The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

t Though they do what is unjust or wrong. It must be remembered that above (V. 1, 12-end) it was laid down that all vicious action, when viewed in relation to others, is unjust (in the wider sense of the term).

10, -2-11, 3.] OF PLEASURE. 239

Both incontinence and continence imply something beyond the average character of men ; for the one is more steadfast than most men can be, the other less.

Of the several kinds of incontinence, that of the melancholic temper is more curable than that of those ■svho make resolutions but do not keep them, and that which proceeds from custom than that which rests on natural infirmity : it is easier to alter one's habit than to change one's nature. For the very reason why habits ai-e hard to change is that they are a sort of second nature, as Euenus says —

" Train men but long enough to what vou will,
And that shall be their nature in the end."

We have now considered the nature of continence and incontinence, of hardiness and softness, and the relation of these types of character to each other.

CHAPTERS 11 — 14. OF PLEASURE.

11. The consideration of pleasure and pain also wenust falls within the scope of the political philosopher, p^^uW since he has to construct the end by reference to about^ which we call everything good or bad.

Moreover, this is one of the subjects we are bound to discuss ; for we said that moral \Trtue and vice have to do with pleasures and pains, and most people say that happiness implies pleasure, which is the reason of the name /uaKapiog, blessed, from ^(aipeiv, to rt;juice.

Now, (1) some people think that no pleasure isp. 240 good, either essentially or accidentally, for they say that good and pleasure are two distinct things ; (2) others think that though some pleasures are good most are bad; (3) others, again, think that even though all pleasures be good, yet it is impossible that the supreme good can be pleasure.

• (1) It is argued that pleasure cannot be good, (a) because all pleasure is a felt transition to a natural state, but a transition or process is always generically different from an end, e.g. the process of building is generically different from a house; (6) because the temperate man avoids pleasures ; (c) because the prudent man pursues the painless, not the pleasant ; {d) because pleasures impede thinking, and that in proportion to their intensity (for instance, the sexual pleasures : no one engaged therein could think at all) ;
• (e) because there is no art of pleasure, and yet every good thing has an art devoted to its production ; (/) because pleasure is the pursuit of children and brutes.

(2) It is argued that not all pleasures are good, £ because some are base and disgraceful, and even hurtful; for some pleasant things are unhealthy.

(3) It is argued that pleasure is not the supreme good, because it is not an end, but a process or transition.

Answers to 12. Thcse, then, we may take to be the current l

Tgain^^^ opinious ou the subject ; but that it does not follow ^ita^re thcrcfrom that pleasure is not good, or even the of'yoodand highest good, may be shown as follows. Vulture not In the first place, since "good" is used in two but unim- ' senses (" good in itself " and " relatively good "), activity. naturcs and faculties will be called good in two

11, 4-12, 2] OF PLEASURE. 241

!ses, and so also will motions and processes : and when they are called bad, this sometimes means that they are bad in themselves, though for particular persons not bad but desirable ; sometimes that they are bad in themselves and not desirable even for particular persons, though desirable occasionally and for a little time ; while some of them are not even pleasures, though they seem to be — I mean those that involve pain and are used medicinally, such as those of sick people.

In the second place, since the term good may be applied both to activities and to faculties, those activities that restore us to our natural faculties [or state] are accidentally pleasant.