The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

These are the reflections which give rise to the difficulty about what is equitable. Now, in a way, they are all correct and not incompatible with one another; for that which is equitable, though it is better than that which is just (in one sense of the word), is itself just (in another sense), and is not better than what is just in the sense of being something generically distinct from it. What is just, then, and what is equitable are generically the same, and both are good, though what is equitable is better.

But what obscures the matter is that though what is equitable is just, it is not identical wdth, but is a correction of, that which is just according to law.

The reason of this is that every law is laid dowTi in general terms, while there are matters about which it is impossible to speak correctly in genei-al terms. Where, then, it is necessary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so coirectly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all.

The law", indeed, is none the less correctly laid down because of this defect; for the defect lies not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the subject-matter, being necessarily involved in the very conditions of human action.

When, therefore, the law lays down a general rule, but a particular case occurs which is an exception to this rule, it is right, where the legislator fails and is in error through speaking without qualification, to make good this deficiency, just as the lawgiver himself would do if he were present, and as he wouldp. 176 have provided in the law itself if the ease had occurred to him.

What is equitable, then, is just, and better than 6 what is just in one sense of the word — not better than what is absolutely just, but better than that which fails through its lack of qualification. And the essence of what is equitable is that it is an amendment of the law, in those points where it fails through the generality of its language.

The reason why the law does not cover all cases is that there are matters about which it is impossible to lay down a Jaw, so that they require a special decree. For that which is variable needs a variable 7 rule, like the leaden rule employed in the Lesbian style of masonry ; as the leaden rule has no fixed shape, but adapts itself to the outline of each stone, so is the decree adapted to the occasion.

We have ascertained, then, what the equitable 8 course is, and have found that it is just, and also better than what is just in a certain sense of the word. And after this it is easy to see what the equitable man is : he who is apt to choose such a course and to follow it, who does not insist on his rights to the damage of others, but is ready to take less than his due, even when he has the law to back him, is called an equitable man; and this type of character is called equitableness, being a sort of justice, and not a different kind of character.

11. The foregoing discussion enables us to answer i the question whether it be possible or not for a man to act unjustly to himself.

That which is just in one sense of the word we10, 6-11, i.] JUSTICE. 177 found to be those manifestations of the several virtues which the law prescribes ; e.g. the law does not order a man to kill himself, and what the law does not rder it forbids ; and, further, when a man, contrary to the law, voluntarily inflicts hurt without provocation, he acts unjustly (voluntarily meaning with knowledge of the person and the instrument). Now, the man who kills himself in a rage voluntarily acts thus airainst right reason and does what the law forbids : he acts unjustly therefore.