The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

This view of pleasure seems to have been suggested by the pleasures and pains connected with nutrition; for there it is true that we come into a state of want, and, after previous pain, find pleasure in replenishment. But this is not the case with all pleasures ; for there is no previous pain involved in the pleasures

* Adopting Spengel's conjecture, Kevoiiievos for rffiy6fifyos.

p. 324

of the mathematician, nor among the sensuous pleasures in those of smell, nor, again, in many kinds o: sights and sounds, nor in memories and hopes. Whai is there, then, of which these pleasures are the becoming ? Here there is nothing lacking that can b( replenished.

To those, again, who [in order to show thai pleasure is not good] adduce the disgraceful kinds o: pleasure we might reply that these things are no1 pleasant. Though they be pleasant to ill-conditionec persons, we must not therefore hold them to be pleasant except to them ; just as we do not hold that to be wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which is wholesome, sweet, or bitter to the sick man, or that to be white which appears white to a man with ophthalmia

Or, again, we might reply that these pleasures are desirable, but not when derived from these sources, just as it is desirable to be rich, but not at the cost of treachery, and desirable to be in health but not at the cost of eating any kind of abominabh food.

Or we might say that the pleasures are specifically different. The pleasures derived from noble sources are different from those derived from base sources and it is impossible to feel the just man's pleasur( without being just, or the musical man's pleasure without being musical, and so on with the rest.

The distinction drawn between the true frienc and the flatterer seems to show either that pleasure i not good, or else that pleasures differ in kind. Fo: the former in his intercourse is thought to have th( good in view, the latter pleasure ; and while we blam«3, 8-4, 2] PLEASURE. 325 the latter, we praise the former as having a different aim in his intercourse.

Again, no one would choose to live on condition of having a child's intellect all his life, though he were to enjoy in the highest possible degree all the pleasures of a child ; nor choose to gain enjoyment by performance of some extremely disgraceful act,

•ugh he were never to feel pain.

There are many things, too, which we should care for, even though they brought no pleasure, as sight, memory, knowledge, moral and intellectual excellence. Even if we grant that pleasure necessarily accompanies them, this does not affect the question ; for we ^ould choose them even if no pleasure resulted fix>m item.

It seems to be evident, then, that pleasure is not the good, nor are all pleasures desirable, but that some ire desirable, diffei-ing in kind, or in their sources, from those that are not desirable. Let this be taken then as a sufficient account of the current opinions about pleasure and pain.

4. As to the nature or quality of pleasure, we shall puatitre anore readily discover it if we make a firesh start as rdLim^ to foUows:- *'^^-

Vision seems to be perfect or complete at any moment; for it does not lack anything which can be added afterwards to make its nature complete. Pleasm-e seems in this respect to resemble vision ; for 'it is something whole and entire, and it would be ossible at any moment to find a pleasure which ild become complete by lasting longer.

Therefore pleasure is not a motion; for every

p. 326