The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

56 . 4 . Madhyamika. We answer. If our system did allow assertive judg¬ ments (implying the transcendental reality of a substratum), the question would then arise whether these judgments are founded on sound method or not. However there is no (place for them in a system of Universal Relativity). The reason for that is just the following one. If problematic judgments re¬ garding reality were admitted as possible, we would then be obliged to ad¬ mit the counterpart, the possibility of corresponding assertions. But we also absolutely deny the possibility of problematic judgments (regarding the transcendental reality of a substratum), how could we then make the correlative 4 assertions, since they would not be correlative with the other (unexisting) member of the relation. It would be like the length and the short-

1 anutpannah sarva-dharmdh , (dharma — bhava).

2 sarva-bhdvotpattih.

3 sarva-bhava apratisddhdh.

4 Read tadviruddho.

ness (of an unexisting thing, e. g.), the horn of a donkey. Therefore, since we do not make any such assertion, (where are the things) for the sake of whose reality we should so much imagine the existence of the sources of right knowledge? 1 And how could we (establish) their number, their essence and their (respective) objects? How could we (decide) whether they originate out of themslves, out of non-self, out of both, or without a cause? It is not our business to answer all these questions!

The Logician. You thus (insist that you) make no assertion whatsoever. 57. 4 But we hear from you a proposition which looks like a definite assertion, 2 viz. that entities arise neither out of themselves, nor out of something different, nor out of both, nor at random. How is that (to be explained)?

The Madhyamika. We answer. This our statement appears decisive 57. 5 to simple people who (try) to understand it according to arguments fami¬ liar to them, but not to the Saints 3 (who can intuit absolute reality).

The Logician. Do you really mean to say.that these Saints (believe 57. 7 m) no argument?

The Madhyamika. Who (can) say whether they have or not (any

1 Lit., p. 56.4 — 57.1. a We answer. If we would Lave (what you) call assertion, it would be produced either by right cognition or not by right cognition. But we have none. Why?

Here, when non-assertion is possible, its counterpart, an assertion relative to it, might exist.

But when we, first of all, don’t have any non-assertion, then wherefrom the counterpart, the as¬ sertion? since (it would be) disregarding the other part of the relation, just as the length and the shortness of the donkey’s horn. And when there thus is no assertion, then for the sake of whose reality (siddhi) we would very much imagine (pari-kalp) sources of right knowledge?)) niicaya = adhyatasaya — vikalpa, cp. Tatparyat., p. 88. 22. vikalpa is an assertion of the form a this is that» sa evayam, cp. N. b. t. tipp., p. 23. 4, where the element « this» refers to the «Hoc Aliquid a interpreted by Dignaga as the «thing in itself» ( svalaksana ).

The judgment is regarded as synthetic ( kalpand — nama-jdti-yojanu) and as dialectical (w'fcaZpa-dilemma). aniScaya evidently means a problematic judgment, iha means either = asman mate, ov — satyam Sunyatayam. Cp. N. b. t. 69 . 22 ft'., where it is stated that when something is cognized (paricchidyate) it means that it is contrasted (vyavacchidyate) with its counterpart. For both parties every assertion (ni&caya = kalpand) has a counterpart (pratipaksa), it is a dichotomy (dtaidhl-karana), it is relational (apeksa), dialectical (vikalpa). If the counterpart (sambandhy-antara =.pratipdksa) is missing, an assertion is impossible, since it would be without a counterpart, non-relative (nirapeksa). But for the Logician every relation, as e. g., short and long, has an indirect (paratantra) reality in the underlying «thingin itself))

(svalaksana). This for the Madhyamika is like the horn of a donkey. His point seems here to be that Relativity is itself relative.

2 niScita-rupam vakyam — upapattih — pramaiiain.

3 The Buddhist Saint ( arya ) is here the equivalent of the Monist who by mystic intuition (yogi-pratyaJcsa) has reached a direct vision of the world sub specie aetemitatis, he has entered the drsti-marga, cp. above p. 90 . He has absolutely no judgmeuts ( niScaya ), strictly speaking, not even the assertion of Relativity ( Sunyata ), cp. above, p. 49 .

NIRVANA

appendix: candkakIrlvs comment on RELATIVITY, I arguments)? (About) the Absolute 1 the Saints remain silent! How is then a conversation 2 (with them on this subjebt) possible? (How can we then decide) whether there are arguments or not?

The Logician. If the Saints do not enlarge upon arguments, how do they (manage) to bring home to simple folk the idea of an Absolute?