The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

But I cannot think that it is right to speak thus. For assertions about matters of feeling and conduct cany less weight than actions ; and so, when assertions are found to be at variance with palpable facts, they fall into contempt, and bring the truth also into discredit. Thus, when a man who speaks HI of pleasure is seen at times to desire it himself, he is thought to show by the fact of being attracted by it that he really considers all pleasure desirable ; for the generality of men are not able to draw fine distinctions. It seems, then, that tnie statements are the most useful, for practice as well as for theory ; for, being in harmony with facts, they gain credence, and so incline those who understand them to regulate their lives by them. But enough of this : let us now go through the current opinions about pleasure.

2. Eudoxus thoucrht pleasure was the ffood, because Argument* he saw that all beinors, both rational and irrational, oatrUature strive after it ; but in all cases, he said, that which is desirable * is good, and that which is most desirable is best : the fact, then, that all beings incline to one and the same thing indicates that this is the best thing for all ; for each being finds out what is good for itself — its food, for instance : that, then, which is good for all, and which all strive after, is the good. The statements of Eudoxus were accepted rather

* rh alpeT6v coTers, as no English word can, the transition from desired to desirable.

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because of the excellence of his character than on their own account ; for he seemed to be a remarkably temperate man ; and so people thought that it was not from love of pleasure that he spoke thus, but that what he said really was the fact.

Eudoxus also thought that his point could be proved no less clearly by the argument from the opposite of pleasure : — pain is, in itself, an object of aversion to all beings ; therefore its opposite is desirable for all.

Again, he argued, that is most desirable which we choose, not on account of something else, but for its own sake : but this is admitted to be the case with pleasure ; for we never ask a man for his motive in being pleased, it being understood that pleasure is in itself desirable.

Again, he argued that any good thing whatsoever is made more desirable by the addition of pleasure, e.g. just or temperate conduct; but it can only be by the good that the good is increased.

Now, this last argument seems indeed to show that pleasure is a good thing, but not that it is one whit better than any other good thing ; for any good thing is more desirable with the addition of another good thing than by itself

Nay, Plato actually employs a similar argument to show that pleasure is not the good. " The pleasant life," he says, "is more desirable with wisdom than without : but if the combination of the two be better, pleasure itself cannot be the good ; for no addition can make thf^ good itself more desirable." And it is equally evident that, if any other thing be made more desirp. 321by the addition of one of the class of things that

^'ood in themselves, that thing cannot be the good.

it good is there, then, which is thus incapable of adilition, and at the same time such that men can participate in it ? For that is the sort of good that

■we want.

But those who maintain, on the contrary, that t all desire is not good, surely talk nonsense.

at all men think, that, we say, is true. And to who bids us put no trust in the opinion of manrd, we reply that we can scarce put greater trust in opinion. If it were merely irrational creatures that desired these things, there might be something H what he says ; but as rational beings also desire wem, how can it be anything but nonsense ? Indeed, it may be that even in inferior beings there is some natural principle of good stronger than themselves, which strives after their proper good.