The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

It is the character of the incontinent man to 4 pursue, without being convinced of their goodness, bodily pleasures that exceed the bounds of moderation and are contrary to right reason ; but the profligate man is convinced that these things are good because it is his character to pursue them : the former, then, may be easily brought to a better mind, the latter not. For virtue preserves, but vice destroys the principle ; but in matters of conduct the motive [end or final cause] is the principle [beginning or efficient cause] of action, holding the same place here that the hypotheses do in mathematics.* In mathematics no reasoning or demonstration can instruct us about these principles or starting points ; so here it is not reason but virtue, either natural or acquired by training, that teaches us to hold right opinions about the principle of action. A man of this character, then, is temperate, while a man of opposite character is profligate.

But there is a class of people who are apt to be 5 momentarily deprived of their right senses by passion, and who are swayed by passion so far as not to act

* i.e. the definitions ; not the axioms, since in Aristotle's language a virSOeais, strictly speaking, involves the assumption of the existence of a corresponding object.

8, 3-9, 2.] INCON'TINENCE. 235

according to reason, but not so far that it has become part of their nature to believe that they ought to pursue pleasures of this kind without limit. These are the incontinent, who are better than the profligate, and not absolutely bad ; for the best part of our nature, the principle of right conduct, still sui-vives in them.

To these are opposed another class of people who are wont to abide by their resolutions, and not to be deprived of their senses by passion at least. It is plain from this, then, that the latter is a good type of character, the former not good.

9. Now, who is to be called continent ? he who omHnenee abides by any kind of reason and any kind of purpose, tinence »ot or he who abides by a right purpose ? And who is to «<* *<«p»»v be called incontinent ? is it he who abandons anv ^''s « ruoi»t-

•' tion.

kind of purpose and any kind of reason ? is even he who abandons a false reason and a wrong purpose to be called incontinent ? — a difficulty which we raised before.* Is it not the case that though " accidentally " it may be any kind, yet " essentially " it is a true reason and a right purpose that the one abides by and the other abandons ? For if you choose or pursue A for the sake of B, you pursue and choose B " essentially," but A " accidentally." But by " essentially" (jcod* avTo) we mean "absolutely" or "simply" (aTrXwc) ; so that we may say that in a certain sense it may be any kind of opinion, but absolutely or simply it is a true opinion that the one abides by and the other abandons.

But there is another class of persons that are aptp. 236 to stick to their opinions (I mean those whom we eall stubborn or obstinate), because they are averse to persuasion and not readily induced to change their mind. These bear some resemblance to the continent, as the prodigal does to the liberal, and the foolhardy to the courageous, but in many respects are different. For it is changing his mind at the prompting of passion or appetite that the continent man dislikes ; he is ready enough on occasion to yield to reason : but it is to reason especially that the obstinate man will not listen, while he often conceives a passion, and is led about by his pleasures.

* Cf. supra, 2, 7-9.