Timaeus — Plato

The nature of e?ids and excellences. 33 I should like to examine further, for no light matter is at Republic i. stake, nothing less than the rule of human life. Socrates, Proceed. Thrasvma- CHUS. I will proceed by asking a question : Would you not say ^ J Illustr.itions that a horse has some end? of ends and I should. excellences preparatory And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be to the enquiry that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accom- '"'° ^^^ f""* *■ and excellence plished, by any other thing? of the soul. I do not understand, he said. Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye? Certainly not. Or hear, except with the ear? No. These then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs? They may. But you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many other ways? Of course. And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose? True. May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook? We may. Then now I think you will have no difficulty in. understanding my meaning when I asked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing? I understand your meaning, he said, and assent. And that to which an end is appointed has also an excel- aii things lence? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end? which have *-' ^ ends have It naS. , also virtues And has not the eye an excellence ? f ""^ ^"r'' ^ lences by Yes. which they And the ear has an end and an excellence also ? ["^'J^ '*'°"' True. And the same is true of all other things ; they have each of them an end and a special excellence? That is scf. Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are VOL. III. — 18

p. 34

Everything has a special end and excellence.

Republic I. Socrates, Thrasyma- CHUS.

And the soul has a virtue and an end — the virtue justice, the end happiness.

Hence justice and happiness are necessarily connected.

wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead? How can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see? You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight ; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect? Certainly, he replied. I might say the same of the ears ; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end? True. And the same observation will apply to all other things? I agree. Well ; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions proper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other? To no other. And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul? Assuredly, he said. And has not the soul an excellence also? Yes. And can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that excellence? She cannot. Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the good soul a good ruler? Yes, necessarily. And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul? That has been admitted. Then the just soul and the just man will hve well, and the unjust man will live ill? That is what your argument proves. And he who hves well is blessed and happy, and he who 354 lives ill the reverse of happy? Certainly. Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

Socrates knoivs nothing after all.

p. 35

Socrates, Thrasyma- CHUS.

So be it. ' Republic I. But happiness and not misery is profitable. Of course. Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice. Let this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea. For which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Never- Socrates is theless, I have not been well entertained ; but that was my ^'.sp'^^s^d ' ■' with himself own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of and with the every dish which is successively brought to table, he not ^'"g""''^"*- having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly ; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

BOOK II.

Republic II. Socrates, Glaucon.

The threefold division of goods.