Fetching
One moment.
Fetching
One moment.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1XX111 on all such subjects which has been throughout its history a distinguishing characteristic of the Indian people. Now there is one work, of more importance than any other in Buddhism, the collection of the Dialogues of Gotama the Buddha, brought together in the Digha and Ma^^ima Nikayas. It contains the views of the Buddha set out, as they appeared to his very earliest disciples, in a series of 185 conversational discourses, which will some day come to hold a place, in the history of human thought, akin to that held by the Dialogues of Plato. Is it a mere chance, or is it the actual result of the necessities of the case, that this question of c souls ' is put into the forefront of this collection, just as it is the point treated first and at the greatest length in the Katha Vatthu, and put first also in the Milinda ? The first of these 185 dialogues is the Brahma^ala Suttanta, the discourse called the Perfect Net, the net whose meshes are so fine that no folly of superstition, however subtle, can slip through — the clearing away of the rubbish before the foundations are laid for the new palace of good sense. In it are set out sixty-two varieties of existing hypotheses, and after each and all of them has been rejected, the doctrine of Arahatship is put forward as the right solution. The sixty-two heresies are as follows : 1-4. SASSATA-VADA. People who, either from medita- tion of three degrees, or fourthly through logic and reasoning, have come to believe that both the external world as a whole, and individual souls, are eternal. 5-8. Ekaaxa-SASSATIkA. People who, in four ways, hold that some souls are eternal, while others are not. a. Those who hold that God is eternal, but not the individual souls. b. Those who hold that all the gods are eternal, but not the individual souls. c. Those who hold that certain illustrious gods are eternal, but not the human souls. XXIV QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES OF MILINDA THE KING. d. Those who hold that while the bodily forms are not eternal, there is a subtle something, called Heart or Mind, or Consciousness, which is. 9-12. AntAntika. People who chop logic about finity and infinity. a. Those who hold the world to be finite. b. Those who hold it to be infinite. c. Those who hold it to be both. d. Those who hold it to be neither. 13-16. Amara-vikkhepika. People who equivocate about virtue and vice — a. From the fear that if they express a decided opinion grief at possible mistake will injure them. b. That they may form attachments which will injure them. c. That they may be unable to answer skilful dis- putants. d. From dullness and stupidity. 17,18. Adhlo-a-samuppanika. People who think that the origin of things can be explained without a cause. 19-50. Uddhama-aghatanika. People who believe in the future existence of human souls. a. Sixteen different phases of the hypothesis of a conscious existence after death. b. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an
219-50. Uddhama-aghatanika. People who believe in the future existence of human souls. a. Sixteen different phases of the hypothesis of a conscious existence after death. b. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an unconscious existence after death. c. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an existence between consciousness and unconscious- ness after death. 51-57. Ukkheda-vada. People who teach the doctrine that there is a soul, but that it will cease to exist on the death of the body here, or at the end of a next life, or of further lives in higher and ever higher states of being. 58-62. DirraA-DHAMMiKA-NiBBANA-vADA. People who hold that there is a soul, and that it can attain to perfect bliss in this present world, or in whatever world it happens to be — INTRODUCTION. XXV a. By a full, complete, and perfect enjoyment of the five senses. b. By an enquiring mental abstraction (the First Dhyana). c. By undisturbed mental bliss, untarnished by enquiry (the Second Dhyana). d. By mental peace, free alike from joy and pain and enquiry (the Third Dhyana). e. By this mental peace plus a sense of purity (the Fourth Dhyana). Professor Garbe, in his just published ' Sankhya Philo- sophic1,' holds that the first persons attacked in this list are the followers of the Sankhya. The double view of the Sassata-vada is no doubt the basis of the Sankhya system. But the system contains much more, and it would be safer to say that we have here a warning against the philosophical view which afterwards developed into the Sankhya, or rather which became afterwards a fundamental part of the Sankhya. The Vedanta, in either of its forms, is not, it will be noticed, referred to in any one of the sixty-two divisions ; but philosophical views forming part of the Vedanta may be traced in Nos. 5, 8, 10, 20, &c. The scheme is not intended as a refutation of the views, as a whole, held by any special school or individual, but as a statement of erroneous views on two special points, namely, the soul and the world. However this may be, we find an ample justification in this comprehensive and systematic condemnation of all current or possible forms of the soul-theory for the prominence which the author of the Milinda gives to the subject. The other points on which the Milinda may be compared with the Katha Vatthu will need less comment. The discussion in the Milinda as to the manner in which the Divine Eye can arise in a man 2, is a reminiscence of the question raised in the Katha Vatthu III, 7 as to whether the eye of flesh can, through strength of dhamma, grow into the Divine Eye. The discussion in the Milinda as to 1 Introduction, p. 57. 2 Milinda, i, pp. 179-185. XXVI QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES OF MILINDA THE KING. how a layman, who is a layman after becoming an Arahat, can enter the Order 1, is entirely in accord with the opinion maintained, as against the Uttarapathak&, in the Katha Vatthu IV, i. Our Milinda ascribes the verses,
32 Milinda, i, pp. 179-185. XXVI QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES OF MILINDA THE KING. how a layman, who is a layman after becoming an Arahat, can enter the Order 1, is entirely in accord with the opinion maintained, as against the Uttarapathak&, in the Katha Vatthu IV, i. Our Milinda ascribes the verses, ' Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith/ &c, to the Buddha2. In the note on that passage I had pointed out that they are ascribed, not to the Buddha, but to Abhibhu in certain Pi/aka texts, and to the Buddha himself only in late Sanskrit works. In the exposition of Katha Vatthu II, 3 the verses are also ascribed to the Buddha.' The proposition in the Katha Vatthu II, 8 that the Buddha, in the ordinary affairs of life, was not transcendental, agrees with Nagasena's argument in the Milinda, part ii, pp. 8-12. The discussion in the Milinda as to whether an Arahat can be thoughtless or guilty of an offence 3 is foreshadowed by the similar points raised in the Katha Vatthu I, 2 ; II, 1, 2, and VIII, 11. And the two dilemmas, Nos. 65 and 66, especially as to the cause of space, may be compared with the discussion in Katha Vatthu VI, 6, as to whether space is self-existent. The general result of a comparison between these two very interesting books of controversial apologetics seems to me to be that the differences between them are just such as one might expect (a) from the difference of date, and (b) from the fact that the controversy in the older book is carried on against members of the same communion, whereas in the Milinda we have a defence of Buddhism as against the outsider. The Katha Vatthu takes almost the whole of the conclusions reached in the Milinda for granted, and goes on to discuss further questions on points of detail. It does not give a description of Arahatship in glowing terms, but discusses minor points as to whether the realisa- tion of Arahatship includes the Fruits of the three lower paths4, or whether all the qualities of an Arahat are free from the Asavas5, or whether the knowledge of his 1 Milinda, ii, pp. 96-98 (compare 57-59). 2 Milinda, ii, p. 60. 3 Milinda, ii, pp. 98 foil. 4 Katha Vatthu IV, 9. 5 Katha Vatthu IV, 3. INTRODUCTION. XXVli emancipation alone makes a man an Arahat1, or whether the breaking of the Fetters constitutes Arahatship, and whether the insight into Arahatship suffices to break all the Fetters2, and so on. The discussion of these details gives no opportunity for the enthusiastic eloquence of the author of our Milinda, and the very fact of his eloquence argues a later date. But there can be no doubt as to the superiority of his style. And I still adhere to the opinions expressed in the former Introduction that the work, as it stands in the Pali, is of its kind (that is, as a book of apologetic controversy) the best in point of style that had then been written in any country ; and that it is the masterpiece of Indian prose. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. Temple, May, 1894.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1XX111 on all such subjects which has been throughout its history a distinguishing characteristic of the Indian people. Now there is one work, of more importance than any other in Buddhism, the collection of the Dialogues of Gotama the Buddha, brought together in the Digha and Ma^^ima Nikayas. It contains the views of the Buddha set out, as they appeared to his very earliest disciples, in a series of 185 conversational discourses, which will some day come to hold a place, in the history of human thought, akin to that held by the Dialogues of Plato. Is it a mere chance, or is it the actual result of the necessities of the case, that this question of c souls ' is put into the forefront of this collection, just as it is the point treated first and at the greatest length in the Katha Vatthu, and put first also in the Milinda ? The first of these 185 dialogues is the Brahma^ala Suttanta, the discourse called the Perfect Net, the net whose meshes are so fine that no folly of superstition, however subtle, can slip through — the clearing away of the rubbish before the foundations are laid for the new palace of good sense. In it are set out sixty-two varieties of existing hypotheses, and after each and all of them has been rejected, the doctrine of Arahatship is put forward as the right solution. The sixty-two heresies are as follows : 1-4. SASSATA-VADA. People who, either from medita- tion of three degrees, or fourthly through logic and reasoning, have come to believe that both the external world as a whole, and individual souls, are eternal. 5-8. Ekaaxa-SASSATIkA. People who, in four ways, hold that some souls are eternal, while others are not. a. Those who hold that God is eternal, but not the individual souls. b. Those who hold that all the gods are eternal, but not the individual souls. c. Those who hold that certain illustrious gods are eternal, but not the human souls. XXIV QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES OF MILINDA THE KING. d. Those who hold that while the bodily forms are not eternal, there is a subtle something, called Heart or Mind, or Consciousness, which is. 9-12. AntAntika. People who chop logic about finity and infinity. a. Those who hold the world to be finite. b. Those who hold it to be infinite. c. Those who hold it to be both. d. Those who hold it to be neither. 13-16. Amara-vikkhepika. People who equivocate about virtue and vice — a. From the fear that if they express a decided opinion grief at possible mistake will injure them. b. That they may form attachments which will injure them. c. That they may be unable to answer skilful dis- putants. d. From dullness and stupidity. 17,18. Adhlo-a-samuppanika. People who think that the origin of things can be explained without a cause. 19-50. Uddhama-aghatanika. People who believe in the future existence of human souls. a. Sixteen different phases of the hypothesis of a conscious existence after death. b. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an
219-50. Uddhama-aghatanika. People who believe in the future existence of human souls. a. Sixteen different phases of the hypothesis of a conscious existence after death. b. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an unconscious existence after death. c. Eight different phases of the hypothesis of an existence between consciousness and unconscious- ness after death. 51-57. Ukkheda-vada. People who teach the doctrine that there is a soul, but that it will cease to exist on the death of the body here, or at the end of a next life, or of further lives in higher and ever higher states of being. 58-62. DirraA-DHAMMiKA-NiBBANA-vADA. People who hold that there is a soul, and that it can attain to perfect bliss in this present world, or in whatever world it happens to be — INTRODUCTION. XXV a. By a full, complete, and perfect enjoyment of the five senses. b. By an enquiring mental abstraction (the First Dhyana). c. By undisturbed mental bliss, untarnished by enquiry (the Second Dhyana). d. By mental peace, free alike from joy and pain and enquiry (the Third Dhyana). e. By this mental peace plus a sense of purity (the Fourth Dhyana). Professor Garbe, in his just published ' Sankhya Philo- sophic1,' holds that the first persons attacked in this list are the followers of the Sankhya. The double view of the Sassata-vada is no doubt the basis of the Sankhya system. But the system contains much more, and it would be safer to say that we have here a warning against the philosophical view which afterwards developed into the Sankhya, or rather which became afterwards a fundamental part of the Sankhya. The Vedanta, in either of its forms, is not, it will be noticed, referred to in any one of the sixty-two divisions ; but philosophical views forming part of the Vedanta may be traced in Nos. 5, 8, 10, 20, &c. The scheme is not intended as a refutation of the views, as a whole, held by any special school or individual, but as a statement of erroneous views on two special points, namely, the soul and the world. However this may be, we find an ample justification in this comprehensive and systematic condemnation of all current or possible forms of the soul-theory for the prominence which the author of the Milinda gives to the subject. The other points on which the Milinda may be compared with the Katha Vatthu will need less comment. The discussion in the Milinda as to the manner in which the Divine Eye can arise in a man 2, is a reminiscence of the question raised in the Katha Vatthu III, 7 as to whether the eye of flesh can, through strength of dhamma, grow into the Divine Eye. The discussion in the Milinda as to 1 Introduction, p. 57. 2 Milinda, i, pp. 179-185. XXVI QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES OF MILINDA THE KING. how a layman, who is a layman after becoming an Arahat, can enter the Order 1, is entirely in accord with the opinion maintained, as against the Uttarapathak&, in the Katha Vatthu IV, i. Our Milinda ascribes the verses,
32 Milinda, i, pp. 179-185. XXVI QUESTIONS AND PUZZLES OF MILINDA THE KING. how a layman, who is a layman after becoming an Arahat, can enter the Order 1, is entirely in accord with the opinion maintained, as against the Uttarapathak&, in the Katha Vatthu IV, i. Our Milinda ascribes the verses, ' Exert yourselves, be strong, and to the faith/ &c, to the Buddha2. In the note on that passage I had pointed out that they are ascribed, not to the Buddha, but to Abhibhu in certain Pi/aka texts, and to the Buddha himself only in late Sanskrit works. In the exposition of Katha Vatthu II, 3 the verses are also ascribed to the Buddha.' The proposition in the Katha Vatthu II, 8 that the Buddha, in the ordinary affairs of life, was not transcendental, agrees with Nagasena's argument in the Milinda, part ii, pp. 8-12. The discussion in the Milinda as to whether an Arahat can be thoughtless or guilty of an offence 3 is foreshadowed by the similar points raised in the Katha Vatthu I, 2 ; II, 1, 2, and VIII, 11. And the two dilemmas, Nos. 65 and 66, especially as to the cause of space, may be compared with the discussion in Katha Vatthu VI, 6, as to whether space is self-existent. The general result of a comparison between these two very interesting books of controversial apologetics seems to me to be that the differences between them are just such as one might expect (a) from the difference of date, and (b) from the fact that the controversy in the older book is carried on against members of the same communion, whereas in the Milinda we have a defence of Buddhism as against the outsider. The Katha Vatthu takes almost the whole of the conclusions reached in the Milinda for granted, and goes on to discuss further questions on points of detail. It does not give a description of Arahatship in glowing terms, but discusses minor points as to whether the realisa- tion of Arahatship includes the Fruits of the three lower paths4, or whether all the qualities of an Arahat are free from the Asavas5, or whether the knowledge of his 1 Milinda, ii, pp. 96-98 (compare 57-59). 2 Milinda, ii, p. 60. 3 Milinda, ii, pp. 98 foil. 4 Katha Vatthu IV, 9. 5 Katha Vatthu IV, 3. INTRODUCTION. XXVli emancipation alone makes a man an Arahat1, or whether the breaking of the Fetters constitutes Arahatship, and whether the insight into Arahatship suffices to break all the Fetters2, and so on. The discussion of these details gives no opportunity for the enthusiastic eloquence of the author of our Milinda, and the very fact of his eloquence argues a later date. But there can be no doubt as to the superiority of his style. And I still adhere to the opinions expressed in the former Introduction that the work, as it stands in the Pali, is of its kind (that is, as a book of apologetic controversy) the best in point of style that had then been written in any country ; and that it is the masterpiece of Indian prose. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. Temple, May, 1894.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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