. For if made by him without a purpose, e was acting foolishly; (105) a thing without a purpose decmg not acceptable by the wise. 106. If made by him for a purpose, and created by him for his own pleasure and the comfort and happiness of mankind, (107) why was it not made by him prosperous avd full of happiness ?
108. If his pleasure and happiness avzse from the preparation of mankind and the creatures, what is the advantage from their slaughter and devastation?
109. If thoughts of crime are not given by him himself to mankind, who is he who gives thoughts. of crime different from his command and will? ro. If ¢hey are given by him himself, and he now considers them a fault, what is that justice and arbitration of his owing to? 111. For when mankind, with little knowledge and little wisdom, even then, so far as they are able, do not let the lion and wolf and other noxious creatures in among their own young ones and pregnant females, (112) so long as they caz destroy them, (113) why as the merciful sacred being now let? Aharman and the demons in upon his own creatures, (114) so that they have
* That is, why is the sinner punished while the adversary, who occasions the sin, remains unmolested and triumphant? AK has ‘let’ written above ‘admitted.’
CHAPTER XI, 103-125. 183
made them vile !, defiled, wicked, avd hellish? 115. If done for the sake of experiment, just as that which they assert, that evil was created by him for the sake of an experiment as regards the creatures, (116) why was it not understood by him before those men and creatures exested? 117. Because he whose custom? is experiment is not to be called omniscient.
117. Because he whose custom? is experiment is not to be called omniscient.
118. The conclusion is this, that the sacred being, if there existed no opponent and adversary of his, was able to create all those creatures and creations of his free from misfortune ; why did 4e not so create them? 119. Or was it not possible for him to wish zt? 120. If it were not possible for him to wish zt, he is not completely capable. 121. If it were possible for him not to wish 2¢, fe is not merciful.
122. If zt were known by him that he might say: ‘Something ov some one wz// arise, from these creatures azd creations which I create, that w2// not de according to my will, (123) and ultimately he made ‘hem, (124) then to attach now all this wrath and cursing avd casting away for punishment in hell, discontentedly to his own performance, is unreasonable.
125. Again, odserve this, that if all the crimemeditating avd crime-committing sin which mankind think axzd speak and do, as well as: pain, sickness, poverty, axd the punishment azd misery of hell, cannot arise, except by the will and command of the
1 P4z. khér, which Nér. seems to have identified with Pers. kar, as his Sans. gives ‘deaf.’ It may, however, mean ‘blind’ (Pers. kr), as in Chap. XII, 64, 70.
* The Sanskrit takes P4z. dastfr in its more usual sense of ‘high-priest.’
p. 184
sacred being—(126) the will axa power of the sacred being deing eternal !, (127) because his self-existence is also eternal—(128) the hopelessness of eternally saving any one whatever from misery and punishment is now certain. 129. For z¢ is repeatedly declared that there is no learned teacher whatever who keeps one away from these mischievous evil desires, (130) if the worshipper de even of the same kind as those worshippers and high-priests who have issued to mankind this admonition: ‘Commit no crime and sin. 131. Because they wish to set aside the will azd command of the sacred being*®. 132. Observe this, too, that, as both are his will, alike crime and alike good works, z¢ is not manifest whether he approves the good works of doers of good works more, or the crimes of criminals.
133. Likewise odserve this, those physicians who, on account of the hope of the soul, prepare the medicine of the sick, (134) and remove azd dismiss their pain and disease, (135) so that merit is possessed by them (the physicians) owing to that practice; (136) yet they* are prepared for the punishment of hell. 137. And those who, on account of affection for the soul, give something ¢o poor, begging, suffering people, (138) and thereby scatter * and dismiss their want and poverty, (139) so that merit is possessed by them (the charitable)
1 Sans. has ‘the will of the sacred being deimg powerful and eternal.’ ‘2 Without whose will and command the sin and evil cannot arise, as assumed in § 125. 5 The sick are probably meant, but the original text is ambiguous. * Assuming that Paz. hug@rezd stands for Pahl. afikalend.
has ‘the will of the sacred being deimg powerful and eternal.’ ‘2 Without whose will and command the sin and evil cannot arise, as assumed in § 125. 5 The sick are probably meant, but the original text is ambiguous. * Assuming that Paz. hug@rezd stands for Pahl. afikalend.
CHAPTER XI, 126-149. 185
owing to that practice ; (140) yet it becomes grievous sin for them}, through anxiety. 141. If they say that those physicians and the remedies which they offer, avd also those who give something Zo the poor and suffering, all exist by the will of the sacred being, (142) it is easier, more reasonable, avd more adapted to divinity, when the sacred being is without an adversary and without an opponent, for him not to create that disease and poverty (143) than chat, as to those that 4e himself is to make sick and poor, he should have commanded mankind thus: ‘Ye shall make them healthy and free from want. 144. If they say that his desire is this, that he may occasion the happiness of those physicians and givers by the recompense for it, (145) and make them proceed ? to the eternal happiness of heaven (vahist) ; (146) you should observe, as éo that, since he acts injudiciously and incapably when, on account of the existence of a complete desire for happiness and prosperity * among others, 4e is an attainer of misery for multitudes of the innocent who are distressed, poor, necessitous, and sick, (147) this may also ée sazd, that if z¢ de not possible for him to occasion happiness and prosperity * as regards one, except by the distress, pain, and vexation of some other, (148) that shows that his absolute power and freedom from opposition are not adapted for effectual operation. 149. If they say
1 Probably the poor, but the original text is ambiguous.
® Assuming that Paz. gamined stands for Pahl. gaminéd. The old MS. AK ends with this section, and the remaining half of the extant text has been found only in modern copies, having been formerly separated from AK and lost
® So in JE, but JJ has ‘nobility,’ and MH1g has ‘pleasure.’
4 JJ has ‘nobility.’
186 SIKAND-GOMANfK VIGAR, that he makes those sick avd poor proceed to the eternal happiness of heaven in the spiritual exzstence, as a recompense for it, (150) that zweples, if 2¢ de not possible, ov not completely possible, for him to give the recompense in the spiritual evestence, except through the misery of the worldly ome, (151) also this, that—his production of distress in the worldly existence arising unquestionably azd unreasonably, through z¢s previous occurrence, (152) avd the recompense of the spiritual existence arising doubtfully and incredibly after the production of the distress—(15 3) just as the previous distress is unreasonable, the after recompense occurs alike unreasonably and foolishly. 154. This also may de sazd, that no after nobility is obtained for previous distress without a cause.
154. This also may de sazd, that no after nobility is obtained for previous distress without a cause.
155. Again, odserve this, that the existence of one of these three doctrines is inevitable :—({156) Every single thing that is, or was, or well be in this world is all by his will, or z¢ is not, (157) or there are some that are by his will avd there are some that are not.
158. Because nothing whatever is found which is not good, or evil, or a mixture! of both.
159. If they say that all ¢hzngs are dy his will, the good and evil are both his desire. 160. If good and evil are both his desire, 4e is not of. perfect will;
(161) z¢ is not perfect even as to a single ¢hing. 162. And he who is of imperfect will must be himself imperfect, (163) as is shown above*. .
164. If nothing de éy his will, (165) on account of nothing being éy the will there is no will. 166. He éw whom there is no will is working constitutionally’,
1 Assuming that Paz. hamekhtaa stands for Pahl. Amfkhtak. ? Compare Chap. VIII, 108-116. 8 That is, ‘instinctively.’
CHAPTER XI, 150-188. 187
(167) and he who is working constitutionally is constituted and made.
168. If there be some things which are éy his will, and there be some which are not dy his will, (169) and nothing is found in the world which is not good and not evil, (170) from that z¢ is known ¢hat, if the sacred being 4¢ of good will, Ze is not desirous of that evil of it, (171) and that which is evil is not by his will, 172. If his will de evil Ze is inevitably not desirous of that good of it, (173) azd that which is good is not by his will. 174. If that which is good be by the will of the sacred being, z¢ is known that that which is evil arose from another will. 175. If that which is evil de dy his will, that which is good arose inevitably from another will. 176. Ad the inevitability ofa rival of the will of the sacred being is manifest.
177. If one says the evil springs from mankind,
(178) that zmpies the inevitability—since mankind is not perpetually a self-existence—shat evil either arose before mankind, or after, (179) or it arose with mankind. 180. If they say it arose before mankind,
(181) that zm#plies—since, apart from the sacred being, ¢ere was no other creator and producer—
(182) ¢hat either the sacred being produced that evil, or it produced its own existence itself, or it was itself eternal. 183. If they say it arose after mankind, (184) as éo that, when human nature is likewise a production of the sacred being, (185) and the sacred being did not produce evil in the nature of mankind, (186) how has it sprung into action from them? 187. If the evil was set in action by them, apart from the will of the sacred being, (188) and a knowledge, as to ¢heir setting about it, existed 2x
p. 188
187. If the evil was set in action by them, apart from the will of the sacred being, (188) and a knowledge, as to ¢heir setting about it, existed 2xp. 188 the sacred being, (189) that zmpies that the sacred being is imperfect in his own will, (190) and mankind are victorious and triumphant in setting aside the will azd command of the sacred being, and doing the evil competing wz¢h the will of the sacred being. 191. Also the power of the sacred being in his own will and his own servants is manifestly unprevailing. 192. If they say that he makes them proceed afterwards to the awful punishment of hell, (193) as to that!, if the sacred being de a powerful doer, and not to allow the committal of crime, du¢ to convey z¢ away from their minds, d¢ more advantageous and more adapted to the compassion of a sacred being than zf he allowed the committal, (194) yet he has become helplessly contented with it, (195) amd, afterwards, contentedly punishes his own creatures, (196) then, as to the one matter I am well considering, either incapability, or scanty knowledge, or scanty goodness is thereby manifested.
197. If they say that the sacred being produced and created evil for the reason that so mankind may fully understand the value of goodness, (198) as ¢o that you should observe that, if evil de requisite and advantageous for understanding goodness, that evil exists éy his good will. 199. And if evil exists dy his good will, and is requisite and advantageous for him of whom they say that evil is not his wish, z¢ is inconsistent.
200. As ¢o that also which they say, that death, pain, azd poverty are produced by him for the reason that so mankind may much better understand the value of life, health, and opulence, (201) awd become more grateful unto the sacred being, (202) as ¢o that
? So in MH1o9 and Sans., but JE omits ‘ that.’
CHAPTER XI, 189-215.
you should observe that z¢ is as z¢ were acting unreasonably, in the mode of him who gives poison to mankind for the sake of increasing the value and price of an antidote, (203) so that he may sell the antidote dearer and more costly. 204. To what is this intermeddling action owing, that, for the sake of an understanding of the value of the goodness of other ¢hzmgs, he allows pain, death, azd misery in some one else ?
204. To what is this intermeddling action owing, that, for the sake of an understanding of the value of the goodness of other ¢hzmgs, he allows pain, death, azd misery in some one else ?
205. Again, as ¢4o that which a multitude of them say, that the sacred being is a ruler over every creature and creation, (206) because his creations are all his own. 207. And he acts about them as is desirable for him, because it is desirable for him, and he is not a causer of distress. 208. Since distress is that which they inflict upon anything that is not their own, (209) then he who, all things being his own, acts about them as is desirable for him, is not a causer of distress'. 210. As éo that you should know that, if, on account of sovereignty, he who occasions distress is not to be called a causer of distress, (211) that is as though even he who is a sovereign and tells a lie is speaking truthfully, (212) and he who, on account of sovereignty, commits crime, sin, theft, azd plunder is not to be called a sinner. 213. Such as that which the glorified Réshan2, son of Attr-frébag, related as a parable (Angunt-aitak), (214) that they saw a man who was defiling an ass, (215) when they enquired of him
* Compare Rom. ix. 20, 21: ‘Shall the thing formed say to him that formed 7#, “ Why hast thou made me thus?” Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour ?’
® See Chap. X, 53.
190 SIKAND-GOMANfK VIGAR.
thus: ‘Why dost thou commit this execrable action ?’ 216. And he spoke thus, in excuse: ‘The ass is my own.’
217. Again, you should ask this of them, (218) that is: ‘Is the sacred being a friend, or an enemy, to these creatures and creations which are made by him?’ 219. If Ze de a friend of the creatures, that emplies that it is not proper for him to desire and to produce the evil azd misery of the creatures; (220) yet, as regards the devastation and misery of his own achievements, fe has never even become tired of them. 221. If 4e de an enemy of the creatures, that implies that it is not proper for him to create and produce, through his own competent knowledge, that thing which is his enemy and disablement!, and struggles against his will.
222, This, too, you should ask, (223) that is: ‘Is the sacred being always a well-understanding, good sovereign, occasioning prosperity*, (224) or an evilunderstanding, bad sovereign, occasioning distress ? 225. Or is there a time when Ze zs a well-under- Standing, good sovereign, occasioning prosperity, (226) and is there a time when 4e zs an evil-understanding, bad sovereign, occasioning distress ?’
227. If ke be always a well-understanding, good sovereign, occasioning prosperity, (228) that zmplies that there are not, in his country and sovereignty, any oppression, distress, and complaint; (229) and his affection for the creatures and the affection of
. the creatures for him are pure. 230. Owing to the
the creatures for him are pure. 230. Owing to the
1 Assuming that Paz. apadvah stands for Pahl. apatfgih; the two words being nearly alike in Pahlavi letters.
* Reading 4v4dth-kar instead of Paz. 4z4dfgar, ‘ producing freedom, or nobility,’ which two words are alike in Pahlavi writing.
CHAPTER XI, 216-245. 191
same reason #e zs merciful as regards his own creatures, (231) and his creatures are recounting zs praise, utterers of thanksgivings avd pure friends towards him. 232. His title of divinity, moreover, is worthily his own.
233. If he de an evil-understanding, bad sovereign, occasioning distress, (234) that zmplzes that he ts himself a pure? enemy to the creatures, and his creatures are also ofa like nature towards him. 235. Owing to the same reason fe zs an injurer, destroyer, and deluder of the creatures, (236) and his creatures are complainers of him, strugglers concerning him, and pure enemies. 237. His title of divinity, moreover, is the equivalent of an unworthy name; (238) and, even on account of his eternity, the creatures are hopeless of becoming free from the risk of distress and misery for an unlimited time.
239. If there be a time when 4e zs a good sovereign, well-understanding, ad occasioning prosperity, and there be a time when Ze is turned away from this; (240) that zmples that his affection for the creatures is mingled. 241. From a mingled affection artses mingled action, (242) azd from mingled action a mingled individuality is also manifested. 243. And his creatures also are mingled friends to him.
244. Of one’s associates there is none who, if a friend, is not one’s enemy, no praiser who is not complaining of one, no glorifier even who is not scorning one ; a character of this description is manifest among all creatures.
245. Again, observe this, that since all things which are in the world are not outside of these two terms,
1 The word avézak, ‘pure,’ is here used idiomatically for ‘mere,’ precisely as ‘ pure’ is often used in English.
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good and evil, (246) that zmplzes, if good and evil are both said ¢o arvzse from the sacred being and through the will of the sacred being, (247) ¢a¢ the troublesome Aharman is unreasonably defamed ; that, being innocent and without an original evolution, he never was, nor wz// be, evil and headstrong'. 248. That which is mentioned in scripture (niptk)*, that Aharman became headstrong, and was put out of heaven by them, is unreasonable, (249) because even that headstrongness and disobedience were likewise through the will of the sacred being.
248. That which is mentioned in scripture (niptk)*, that Aharman became headstrong, and was put out of heaven by them, is unreasonable, (249) because even that headstrongness and disobedience were likewise through the will of the sacred being.
250. If even it be said that the good arises from the sacred being and through the will of the sacred being, avd the evil from mankind, still Aharman is without an original evolution azd innocent, and curses and scorn for him are unreasonable. 251. If all this misery and evil de sent down, not from a different nature, but from the individuality and individual nature of the sacred being himself, (252) that zaples that the sacred being is an enemy and adversary to his own tendencies (rfin).
253. Odserve this, too, that to speak of the existence of criminality apart from a nature of crime is very deluding ; (254) and as zt is deluding to imagine a nature of crime that is good, zs z¢ more deluding to imagine Aharman—who is the origin amd original evolution of every crime—aparé from the creation and achievement of the sacred being ?
255. The conclusion is this, that if a¢ first there be anything which is not within the will of the sacred being, provided everything be through the will of the sacred being, no one whatever is a sinner; (256)
} Literally ‘with averted head.’ * Probably referring to the Qur’an XV, 26-40 (see § 59 n).
CHAPTER XI, 246-267. 193
and the apostle! and religion were appointed without a purpose. 257. If it be expedient to ruin any one for sinfulness, it is more expedient to ruin him who is the original doer, maintainer, and creator of every eviland crime. 258. And if it be said ¢hat evil and crime arise from Aharman or mankind, that zmplies, as they are likewise created and produced dy the sacred being, ¢hat he is the source of them; in like manner, he who is the cause of the origin of evil (259) is worse than evil.
260. This, too, you should observe, that sects (késh4n) of every kind assert this maxim, handed down by their own high-priests, when z¢ is mentioned and prescribed by them to their own congregation (ram), that is: ‘Perform good works and abstain from crime.’ 261. On account of delusion they do not consider this, that is, from where and what origin ought the crime to arise, about which z¢ is thus commanded: ‘Ye shall not commit z¢, and I will cast him who commits 7¢ into eternal hell.’ 262. So that, if shat same de owing to the sacred being, it would be easier for him not to produce it, than, after z¢s production, ¢o have brought z¢ to notice and commanded zs to abstain from it. 263. So far, indeed, I do not understand any advantage and motive 7” the production and creation of evil.
So that, if shat same de owing to the sacred being, it would be easier for him not to produce it, than, after z¢s production, ¢o have brought z¢ to notice and commanded zs to abstain from it. 263. So far, indeed, I do not understand any advantage and motive 7” the production and creation of evil.
264. Again, in their scriptures, he speaks inconsistently about good works and crime (265) thus : ‘Good works and crime are both owing to me. 266. Neither demons, nor wizards, are unrestricted in causing the ruin of any one. 267. Noone has accepted the religion and done good works, and no one Aas walked in infidelity azd committed crime, except through my will.’
1 Zaratist. [24] oO
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268. In the same scripture he adduces many ¢hzngs which one has to connect, and inflicts curses on the creatures, (269) thus: ‘Why do mankind desire and commit that crime which I design for them?’ 270. It occurs concerning the will and work of his own hand, and yet he frightens them with punishment in body and soul. 271. J” another place he speaks thus: ‘I myself am the deluder of mankind, for if it should be my will they woudd then be shown the true path by me, but z¢ zs my will that they go to hell!’ 272. And zz another place he speaks thus: ‘Man himself is the causer of crime.”
273. In these three modes the sacred being gives evidence of different kinds about his own creatures.
274. One is this, that Ze himself is Aharman?; (275) one is this, that he is himself the deluder of the creatures®; (276) and, in the other, he makes his own creatures confederates involved with Aharman in deluding‘; so that Le zmphes: ‘There are instances when I occasion 24, and there are instances when Aharman does.’
277. Through that whzck he states, that mankind themselves occasion crime, they are made by him confederates with Aharman; Ae himself decng at a distance from the crime. 278. For if mankind commit crime owing to their own nature and their own delusion, that zmplies that the sacred being, with
1 Texts to this effect are numerous in the Qur’4n, such as ‘whom he pleases does God lead astray, and whom he pleases he places on the right way . . . God leads the wrong-doers astray ; for God does what he will... in hell they shall broil’ (Qur'an VI, 39, XIV, 32, 34; SBE, vol. vi).
2 As deduced from the passage quoted in § 269.
® As stated in the passage quoted in § 271.
* As implied in the passage quoted in § 272.
CHAPTER XI, 268-293. 195
Aharman, is far from the criminality, (279) because Zt ts as zt were not owing to the sacred being, nor yet owing to Aharman.
vi).
2 As deduced from the passage quoted in § 269.
® As stated in the passage quoted in § 271.
* As implied in the passage quoted in § 272.
CHAPTER XI, 268-293. 195
Aharman, is far from the criminality, (279) because Zt ts as zt were not owing to the sacred being, nor yet owing to Aharman.
280. Again, you should ask of those whom they call Mftazalik! (281) thus: ‘Is z# the will of the sacred being for all mankind to. abstain from crime through cher own free will?, to escape from hell, and to make ¢hem proceed to heaven, or not?’ 282. If one says that z¢ zs not, (283) that zmphes that an® opinion is formed by him as to the little goodness of the sacred being and the evil of his will; (284) and, for the same reason, z¢ is not fitting to glorify hem as the divine existence. 285, If ove says that z¢ zs his will, (286) that zmples that an opinion is formed by him as to the good will-of the sacred being ; (287) and, for the same reason, z¢ is fitting to glorify Zem as the divine existence.
288. Ask this, too, that is: ‘If z¢ de his will, is he capable of performing z¢, or not?’ 289. If ove says that Ae zs not, (290) that zmpies that an opinion is formed by him as to the incapability of the sacred being as regards that will of his; (291) and, for the same reason, z¢ is not fitting to glorify zm as the divine existence which is almighty. 292. If ome says that Ae is capable of performing 42s will, (293) that implies that an opinion is formed by him as to zs
1 Which is doubtless the original Pahlavi form of Paz. muthzari. It is an adjective, meaning ‘seceding, schismatic,’ derived from Ar. muwhtazil, and applied specially to Muhammadan schismatics. ;
2 Assuming that P4z. A4wad-k4mf stands for Pahl. 4z4dkAmith, which would be identical with the former word in Pahlavi writing.
5 JE has ‘no’ in Paz. but not in Sans., which negative is evidently a modern blunder.
O 2
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capability for that will of his; (294) and, for the same reason, ?7¢ is fitting to glorify 42m as the divine existence which is almighty.
295. Again, ask this, that is: ‘When Ze is capable of performing his will, does he perform z¢, or not?’
296. If ome says that he performs 7z¢, (297) that implies that the abstaining from sin, escaping from hell, and bringing to heaven! would be manifested unto all mankind ; (298) dz¢ this is that which is not manifest by his existence, and is falsifying even his own revelation (dind). 299. If one says that he is capable of performing his will, but does not perform zt, (300) that zmples that an opinion is formed by him as to the unmercifulness of the sacred being, zs enmity to mankind, and the inconstancy of his will.
301. For if he performs 2z¢, 2# is no harm to him himself and is an advantage ¢o mankind; his own will is also continuous thereby. 302. But if he does not perform 2¢, z¢ is no advantage to him himself and is harm ¢o mankind; his own will is also discontinuous thereby.
301. For if he performs 2z¢, 2# is no harm to him himself and is an advantage ¢o mankind; his own will is also continuous thereby. 302. But if he does not perform 2¢, z¢ is no advantage to him himself and is harm ¢o mankind; his own will is also discontinuous thereby.
303. Again, as& this, that is : ‘ Does he not perform z¢ through will, or without will?’ 304. If ome says that he does not perform z¢ through will, (305) that temples that an opinion is formed by him that the sacred being is good-willed, du¢ has no will to do good ; (306) azd this is even to consider 42m faulty through inconsistency. 307. If ome says that he is without will, ad therefore does not perform 2¢, (308) that zmples that an opinion is formed by him as to the weakness of the sacred being in his own self, or the existence of an injurer of his will.
309. The conclusion is this, that, wh a manager
1 JJ has ‘saving from hell and escaping to heaven.’
CHAPTER XI, 294-319. 197
of this worldly exzstence who may be without an opponent, without competition, and perfect in sagacity, goodness, and capability, ¢heve should not be all these unworthy actions, trouble and misery, pain and vexation, especially of mankind and the other creatures. 310. Because, when a manager, without an opponent, is perfect in sagacity, he knows means for evil not to occur and also remedies for carrying off evil. 311. When Ze is perfect in goodness and merciful, Ze Aas no wish for the occurrence of evil at first, dv¢ a wish for z¢s extinction. 312. When he is perfect in capability, Ze is capable of not really becoming equally the origin of evil.
313. Now, as in the worldly exzstence, whose manager is the sacred being, the existence of evil is unquestionably visible, then thus much is not separable from this, either where the manager is provided with an opponent, or is without an opponent :—314. If he does not know means for evil not to occur, and remedies for carrying off evil, the imperfect sagacity of the sacred being is thereby! manifested. 315. Or the evil exists with his good will, azd the imperfect goodness of his will is manifested. 316. Or 4e is not capable of not a//owzng the occurrence of evil, and of carrying z¢ off, and the imperfect capability of the sacred being is manifested. 317. And when “e is imperfect even 2% one—in sagacity, or goodness, or capability—z¢ is not fitting to glorify and worship him as the divine existence who is almighty, all-good, and all-wise.
318. This, too, you should know, that since any existing thing, which is acting, is prouzded with a will, but z¢s nature Aas not become unrestricted, (319) that
1 Reading agas instead of the similarly-written afas, ‘and by it.’
198 SIKAND-GOMANIK vIGAR.
318. This, too, you should know, that since any existing thing, which is acting, is prouzded with a will, but z¢s nature Aas not become unrestricted, (319) that
1 Reading agas instead of the similarly-written afas, ‘and by it.’
198 SIKAND-GOMANIK vIGAR.
shows that, if the original existence of the creator de divinity, and his nature de light azd beauty, fragrance and purity, goodness and sagacity, then such ¢hengs as darkness and ugliness, stench and pollution, vileness avd ignorance—the demoniacal nature itself— ought to be far from him. 320. Ifhis original existence be anything demoniacal, and his nature de darkness or stench, ugliness or pollution, vileness ov ignorance, then the nature of divinity remains strange to him.
321. If there be azy one by whom indecision about all this is insinuated into his own self, that amples that, owing to his indecision about it, there is no discrimination zz him as to goodness, amid his own evil. 322. Now, moreover, the hope of the hopeful is absorbed, (323) for even he who goes to heaven through doing good works is, even there, in evil and misery, (324) because there is no distinct discrimination of good from evil, even there, (325) if there be the goodness which is devoid of evil, and there be also the evil which is devoid of goodness, represented as really of the same origin. 326. This is known, that the difference of good and evil is owing to difference of nature. 327. When the two origins of their difference and distinction from the other of different nature are manifest, that hope of the hopeful is just, (328) and sagacity is their passport (parvanak).
329. This, too, you should know, that every statement which is not unconfused by its own limits is unenquiring (apad-khv4h)'. 330. Likewise this, that the limit of divinity is specially sagacity. 331. And also this, that? the limit of sagacity is only?
1 Sans. has ‘undesirable.’ ® JJ and Sans. omit these four words. 5 Literally ‘one.’
CHAPTER XI, 320-350. 199
330. Likewise this, that the limit of divinity is specially sagacity. 331. And also this, that? the limit of sagacity is only?
1 Sans. has ‘undesirable.’ ® JJ and Sans. omit these four words. 5 Literally ‘one.’
CHAPTER XI, 320-350. 199
advantageous action. 332. Advantageous action is not doing injury; (333) azd the modes of doing injury are three. 334. One is that which, dezxg no advantage to oneself, is the injury of another also. 335. [One is that which, dezng no advantage to another '], is the injury of oneself also. 336. Amd one is that which is the injury of oneself and the injury of another also. 337. And from the creation of Aharman and the demons ¢heve is no advantage Zo a wisely-acting sacred being himself, and there zs injury of others also; (338) the non-advancement of even his own will, owing to his own work, is always manifested thereby. . 339. This, too, you should know, that if the will of the sacred being de goodness, (340) his will is also eternal. 341. And he should be capable of a suitable will, (342) so that, from the beginning even to the end, all the goodness azd virtue of the will of the sacred being would have proceeded in the world. 343. Now z¢ is manifest that vileness and vice always proceed much more. 344. Therefore the cause is one of these, either they always proceed through the will of the sacred being, or without Azs will. 345. If they always proceed through some will of the sacred being, 2¢ is evident. that his will is also for vileness as well as for goodness, (346) or Ae is inefficient and changeable in will. 347. Since a will does not change, unless owing to a cause, or unless owing to a changer, (348) that zmples one of these two, either z¢ is through some cause, or there exists some other being with him as a changer of his will. 349. If they always proceed not through the will of the sacred being, (350) from that z¢ is evident that the
1 The words in brackets are omitted, both in Paz. and Sans., by JE and JJ, the only two MSS. available.
p. 200
sacred being is suffering in his own will, and his will is not perfect, (351) or there exists some diminisher of it who is a possessor of will.
352. As ¢o this, too, which they assert, that the sacred being commanded Adam thus: ‘ Thou shalt not eat of this one tree which is in paradise (vahist)},’
(353) you should ask of them (354) thus: ‘Was the command which the sacred being gave to Adam, thus : “You shall not eat of this tree,” good or evil?’ 355. If the command were good z¢ is evident that the tree was evil, (356) and it is not befitting the sacred being to create anything that is evil. 357. If the tree were good the command was evil, azd it is not befitting the sacred being to give an evil command. 358. If the tree were good, and the command as to not eating were given by him, it is not? adapted to the goodness and mercifulness of the sacred being to allot a benefit away from his own innocent servants.
358. If the tree were good, and the command as to not eating were given by him, it is not? adapted to the goodness and mercifulness of the sacred being to allot a benefit away from his own innocent servants.
359. As ¢o this, too, which they assert, that the sacred being brings every one whom he wills unto faith and the true way, and, as the recompense, he makes him proceed to the happy progress which is eternal; (360) azd him whom he does not will he leaves in irreligion and ignorance of the sacred being, and, for that reason, he casts him into hell and eternal misery ®; (361) you should ask of them
(362) thus: ‘Is he good whose desire and will are for the religion and faith of the sacred being and the true way, or he whose desire and will are for going astray, irreligion, and ignorance of the sacred being ?’
363. If one says that he is good whose desire and will
1 See § 64.
? Reading Paz. ne instead of Paz. be, ‘quite, as the Sanskrit has a negative participle. 5 See § 271.
CHAPTER XI, 351-371. 201
are for the religion of the sacred being and the true way, (364) now as ¢o that man about whom this is the will of the sacred being, that he sha// leave him in irreligion, going astray, and ignorance of the sacred being, and to whom an apostle, or some other person who is a friend, recites the revelation (dtn6) of the sacred being and the true way, (365) does that show that the sacred being is thereby better and more beneficial to him, or are that apostle and that person so? 366. If ome says that the will of the sacred being about him! is good, it is thereby asserted by him, that not understanding the sacred being, not accepting the religion, and going astray are good; dz¢ this is not acceptable [and not to be taught], on account of error. 367. If one says that his coming to the true religion and understanding the sacred being are thereby better and more beneficial, (368) it is thereby obviously asserted by one that the apostle and person are thereby better to him than the sacred being. 369. Because a person through whom the true way and an understanding of the sacred being are wanted among mankind, and his will is den¢ upon it, is much better than he who is a sacred being (370) 6y whose will backsliding (av4zrasth), misunderstanding, and irreligion ex¢s¢ among them ; avd the sacred being is much worse than that person.
371. Observe this, too, that if the criminal thought and criminal action of man are by the will of the sacred being, that already zmpies that the sacred being produced criminal thought, and sowed crime
1 The man mentioned in § 364. 2 The words in brackets have no equivalent in the Pazand text, but are indicated by 4svadyav&a in Sans.
p. 202
2 The words in brackets have no equivalent in the Pazand text, but are indicated by 4svadyav&a in Sans.
p. 202
in his mind, (372) and Aharman merely invites and instigates him to the committal of crime; that shows that the criminal thought ¢vaced ¢o the sacred being and also his desire for it are more violent and worse than the invitation of Aharman. 373. When, too, his listening to what proceeds from Aharman, as ¢o the committal of crime, is likewise due to the criminal thought which the sacred being produced, and so also zs his desire for it, z¢ is already obvious that the sacred being is much worse and more sinful than Aharman.
374. As regards these statements, which are enumerated by us, (375) one of these two ofznzons must arise, (376) either that all are true or that all are false, (377) or there are some which are true and there are some which are false. 378. If all de true, every statement that is not adapted to these statements is false, 0x something of the two, truth and falsehood. 379. If all de false, every statement that is not adapted to these statements is true, ov something of the two together. 380. If.there be some that are true and there be some that are false, (381) then of those which are true—derzved from the nature and nucleus (n4f) of truth—(382) and of those which are false—derived from the nature and nucleus and original evolution of falsehood—(383) the origins are two, one from which a@rzses truth, and one from which avzses falsehood.
CuHarTer XII.
1. Again, about the inconsistency of their assertions ¢here are several statements from the Dinkard?
1 Sans. has ‘something mingled twofold’ 2 See Chap. IV,107. As the inconsistent statements which
CHAPTER XI, 372—XiI, 21. 203
CuHarTer XII.
1. Again, about the inconsistency of their assertions ¢here are several statements from the Dinkard?
1 Sans. has ‘something mingled twofold’ 2 See Chap. IV,107. As the inconsistent statements which
CHAPTER XI, 372—XiI, 21. 203
manuscript, (2) as fo that which they say, that the sacred being is around everything, du¢ nothing is within him; (3) and within everything, dv¢ nothing is around him. 4. That he ts above everything, éu¢ nothing is below him; (5) and below everything, éut nothing is above him. 6. Zhat he sits upon a throne, du is possessing no vesteng-place ; (7) and is inside heaven, du¢ is possessing no whereabouts. 8. That he does not exist in any place, and yet he does exist there. 9. That he exists everywhere, and yet his place does not exist. 10. Also ¢hat everything of his becomes /¢ for his own by his own will, (11) Ais original evolution dezng both malice and good; (12) and e zs eternally unforgiving and compassionate, (13) preparing distress and not distressing. 14. Likewise ¢hat he has commanded him who is incapable of performing oy neglecting the divine command, (15) and he das created him who is innocent for hell, not the-distresser. 16. Zhat he ts aware of the hellish existence of mankind, owing to wickedness, and his will is for it; (17) and he zs good-willed, or it as become not his will. 18. Zhat he has produced a remedy, and is not himself distressing ; (19) or no remedy, but want of remedy, is produced by him, and yet he is not possessing an opponent. 20. Zhat he 7s wanting experience, and yet omniscient; (21) neglecting commands, and yet follow in the text are not to be found in the portion of the Dinkard known to be extant, they were probably contained in the first two books of that work, which have not yet been discovered. Chap. 132 of the third book (130 in Dastfr Peshotan’s translation, pp. 176-178) is the nearest approach to our text in style, but not in matter. It is ‘about him who is in all and over all, over and not lower than anything zor through anything, that is, even owing to management /e és over all, and all is manageable by him.’
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they are themselves his will; (22) and he who neglects, azd provides a restricted evolution’, is yet a good sovereign. 23. Also ¢hat his commands are all continuous, (24) and ye¢ the setting aside of his commands is obtainable. 25. And ¢ha¢ there is some of his will which is not continuous, (26) and neglect of his will is not an injurer of the will. 27. Likewise that he has commanded that which is not his will, (28) and the command wzch zs not inconsistent with his will azd also the command wzch ts inconsistent with his will are both proper. 29. Also ¢hat his good will is not a discontinuous will, (30) and as ¢o his evil will, which makes evil things, that is judicious. 31. And many other inconsistencies which are in the assertions of varzous sects.