Timaeus — Plato

ancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality; Republic ii. and probably were never purer than at the time of their decay, i when their influence over the world was waning. A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie in the soul ; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary.

The lie in the soul is a true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the highest part of the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering himself.

For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil ; or again, to affirm with Protagoras that * knowledge is sensation,' or that 'being is becoming,' or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,' would have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e. g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John iv.

41), 'he who was blind ' were to say * I see,' is another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke xii. 10), allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking.

To this is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation, — which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had himself raised (i. 331 C) about the propriety of deceiving a madman ; and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man.

For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false.

Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or education, we may note further, (i) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece ; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below (iii. 390) he alludes to the Chronique Scandaleuse of the gods.

xl Analysis 386-389. Republic III. afraid of death, or who behevcs the tales which are repeated by Analysis. the poets concerning the world below. They must be gently requested not to abuse hell ; they may be reminded that their stories are both untrue and discouraging.

Nor must they be angry if we expunge obnoxious passages, such as the depressing words of Achilles — 'I would rather be a serving-man than rule over all the dead ; ' and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the senseless shadows, the flitting soul mourning over lost strength and youth, the soul with a gibber going beneath the 387 earth like smoke, or the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats.

The terrors and horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest of their Tartarean nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their use ; but they are not the proper food for soldiers.

As little can we admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes : — Achilles, the son of Thetis, in tears, throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and down the sea-shore in distraction ; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not prostrated at the loss of children or fortune.

Neither is death terrible to him ; and therefore lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men of note ; they should be the concern of inferior persons only, 388 whether women or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to the gods ; as when the goddesses say, ' Alas ! ray travail !

' and worst of all, when the king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector, or sorrows over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God, if not ridiculed by our young men, is likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be given to excess of laughter — ' Such violent delights ' are followed by a violent re-action.

The descrip- 389 tion in the Iliad of the gods shaking their sides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus will not be admitted by us. ' Certainly not. Truth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we were saying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a medicine.

But this employment of falsehood rnust remain a privilege of state; the common man must not in return tell a lie to the ruler ; any more than the patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain. In the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists in self-control and obedience to authority. That is a

Analysis 389-392. xli lesson which Homer teaches in some places : * The Achaeans Republic ill. marched on breathing prowess, in silent awe of their leaders ; ' — Analysis. but a very different one in other places : ' O heavy with wine, who 390 hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a stag. Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on the minds of youth.

The same may be said about his praises of eating and drinking and his dread of starvation ; also about the verses in vvhich he tells of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once detained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a nobler strain heard in the words: — 'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured worse.

Nor must we allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, * Gifts persuade the gods, gifts reverend kings ; ' or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them; or the meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from 391 Agamemnon ; or his requiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo ; or his insolence to the river-god Scamander ; or his dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius; or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round the walls, and slaying the captives at the pyre: such a combination of meanness and cruelty in Cheiron's pupil is inconceivable.

The amatory exploits of Peirithous and Theseus are equally unworthy. Either these so-called sons of gods were not the sons of gods, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any more than the gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who believes that such things are done by those who have the 392 blood of heaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their example.

Enough of gods and heroes; — what shall we say about men? What the poets and story-tellers say — that the wicked prosper and the righteous are afflicted, or that justice is another's gain ? Such misrepresentations cannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of justice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry. The subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated ; next follows style.

Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come ; and narrative is of three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a composition of the two. An instance will