Timaeus — Plato

The early stages of morality. xix can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final con- Republic i. elusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just return evil Analysis. for evil ; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Peri- >^6 ander, Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C.

398-381) Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is Introducshown to be inadequate to the wants of the age ; the authority of the poets is set aside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries.

Similar words are applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the questioning spirit is stirred within him : — 'If because I do evil, Thou punishest me by evil, what is the difference between Thee and me ? ' In this both Plato and Kheyam rise above the level of many Christian (?) theologians.

The first definition of justice easily passes into the second; for the simple words 'to speak the truth and pay your debts' is substituted the more abstract ' to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies. ' Either of these explanations gives a sufficient rule of life for plain men, but they both fall short of the precision of philosophy.

We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which not only arises out of the conflict of established principles in particular cases, but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality.

The ' interrogation ' of moral ideas ; the appeal to the authority of Homer ; the conclusion that the maxim, ' Do good to your friends and harm to your enemies,' being erroneous, could not have been the word of any great man (cp. ii. 380 A, B), are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic Socrates. . . .

Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to Analysis. interrupt, but has hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar. 'Socrates,' he says, 'what folly is this ? — Why do you agree to be vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?

He then prohibits all the 537 ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies that he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2 X 6, or 3 X 4, or 6 X 2, or 4 X 3. At first Thrasymachus is reluctant 338 to argue ; but at length, with a promise of payment on the part of

XX Analysis 338-343. Republic I. the Company and of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open Analysis. the game. ' Listen,' he says ; ^ my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger: now praise me.* Let me understand you first. Do you mean that because Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our interest, who are not so strong?

Thrasymachus is indignant at the illustration, and in pompous words, apparently intended to restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the 339 ruler or stronger makes a mistake — then the interest of the stronger is not his interest.

Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the 34c word ' thinks; ' — not the actual interest of the ruler, but what he thinks or what seems to be his interest, is justice. The contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning evasion : for though his real and apparent interests may differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest will always remain what he thinks to be his interest.

Of course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new interpretation accepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not disposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly insinuates, his adversary has changed his mind,. In what follows Thrasymachus does in fact withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for he affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible.

Socrates is quite ready to accept the new position, 341 which he equally turns against Thrasymachus by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or science has an interest, but 342 this interest is to be distinguished from the accidental interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the good of the things or persons which come under the art.

And justice has an interest which is the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who come under his sway. Thrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes a bold diversion. 'Tell me, Socrates,' he says, 343 'have you a nurse? What a question! Why do you ask? ' Because, if you have, she neglects you and lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never think of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects.

whereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and Republic i. subjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation Analysis. of life the just man is the loser and the unjust the gainer, ;44 especially where injustice is on the grand scale, which is quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of temples.

The language of men proves this — our * gracious ' and ' blessed ' tyrant and the like — all which tends to show (i) that justice is the interest of the stronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also stronger than justice. Thrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having deluged the company with words, has a mind M r to escape.

But the others will not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. *And what can I do more for you ? ' he says ; ' would you have me put the words bodily into your souls ?

' God forbid ! replies Socrates ; but we want you to be consistent in the use of terms, and not to employ 'physician' in an exact sense, and then again ' shepherd ' or ' ruler ' in an inexact, — if the words are strictly taken, the ruler and the shepherd look only to the good of their people or flocks and not to their own : whereas you insist that rulers are solely actuated by love of office. ' No doubt about it,' replies Thrasy- 746 machus.

Then why are they paid? Is not the reason, that their interest is not comprehended in their art, and is therefore the concern of another art, the art of pay, which is common to the arts in general, and therefore not identical with anyone of them?

547 Nor would any man be a ruler unless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of punishment ; — the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the necessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State [or Church] were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by the last motive only ; and there would be as much ' nolo episcopari ' as there is at present of the opposite. . . .

The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple Introducand apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is '^'°^' introduced. There is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not like being in office, and that therefore they demand pay. Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far Analysis.