The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

But, once more, the man who exercises his reason and cultivates it, and has it in the best condition, seems also to be the most beloved of heaven. For if the gods take any care for men, as they are thought to do, it is reasonable to suppose that they delight in that which is best in man and most akin to themselves (i.e. the reason), and that they requite those who show the greatest love and reverence for it, as

346 NIOOMACHEAN ETHICS OF AEISTOTLE. [Bk. X.

caring for that which is dear to themselves and doing rightly and nobly. But it is plain that all these points are found most of all in the wise man. The 1 wise man, therefore, is the most beloved of heaven ; and therefore, we may conclude, the happiest.

In this way also, therefore, the wise man will be happier than any one else. ^"dtou^ 9. Now that we have treated (sufficiently, though realized f summarily) of these matters, and of the virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, are we to suppose that we have attained the end we proposed ? Nay, surely the saying holds good, that in practical matters the end is not a mere speculative knowledge of what is to be done, but rather the doing of it. It is not enough to know about virtue, then, but we must endeavour to possess it and to use it, or to take any other steps that may make us good.

Now, if theories alone were sufficient to make people good, they would deservedly receive many and great rewards, to use the words of Theognis ; but, in fact, it seems that though they are potent to guide and to stimulate liberal-minded young men, and though a generous disposition, with a sincere love of what is noble, may by them be opened to the influence of virtue, yet they are powerless to turn the mass of men to goodness. For the generality of men are naturally apt to be swayed by fear rather than hj reverence, and to refrain from evil rather because of the punishment that it brings than because of its own foulness. For under the guidance of their passions they pursue the pleasures that suit their nature and the means by which those pleasures may9. 1-8.] CONCLUSION. 347 be obtained, and avoid the opposite pains, while of that which is noble and truly pleasant they have not even a conception, as they have never tasted it.

What theories or arguments, then, can bring such men as these to order ? Surely it is impossible, or at least very difficult, to remove by any argument what has loner been ingT^ined in the character. For my part, I think we must be well content if we can get some modicum of virtue when all the circumstances are present that seem to make men good.

Now, what makes men good is held by some to be nature, by others habit [or training], by others instruction.

As for the goodness that comes by nature, it is plain that it is not within our control, but is bestowed by some divine agency on certain people who truly deserve to be called fortunate.

As for theory or instruction, I fear that it cannot avail in all cases, but that the hearer's soul must be prepared by training it to feel delight and aversion on the right occasions, just as the soil must be prepared if the seed is to thrive. For if he lives under the sway of his passions, he will not listen to the arguments by which you would dissuade him, nor even understand them. And when he is in this state, how can you change his mind by argument ? To put it roimdly, passion seems to jaeld to force only, i and not to reason. The character, then, must be already * formed, so as to be in some way akin to , virtue, lovinor what is noble and hatino^ what is base.

But to get right guidance from youth up in the * Before theory or instraction can be any use.

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