The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 idarnpratyayatd-mdtram — pratitya-samuipada-md.tr am, cp. tex. 67.12, transl. p. 152.

J sa-8vabhdca-vddah.

appendix: candeakirti's comment on relativity, i 135

Accordingly it has been said , 1 55. 2.

Philosophers assume phenomenal world 3
Either as self-produced or as non-self produced.

Or causeless or both (self and non-self made).

But You have proved, it is contingent . 3

And it will be stated (in this treatise) later on , 4 55. 5.

So far there are effects, there is a cause,

So far there is a cause, there are effects.

We cannot realize

For their reality another reason.

Just the same has been declared by Buddha himself in the fol- 55. 8. lowing words,

«The theory of separate elements 5 (implying the denial of personal identity ) 6 means that «this exists so far as that exists», «if this has appeared that will appearn , 7 e. g., prenatal forces exist so far illusion (and desire have not been stopped), a new life s is produced so far there are prenatal forces which produce it, etc. etc.)).

XXXIV. Controversy about the validity of logic.

A vehement protest 9 is raised by some (philosophers against this 55 . 11. condemnation of logic ). 10 «You maintain)) (they say) «that (separate) entities

1 Lokatita-stava. 19, Bstan-ligyur, Bstod, I (M. de la V. P.).

- duhkha. 3 pratitya-ja. 4 VIII. 12.

'■> dharma-samketa—andtma — pudyala-nairdtmya —12 ayatana, cp. Central Cone., p. 28.

6 pudgala-nairatmxja = andtma.

7 This very ancient formulation, cp. Majjh. N., III. 63, is given a realistic interpre¬ tation in Hinayana and a transcendental one in Mahayana, cp. above p. 40.

s vijnana. In the first period of the development of the embryo it is dormant ( sammurcchita ), until sensation ( sparsa ) appears. In a bird’s egg, as long as it has not lost vitality, there is vijnana according to the principles of pratitya-samatpdda. When the term is mistranslated as «thought», «pensee» etc. confusion inevitably arises. Prof. B. Keith, op. cit., p. 101, has imagined that it is « visible®?! Visible is termed in the Pali Canon « sanidassana ». Among the 75 ultimates there is only one, the rupa-ayatana, i.e., colour, which is visible, cp. Digha N. Ill, 217, Ab. Kosabh.1,28.

9 pari-codana.

10 This and the following discussion refers to the pramana-vinikeaya-vada of Dignaga and others. The first step in the vindication of logic has been made by Bhavaviveka. But he remained a Madhyamika. The pramana-xiniScaya-vada is exposed by Vacaspatimisra in Tatparyat. p. 7 1. 28 and p. 248.25 ft., cp. Garbe, Die Sankhya Phil., p. 203. viniScaya is an¬ other name for Dignaga’s conception of kalpana. it represents the fundamental act of think¬ ing appearing in such judgments as «this is Devadatta», w this is dark complexion®, «this ismovng» etc. where the element «this» refers to the svalaksaxxa. cp.n.on p. 137, cp. Tatparyat..p. 101. 1 ff.

NIRVANA

APPENDIX.' CANDRAK1RTPS COMMENT ON RELATIVITY, I

are not caused (in the absolute sense). Now, is this assertion founded on argument, or is it not founded on argument? If you admit that it is founded on argument, you are obliged to answer the following (questions). How many are the sources of our knowledge? What is their essence? what their scope? (What is their origin?) Have they arisen out of themselves, out of something extraneous, out of both, or out of nothing? But (if your denial of causation) is not founded on argument, it must be rejected, because our cognition of an object depends upon the method by which it is cognized. If something is not known, it cannot become known otherwise than by (appropriate) methods. If these methods do not exist, neither will cognition ever be arrived at. How is then your explicit assertion possible? You can¬ not (assert) that the (separate) entities are not caused. Or else just the same reasou which allows you to maintain that nothing is caused will also allow (me to maintain the contrary, viz.) that every single thiqg exists. And just as you assert that all (our) elements of existence are uncaused, 1 1 will maintain that whatsoever exists has a cause ». 2

56. l. «Or perhaps you do not really believe that nothing is being pro¬ duced, (you tell it just for the sake of cavilling)? But then you will never persuade your opponent to believe (a theory) you do not yourself believe. The composition of this treatise will then serve no purpose, and the denial of Pluralism 3 will not have been really made».