The Golden Verses of Pythagoras — with commentary (1917)

1 88 The Golden Verses of Pythagoras which the power of the Will might exercise itself freely, in such a manner that, although the matter might be determined beforehand, its form was not, and that such an imminent event could be suspended, evaded, or changed by a cooperation of the acts of the will, inaccessible to all prevision. This is what was said with such profoundness by Tiresias, the most famous hierophant of Greece and whom Homer called the only sage," these words so often quoted and so little understood: "Whatever I may see will come to pass, or it will not come to pass"*; that is to say. The event that I see is in the necessity of Destiny and it will come to pass, unless it is changed by the power of the Will; in which case it will not come to pass.

77. That which thou dost not know, pretend not that thou dost. Instruct thyself: for time and patience favour all.

Lysis has enclosed in these two lines the summary of the doctrine of Pythagoras regarding science: according to this philosopher, all science consists of knowing how to distinguish what one does not know and of desiring to learn that of which one knows nothing." Socrates had adopted this idea, as simple as profound ; and Plato has consecrated several of his dialogues to its development.''

But the distinction between what one does not know and the desire to learn that of which one is ignorant, is a thing much rarer than one imagines. It is the golden mean of science, as difficult to possess as that of virtue, and without which it is, however, impossible to know oneself. For, without knowledge of oneself, how can one acquire knowledge of others? How judge them if one cannot be one's own judge? Pursue this reasoning. It is eArident 2a Homer, Odyss., K. v. 494; Diodor. Sic, 1. v., c. 6; Plin., 1. vii., c. 56; Plutar., De Oracul. Defect., p. 434. » Horat., Sat., v., 1. ii., v. 59. ^ Hierocl., In Aurea Carm., v. 31. d Alcibiad., i. et ii.{ LaMi, etc.

that one can know only what one has learned from others, or what one has found from oneself : in order to have learned from others, one must have wished to receive lessons; in order to have found, one must have wished to seek; but one cannot reasonably desire to learn or to seek only for what one believes one does not know. If one imposes upon oneself this important point, and if one imagines oneself knowing that of which one is ignorant, one must judge it wholly useless to learn or to seek, and then ignorance is incurable: it is madness to style oneself doctor concerning things that one has neither learned nor sought after, and of which one can consequently have no knowledge. It is Plato who has made this irresistible reasoning, and who has drawn this conclusion : that all the mistakes that man commits come from that sort of ignorance which makes him believe that he knows what he does not know."