The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Of this nature are held to be (1) the manifestations of excellence ; for to do what is noble and excellent must be counted desirable for itself: and (2) those amusements which please us ; for they are not chosen for the sake of anything else, — indeed, men are more apt to be injured than to be benefited by them, through neglect of their health and fortunes. Now, most of those whom men caU happy have recourse to pastimes of this sort. And on this accountp. 336 those who show a ready wit in such pastimes find favour with tyrants ; for they make themselves pleasant in that which the tyrant wants, and what he wants is pastime. These amusements, then, are generally thought to be elements of happiness, because princes employ their leisure in them. But such persons, we may venture to say, are no criterion. For princely rank does not imply the possession of virtue or of reason, which are the sources of all excellent exercise of faculty. And if these men, never having tasted pure and refined pleasure, have recourse to the pleasures of the body, we should not on that account think these more desirable ; for children also fancy that the things which they value are better than anything else. It is only natural, then, that as children differ from men in their estimate of what is valuable, so bad men should differ from good.

As we have often said, therefore, that is truly valuable and pleasant which is so to the perfect man. Now, the exercise of those trained faculties which are proper to him is what each man finds most desirable ; what the perfect man finds most desirable, therefore, is the exercise of virtue.

V Happiness, therefore, does not consist in amusement; and indeed it is absurd to suppose that the end is amusement, and that we toil and moil all our life long for the sake of amusing ourselves. We may say that we choose everything for the sake of something else, excepting only happiness ; for it is the end. But to be serious and to labour for the sake of amusement seems silly and utterly childish ; while to amuse ourselves in order that we may be serious, as6, 4-7, 1] CONCLUSION. 337 acharsis says, seems to be right ; for amusement IS a sort of recreation, and we need recreation because we are unable to work continuously.

Recreation, then, cannot be the end ; for it is taken as a means to the exercise of our faculties.

f- Again, the happy life is thought to be that which » exhibits virtue ; and such a life must be serious and cannot consist in amusement.

Again, it is held that things of serious importance * are better than laughable and amusing things, and that the better the organ or the man, the more important is the function ; but we have already said that the function or exercise of that which is better is higher and more conducive to happiness.

Again, the enjoyment of bodily pleasures is within the reach of anybody, of a slave no less than the best of men ; but no one supposes that a slave can participate in happiness, seeing that he cannot even participate in our life. For indeed happiness does not consist in pastimes of this sort, but in the exercise of virtue, as we have already said

7. But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is of ate reasonable to suppose that it will be the exercise oiu/eathap. ihe highest virtue ; and that wiU be the virtue or u^ut^ excellence of the best part of us.

Now, that part or faculty — caU it reason or what you will — which seems naturally to rule and take the lead, and to apprehend things noble and divine —

* ri ffirowSaJo. It is impossible to convev in a translation the pilay npon the words anovOi and <rxou5euor : tTTrovS-fi, of conrse, is eamestnesg ; tncovScuos nsnally = good simply : here, however, trovdcuos carries both senses, " earnest " or " serions," and "good."

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whether it be itself divine, or only the divinest part of us — is the faculty the exercise of which, in its proper excellence, will be perfect happiness.

That this consists in speculation or contemplati(»i we have already said.

This conclusion would seem to agree both with what we have said above, and with known truths.