Timaeus — Plato

The illusiofi of reiatwcness. 297 You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper Republic ix. and lower and middle region? Socrates, I should. ^^""°^- And if a person were to eo from the lower to the middle '""strations . . . .

0/ the unregion, would he not imagine that he is going up ; and he reality of who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, ""^'" p'^^' . sures. would imagine that he is already in the upper legion, if he has never seen the true upper world? To be sure, he said ; how can he think otherwise? But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and tnily imagine, that he was descending? No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions? Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate state ; so that when they are only being drawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they experience to be real, and in like manner, when 585 drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure ; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting pain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey instead of whit^ — can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed ; 1 should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite. Look at the matter thus: — Hunger, thirst, and the like are inanitions of the bodily state? Yes. And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul? True. And lood and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either? Certainly. And is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or The imeifrom that which has more existence the truer?

'*^*^^"^' "^°\^ real than the Clearly, from that which has more sensual. What cla.sses of things have a greater share of pure 2existence in your judgment — those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge and mind and all the different kinds of virtue?

Put the question in this way: — Which has a more pure being — that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found in such natures ; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and mortal, and is itself variable and mortal? Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence? Yes, of knowledge in the same degree. And of truth in the same degree? Yes. And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence? Necessarily. Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Far less, And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul? Yes. What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real? Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really and truly enjoy true pleasure ; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an illusory and less real ^pleasure? Unquestionably.

Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean , and in this region they move at 3random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world ; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding pleasure.

Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron ; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust.

For they fill themselves with that v/hich is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent. Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle. Their pleasures are mixed with pains — how can they be otherwise?

For they are mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves ; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth. Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense? Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element aLso.

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and knowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth ; and they will have the pleasures which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also' most natural to him? Yes, certainly ; the best is the most natural.