The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

But if to do injustice means simply to hurt a man 4 voluntarily, and voluntarily means with knowledge of the person, the instrument, the manner, etc., then the incontinent man, who voluntarily hurts himself, will voluntarily suffer injustice, and it will be possible for a man to do injustice to himself — the possibility of which last is also one of the questions in dispute.

Again, a man might, through incontinence, volun- 5 tarily suffer himself to be hurt by another also acting voluntarily ; so that in this case also a man might voluntarily suffer injustice.

I think rather that the above definition is incorrect, and that to " hurting with knowledge of the person, the instrument, and the manner," we must add " against his wish."

If we define it so, then a man may voluntarily be 6 hurt and suffer that which is unjust, but cannot voluntarily have injustice done to him; for no one ivishes to be hurt, — even the incontinent man does not wish it, but acts contrary to his wish. No one wishes for anything that he does not think good ; what the incontinent man does is not that which he thinks he ought to do.

9, 4-10.] JUSTICE. 171

7 But he that gives, as Glaucus gives to Diomede in
Homer —

" Gold for his bronze, fivescore kine's worth for nine,"

does not suiSer injustice ; for the giving rests with him, but suffering injustice does not rest with one's self; there must be some one to do injustice.

8 It is plain, then, that suffering injustice cannot be voluntary.

There are still two questions that we purposed to discuss : (1) Is it the man who assigns or the man who receives a disproportionately large share that does injustice ? (2) Is it possible to do injustice to yourself?

9 In the former case, i.e. if he who assigns and not he who receives the undue share does injustice, then if a man knowingh* and voluntarily gives too much to another and too little to himself, he does injustice to himself And this is what moderate persons are often thought to do ; for the equitable man is apt to take less than his due. But the case is hardly so simple : it may be that he took a larger share of some other good, e.g. of good fame or of that which is intrinsically noble.

Again, the difficulty may be got over by reference to our definition of doing injustice ; for in this case nothing is done to the man against his wish, so that no injustice is done him, but at most only harm. I It is plain, moreover, that the man who makes the unjust award does injustice, but not always he who gets more than his share ; for a man does not always do injustice when we can say of what hep. 172 does that it is unjust, but only when we can say that he voluntarily does that which is unjust; and that we can only say of the prime mover in the action, which in this case is the distributor and not the receiver.

Again, there are many senses of the word " do," : and in a certain sense an inanimate instrument, or my hand, or again my slave under my orders, may be said to slay ; but though these may be said to do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act unjustly or to do an act of injustice.

Again, if a man unwittingly gives unjust judg- : ment, he does not commit injustice in the sense of contravening that which is just according to law, nor is his judgment unjust in this sense, but in a certain sense it is unjust ; for there is a difference between that which is just according to law and that which is just in the primary sense of the word : but if he knowingly gives unjust judgment, he is himself grasping at more than his share, in the shape either of favour with one party or vengeance on the other. The judge, then, Avho gives unjust judgment ] on these grounds, takes more than his due, quite as much as if he received a share of the unjust award ; for even in the latter case a judge who awards a piece of land would receive, not land, but money.

Men fancy that as it is in their power to act 1 unjustly, so it is an easy matter to be just. But it is not so. To lie with your neighbour's wife, or to strike your neighbour, or to pass certain coins from your hand to his is easy enough, and always within your power, but to do these acts as the outcome of a certain), 11-16.] JUSTICE. 173 character is not an easy matter, nor one which is

Iways within your power.*

Similarly men think that to know what is just