The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
But I must more particularly express my thanks to my friends Mr. A. C. Bradley and Mr. J. Cook Wilson, the former of whom has been kind enough to read the whole of the proof sheets, and the latter a large portion of them. To both, and especially to the former, I am indebted for many valuable suggestions. But, as I have sometimes persisted in my own opinion in spite of their dissent, the reader must not hold them responsible for any of the errors he may detect.
The notes perhaps require some apology ; they may appear to be too many for footnotes to a translation, but they are certainly too few for a regular commentary, leaving without explanation many points that much need it. But if this translation should meet with any favour, I purpose before long to follow it up with an Introduction, in which I shall hope to some extent to make good this deficiency.
F. H. P.
Oxford, February, 1881.
CONSPECTUS.
Of the good or the end
Of moral virtue in general
Of the will
0 f the several moral virtues and vices
Of the inteUectnal virtues
Of forms of moral character other than virtue or vice
First account of pleasure
Of friendship or love
Second account of pleasure
Conclusion
I.
n.
III. 1-5.
III. 6-eud of V
VI.
Til. 1-10.
\ll. 11-end.
YIII. and IX.
X. 1-5.
X. 6-end.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK L
THE END.
?. PAGE
In all he does man seeks some good as end or means ... 1
2. TA« end is the good ; our subject is this and its science,
PoMtics 2
3. Exactness not permitted by snbject, nor to be expected by student, who needs experience and training 3
4. Men agree that the good is happiness, but differ as to what this is. We must reason from facts accepted without question by the man of trained character 5
5. The good cannot be pleasure, as some hold, nor honour, nor virtue 6
6. Various arguments to show against the Platonists that there cannot be one imiversal good : even if there were it would not help us here 8
7. The good is the final end, and happiness is this. To find it we ask, What is man's function ? Resulting definition of happiness 12
8. This view harmonizes various current views 18
9. Is happiness acquired, or the gift of Gods or chance ? ... 22
10. Can no man be called happy during life ? 23
11. Cannot the fortunes of survivors affect the dead ? 27
12. Happiness as absolute end is above praise 28
13. Division of the faculties and resulting division of the virtues 30
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK 11.
MOKAL VIRTUE.
CHAP. PAGE I
1. Moral virtue is acquired by the repetition of the corresponding acts 34 i
2. These acts must be such as reason prescribes ; they cannot be defined exactly, but must be neither too much nor too little ... ' 36
3. Virtue is in various ways concerned with pleasure and pain 38
4. The conditions of virtuous action as distinct from artistic production 41
5. Virtue not an emotion, nor a faculty, but a trained faculty or habit 42
6. Viz. the habit of choosing the mean 43
7. This must be applied to the several virtues 48