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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
11450 By practising, apart from men, the banishment of all desire he soon attained the one impersonal 1 Sammata or Sammati seems to be the same as Samatha in P4li (concerning which, see Childers, P&li Dict. sub voce). The Chinese expression ‘yih sin’ (one heart) is generally equivalent to ‘sammata,’ ecstatic union. It cannot here be rendered by sam&dhi. ® The place of ‘ sweet dew’ (amrita). * That is, of a Srotépanna. Spence Hardy, in his Manual of Buddhism, p. 218, also says that An&thapindada entered the first path after hearing the sermon; but in his account the sermon consisted of two stanzas only, ‘He who is free from evil desire attains the highest estate and is always in prosperity. He who cuts off demerit, who subdues the mind and attains a state of perfect equanimity, secures Nirvana; this is his prosperity.’ In this account the idea of ‘ prosperity’ is the same as the ‘ charity of Nirvana’ in our version. ‘ This appears to allude to the circumstance that at the dedication of the Vihara An&thapindada arrived at the third degree of holiness, after which there was but one birth (drop) more to experience before reaching Nirvaza (Manual of Buddhism, p. 220). 206 FO-SHO-HING-TSAN-KING, IV, 18. condition, not! as common folk do now-a-day who speculate upon the mode of true deliverance; 1451 For he who does not banish sorrow-causing samskaras does but involve himself in every kind of question ; and though he reaches to the highest form of being, yet grasps not the one and only truth; 1452 Erroneous thoughts as to the joy of heaven are still entwined by the fast cords of lust?. The nobleman attending to the spoken law the cloud of darkness opened before the shining splendour; 1453 Thus he attained true sight, erroneous views for ever dissipated ; even as the furious winds of autumn sway to and fro and scatter all the heaped-up clouds. 1454 He argued ® not that fsvara was cause, nor did he advocate some cause heretical, nor yet again did he affirm there was no cause for the beginning of the world. 1455 ‘If the world was made by fsvara deva ‘4, there should be neither young nor old, first nor after, nor the five ways of birth (transmigration); and when once born there should be no destruction. 1456 ‘Nor should there be such thing as sorrow or calamity, nor doing wrong nor doing right; for all, 1 These lines appear to be by way of reflection. * ‘Lust’ in the sense of ‘appetite.’ ® Here follows a long dissertation on the subject of the ‘maker’ of the world. The theories refuted are (1) that Isvara is maker, (2) that self-nature is the cause, (3) that time is the maker, (4) that self (in the sense of ‘ universal self’) is the cause, (5) that there is no cause. ‘ Here I begin with inverted commas, as if the discourse were either spoken by Buddha or interpolated by Asvaghosha. IV, 18. CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC. 207 both pure and impure deeds, these must come from fsvara deva. 1457
2‘ Here I begin with inverted commas, as if the discourse were either spoken by Buddha or interpolated by Asvaghosha. IV, 18. CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC. 207 both pure and impure deeds, these must come from fsvara deva. 1457 ‘Again, if fsvara deva made the world there should be never question (doubt) about the fact, even as a son born of his father ever confesses him and pays him reverence. 1458 ‘Men when pressed by sore calamity ought not (if fsvara be creator) to rebel against him, but rather reverence him completely, as the self-existent. Nor ought they to adore more gods than one (other Spirits). 1459 ‘ Again, if fsvara be the maker he should not be called the self-existent1, because in that he is the maker now he always should have been the maker (ever making). 1460 ‘But if ever making, then ever self-remembering °, and therefore not the self-existent one. And if he made without a mind (purpose) then is he like the sucking child; 1461 ‘But if he made having an (ever prompting) purpose, then is he not, with such a purpose, selfexistent. Sorrow and joy spring up in all that lives, these at least are not the works of Isvara; 1462 ‘For if he causes grief* and joy, he must himself 1 In the sense of ‘existing in himself’ or independently. How entirely Northern Buddhism changed its character shortly after Asvaghosha’s time, is evident from the fact that Avalokitesvara, ‘the god who looks down’ (in the sense of protector), became an object of almost universal worship, and was afterwards regarded as the creating god. * That is, ever ‘ purposing’ to make, and so not complete in himself. % «This question, “unde malum et quare,”’ was the question that of old met the thoughtful at every turn. And it has always 208 FO-SHO-HING-TSAN-KING. IV, 18. have love (preference) and hate; but if he loves unduly, or has hatred, he cannot properly be named the self-existent. 1463 ‘Again, if Isvara be the maker, all living things should silently submit, patient beneath the maker's power, and then what use to practise virtue? 1464 “Twere equal, then, the doing right or wrong, there should be no reward of works; the works themselves being his making, then all things are the same with him, the maker. 1465 ‘But if all things are one with him, then our deeds, and we who do them, are also self-existent. But if fsvara be uncreated, then all things (being one with him) are uncreated. 1466 ‘But if you say there is another cause beside him as creator, then Isvara is not the “end of all” ({svara, who ought to be inexhaustible, is not so), and therefore all that lives may after all be uncreated (without a maker). 1467 ‘Thus, you see, the thought of {svara is overthrown in this discussion (s4stra); and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is ours’. 1468 ‘Again, if it be said self-nature? is the maker, this done so. Many of the arguments used in the text may be found in works treating on the subject of ‘evil’ and its origin.
31468 ‘Again, if it be said self-nature? is the maker, this done so. Many of the arguments used in the text may be found in works treating on the subject of ‘evil’ and its origin. 1 So the passage must be translated ; but if so, it would appear, as before stated, that this discourse on the ‘maker’ is introduced here parenthetically by Asvaghosha, not as spoken by Buddha. No doubt the theories and their confutations were such as prevailed in his day. * By self-nature, or, original nature, is evidently meant ‘svabhava.’ The theory of such a cause had evidently gained ground at this time in the North, although it seems unknown amongst IV, 18. CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC. 209 is as faulty as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidy4! sdstras asserted such a thing as this, till now. 1469 ‘ That which depends on nothing cannot as a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause, as the plant comes from the seed; 1470 ‘We cannot therefore say that all things are produced by self-nature. Again, all things which exist (are made) spring not from one (nature) as a cause; 1471 ‘And yet you say self-nature is but one, it cannot then be cause of all. If you say that that self-nature pervades and fills all places, 1472 ‘If it pervades and fills all things, then certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to make, and therefore this cannot be the cause. 1473 ‘If, again, it fills all places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout “all time” have made for ever that which is. 1474 ‘But if you say it made things thus, then there is nothing to be made “in time?;” know then for certain self-nature cannot be the cause of all. 1475 ‘ Again, they say that that self-nature excludes all Southern Buddhists, N&gasena wrote a SAstra (‘of one sloka’) to disprove it. ‘ The usual Chinese expression for ‘hetuvidya’ is ‘in ming ;’ here the phrase is ‘ming in;’ but I suppose this to be either an error, or equivalent with the other. The Hetuvidy4 sastra is a treatise on the ‘ explanation of causes.’ * The argument seems to be that self-nature must have made all things from the first as they are; there is no room therefore for further creation, but things are still made, therefore self-nature cannot be the cause. [19] P 210 FO-SHO-HING-TSAN-KING, IV, 18. guzas! (modifications), therefore all things made by it ought likewise to be free from guvas. 1476 ‘ But we see, in fact, that all things in the world are fettered throughout by gumas, therefore, again, we say that self-nature cannot be the cause of all. 1477 ‘If, again, you say that that self-nature is different from such qualities (guzas), (we answer), since self-nature must have ever caused, it cannot differ in its nature (from itself); 1478
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
11450 By practising, apart from men, the banishment of all desire he soon attained the one impersonal 1 Sammata or Sammati seems to be the same as Samatha in P4li (concerning which, see Childers, P&li Dict. sub voce). The Chinese expression ‘yih sin’ (one heart) is generally equivalent to ‘sammata,’ ecstatic union. It cannot here be rendered by sam&dhi. ® The place of ‘ sweet dew’ (amrita). * That is, of a Srotépanna. Spence Hardy, in his Manual of Buddhism, p. 218, also says that An&thapindada entered the first path after hearing the sermon; but in his account the sermon consisted of two stanzas only, ‘He who is free from evil desire attains the highest estate and is always in prosperity. He who cuts off demerit, who subdues the mind and attains a state of perfect equanimity, secures Nirvana; this is his prosperity.’ In this account the idea of ‘ prosperity’ is the same as the ‘ charity of Nirvana’ in our version. ‘ This appears to allude to the circumstance that at the dedication of the Vihara An&thapindada arrived at the third degree of holiness, after which there was but one birth (drop) more to experience before reaching Nirvaza (Manual of Buddhism, p. 220). 206 FO-SHO-HING-TSAN-KING, IV, 18. condition, not! as common folk do now-a-day who speculate upon the mode of true deliverance; 1451 For he who does not banish sorrow-causing samskaras does but involve himself in every kind of question ; and though he reaches to the highest form of being, yet grasps not the one and only truth; 1452 Erroneous thoughts as to the joy of heaven are still entwined by the fast cords of lust?. The nobleman attending to the spoken law the cloud of darkness opened before the shining splendour; 1453 Thus he attained true sight, erroneous views for ever dissipated ; even as the furious winds of autumn sway to and fro and scatter all the heaped-up clouds. 1454 He argued ® not that fsvara was cause, nor did he advocate some cause heretical, nor yet again did he affirm there was no cause for the beginning of the world. 1455 ‘If the world was made by fsvara deva ‘4, there should be neither young nor old, first nor after, nor the five ways of birth (transmigration); and when once born there should be no destruction. 1456 ‘Nor should there be such thing as sorrow or calamity, nor doing wrong nor doing right; for all, 1 These lines appear to be by way of reflection. * ‘Lust’ in the sense of ‘appetite.’ ® Here follows a long dissertation on the subject of the ‘maker’ of the world. The theories refuted are (1) that Isvara is maker, (2) that self-nature is the cause, (3) that time is the maker, (4) that self (in the sense of ‘ universal self’) is the cause, (5) that there is no cause. ‘ Here I begin with inverted commas, as if the discourse were either spoken by Buddha or interpolated by Asvaghosha. IV, 18. CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC. 207 both pure and impure deeds, these must come from fsvara deva. 1457
2‘ Here I begin with inverted commas, as if the discourse were either spoken by Buddha or interpolated by Asvaghosha. IV, 18. CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC. 207 both pure and impure deeds, these must come from fsvara deva. 1457 ‘Again, if fsvara deva made the world there should be never question (doubt) about the fact, even as a son born of his father ever confesses him and pays him reverence. 1458 ‘Men when pressed by sore calamity ought not (if fsvara be creator) to rebel against him, but rather reverence him completely, as the self-existent. Nor ought they to adore more gods than one (other Spirits). 1459 ‘ Again, if fsvara be the maker he should not be called the self-existent1, because in that he is the maker now he always should have been the maker (ever making). 1460 ‘But if ever making, then ever self-remembering °, and therefore not the self-existent one. And if he made without a mind (purpose) then is he like the sucking child; 1461 ‘But if he made having an (ever prompting) purpose, then is he not, with such a purpose, selfexistent. Sorrow and joy spring up in all that lives, these at least are not the works of Isvara; 1462 ‘For if he causes grief* and joy, he must himself 1 In the sense of ‘existing in himself’ or independently. How entirely Northern Buddhism changed its character shortly after Asvaghosha’s time, is evident from the fact that Avalokitesvara, ‘the god who looks down’ (in the sense of protector), became an object of almost universal worship, and was afterwards regarded as the creating god. * That is, ever ‘ purposing’ to make, and so not complete in himself. % «This question, “unde malum et quare,”’ was the question that of old met the thoughtful at every turn. And it has always 208 FO-SHO-HING-TSAN-KING. IV, 18. have love (preference) and hate; but if he loves unduly, or has hatred, he cannot properly be named the self-existent. 1463 ‘Again, if Isvara be the maker, all living things should silently submit, patient beneath the maker's power, and then what use to practise virtue? 1464 “Twere equal, then, the doing right or wrong, there should be no reward of works; the works themselves being his making, then all things are the same with him, the maker. 1465 ‘But if all things are one with him, then our deeds, and we who do them, are also self-existent. But if fsvara be uncreated, then all things (being one with him) are uncreated. 1466 ‘But if you say there is another cause beside him as creator, then Isvara is not the “end of all” ({svara, who ought to be inexhaustible, is not so), and therefore all that lives may after all be uncreated (without a maker). 1467 ‘Thus, you see, the thought of {svara is overthrown in this discussion (s4stra); and all such contradictory assertions should be exposed; if not, the blame is ours’. 1468 ‘Again, if it be said self-nature? is the maker, this done so. Many of the arguments used in the text may be found in works treating on the subject of ‘evil’ and its origin.
31468 ‘Again, if it be said self-nature? is the maker, this done so. Many of the arguments used in the text may be found in works treating on the subject of ‘evil’ and its origin. 1 So the passage must be translated ; but if so, it would appear, as before stated, that this discourse on the ‘maker’ is introduced here parenthetically by Asvaghosha, not as spoken by Buddha. No doubt the theories and their confutations were such as prevailed in his day. * By self-nature, or, original nature, is evidently meant ‘svabhava.’ The theory of such a cause had evidently gained ground at this time in the North, although it seems unknown amongst IV, 18. CONVERSION OF THE SUPPORTER ETC. 209 is as faulty as the first assertion; nor has either of the Hetuvidy4! sdstras asserted such a thing as this, till now. 1469 ‘ That which depends on nothing cannot as a cause make that which is; but all things round us come from a cause, as the plant comes from the seed; 1470 ‘We cannot therefore say that all things are produced by self-nature. Again, all things which exist (are made) spring not from one (nature) as a cause; 1471 ‘And yet you say self-nature is but one, it cannot then be cause of all. If you say that that self-nature pervades and fills all places, 1472 ‘If it pervades and fills all things, then certainly it cannot make them too; for there would be nothing, then, to make, and therefore this cannot be the cause. 1473 ‘If, again, it fills all places and yet makes all things that exist, then it should throughout “all time” have made for ever that which is. 1474 ‘But if you say it made things thus, then there is nothing to be made “in time?;” know then for certain self-nature cannot be the cause of all. 1475 ‘ Again, they say that that self-nature excludes all Southern Buddhists, N&gasena wrote a SAstra (‘of one sloka’) to disprove it. ‘ The usual Chinese expression for ‘hetuvidya’ is ‘in ming ;’ here the phrase is ‘ming in;’ but I suppose this to be either an error, or equivalent with the other. The Hetuvidy4 sastra is a treatise on the ‘ explanation of causes.’ * The argument seems to be that self-nature must have made all things from the first as they are; there is no room therefore for further creation, but things are still made, therefore self-nature cannot be the cause. [19] P 210 FO-SHO-HING-TSAN-KING, IV, 18. guzas! (modifications), therefore all things made by it ought likewise to be free from guvas. 1476 ‘ But we see, in fact, that all things in the world are fettered throughout by gumas, therefore, again, we say that self-nature cannot be the cause of all. 1477 ‘If, again, you say that that self-nature is different from such qualities (guzas), (we answer), since self-nature must have ever caused, it cannot differ in its nature (from itself); 1478
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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