The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

Each kind of being, again, seems to have its proper pleasure, as it has its proper function, — viz. the pleasure which accompanies the exercise of its faculties or the realization of its natura And a separate consideration of the several kinds of animals will confirm this : the pleasures of a horse, a dog, and a man are all different — as Heraclitus says, a donkey would prefer hay to gold; for there is more pleasure in fodder than in gold to a donkey.

The pleasures of specifically different beings, then, are specifically different; and we might naturally suppose that there would be no specific difference between the pleasures of beings of the same species. ) And yet there is no small difference, in the pleasures of men at least : what pleases this man pains that ; what is grievous and hateful to one is pleasant and lovable to another. This occurs in the case of sweet

* Sight and touch are classed together on the one hand, and hearing, smell, and taste on the other, because, while the announcements of all the senses are, in the first instance, of secondary qualities (colours, sounds, etc.), it is mainly from the announcements of sight and touch that we adrance to the knowledge of ' e mathematical properties or primary qualities (nimiber, figure, tion, etc.).

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things, too : a man in a fever has a different notion of what is sweet from a man in health ; and a feeble man's notion of what is hot is different from that of a robust man. And the like occurs in other matters also.

But in all matters of this kind we hold that things are what they appear to be to the perfect man.

Now, if this opinion is correct, as we hold it to be — if, that is, in every case the test is virtue, or the good man as such — then what appears to him to be pleasure will be pleasure, and what he delights in will be pleasant.

If what is disagreeable to him appears pleasant to another, we need not be astonished ; for there are many ways in which men are corrupted and perverted: such things, however, are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these men with their disposition. It is plain, then, that we must not allow the confessedly base pleasures to be pleasures at all, except to corrupt men.

But of the pleasures that are considered good, which or what kind are to be called the proper pleasures of man ? We cannot be in doubt if we know what are the proper exercises of his faculties ; for the proper pleasures are their accompaniments. Whether, then, the exercise of faculties proper to the complete and happy man be one or many, the pleasures that complete that exercise will be called pleasures of man in the full meaning of the words, and the others in a secondary sense and with a fraction of that meaning, just as is the case with the exercises of the faculties.

5, 10-6, 3] CONCLUSION. 335

CHAPTERS 6-9. CONCLUSION.

Ife 6. Now that we have discussed the several kinds mppineu

IV^ not amutt'

im virtue and Mendship and pleasure, it remains to n^*, but give a summary account of happiness, since we assume that it is the end of all that man does. And it will shorten our statement if we first recapitulate what we have said above.

We said that happiness is not a habit or trained faculty. If it were, it would be within the reach of a man who slept all his days and lived the life of a vegetable, or of a man who met with the greatest misfortunes. As we cannot accept this conclusion, we must place happiness in some exercise of faculty, as we said before. But as the exercises of faculty are sometimes necessary (i.e. desirable for the sake of something else), sometimes desirable in themselves, it is evident that happiness must be placed among those that are desirable in themselves, and not among those that are desirable for the sake of something else : for happiness lacks nothing ; it is sufficient in itself

Now, the exercise of faculty is desirable in itself when nothing is expected from it beyond itself.