Name: Metaphysics — Aristotle (trans. W. D. Ross)
Author: Aristotle

(2) (1. 20ff.). Some other subject might be supposed to change from a state of change into another mode of being. Simpl. and Phil. interpret cis érepov efdos in Phys. 225 22 (answering to ets dAdo el8os, 10684 21) as ‘into another kind of change’, But that is not a natural interpretation of é« peraBodgzrs eis dAXo efdos. It is true that in ll. 26, 27 Aristotle says peraBddde... e& airas tavtns THs

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petaBorns <is adAqv, Sc. petaBodrnv, but that comes after he has recalled the fact that change is between opposites (I. 25). Here he expresses himself more generally in the vague phrase eis aAAo €ldos.

22. otov dvOpwrov ek vooou eis bylevay. oiov must introduce an instance, not an analogy (the use of otov comparationt significandae illustrated in Bz. Jndex 501” 55—502* 1 offers no parallel to the pre- sent use), It is surprising, however, to find the change from disease to health offered as an instance of change from change to another mode of being; in 1, 26 it is offered as an instance of the change from one sfa/e to another which is accompanied by a change from one change to another. One must therefore suppose Aristotle to be here using vécos and tyéeva loosely for ‘falling ill’ and ‘becoming well’; in l. 26 they have their proper sense.

23-25. This sentence is preliminary to the proof that when change takes place from one change to another, this is per acczdens, inci- dental to change from one s/aze to another. In this sentence Aristotle merely lays down the general principle that all change is from one thing to another, and more precisely from opposite to opposite. He will presently apply this principle to change from change to change.

25. There is here a great variety in the readings of the manuscripts and of the Greek commentators ; the best reading seems to be that of A> and Simplicius, wAnv ai pev cis dvtixeiueva odi, 7 8 adi, 7 Kivyots, ‘except that generation and destruction are changes into what are Opposites in one sense (sc, contradictories, e.g. from not-man to man or vice versa), while the other, movement, is change into what are opposites in another sense (sc. contraries, e.g. from up to down, from small to large, from white to black)’. For this distinction be- tween generation-and-destruction and the other kinds of change cf. 1067521 and note, Phys, 23513, 261%8. The readings of most of the manuscripts of the Physics—j 82 kivnows (H), 4 8 Kivy- ois ovx dp0iws (FI)—seem to be attempts to get an antithesis to ai pev eis avrixeipeva Odi after 7 3 dé had been lost by haplography. The reading of EJI', od xwyoes, seems to have been introduced from 1, 3.

26. Aristotle now proceeds to illustrate what he has referred to in ], 23—a change from one change to another, incidental to a change from one s/a/e to another. aya at first sight seems questionable ; it would seem that the change from change A to change B must succeed change A. But, as Simplicius points out, of that which is changing into something else some part must still have something of its former quality (T. 1010418). Change A must partly exist while it is changing into change B,

27. av voonon, ‘if it has fallen ill’.

28. eis dmovavoiy, sc. pera BoAnv, ‘into whatever may be the other change concerned’,

évdéxerar yap hpepety is difficult. It is, on the face of it, inconsistent

342 Commentary

with the immediately preceding statement that the subject must have changed into some state of change. Phil. and Simpl. take Aristotle to be referring to the fact that after falling ill one may rest in the state of illness, and rejecting that fact as irrelevant to the case considered. ‘lz the case supposed, viz. that of change from one change to another, that which has changed from health to ‘disease has also changed from falling ill to recovering (though we must remember that 27 fac/ it may rest in the state of disease) ’.

One is tempted to read ovx évdéyerar, and to suppose ovx« to have fallen out by haplography after ézovavotv. ‘For it is not possible, in the case we are considering, that the subject should be at rest.’

29. kal ér.... dei, ‘and further the change from one change must not be, in any case, into any other change at random, but into the opposite change’.

go. The sense requires a comma after the second éorw. ‘So that it will be the opposite change, viz. recovery of health.’

32. dre pev eis Emorhnuny 6té Sé eis Gyvoray. ayvouay is Prof. J. A. Smith’s emendation of iyieay. One would expect this clause to refer solely to the case last mentioned, the change from remember- ing to forgetting, while tyieay introduces a reference to the remoter case of change from falling ill to recovering. Further, éré... 6ré refers naturally not to different cases but to successive stages in the same case. Again, tyiea in the one case does not answer to érucrjyy in the other. The corresponding pairs of terms are as follows: There is primarily a change from health to illness, or from ignor- ance to knowledge, and incidentally a change from falling ill to re- covering, from recollecting to forgetting. Thus the corresponding term to émorjun is vocos. Finally, the change from recollecting to forgetting is incidental not merely to the change from ignorance to knowledge but also to a subsequent change from knowledge to ignorance. On all these grounds, dyvovay seems to be a necessary emendation ; it is confirmed by the interpretations of Simplicius (842. 18, 24, 26—843. 1) and Philoponus (853. 32, 854. 3).

34. dvdykn Sh Kal thy mpotépay, sc. yeverw yiyverOu. Aristotle takes up the particular case of yevéoews yéeveous rather than the more general one of peraBodjs peraBody. If a generation is generated, its generation must have been generated, and so ad infinitum.

35. ami yéveots has not here its technical meaning of generation as opposed to change in size, quality, or place (cf. 1067) 22 f.)—a meaning which would be pointless here. It means the original, simple coming to be as opposed to the ‘coming to be coming to be’ which has just been mentioned in #34 and will be mentioned again in b2.

by~g. In the extraordinary variety of readings recorded here by the manuscripts and the Greek commentators it is hard to choose that which Aristotle is most likely to have written. There would be little profit in discussing the readings in detail, but the following remarks may be made :

(1) The balance of evidence is in favour of omitting da)és in |. 1, and the sense is not seriously affected by this.

(2) Bz.’s 7 Yeyvd pevov yeyvopevov in |, 2 is what the sense requires, and is confirmed by érav yevyra yeyvopevov, 1. 8.

(3) There is good evidence for the omission of 70 in 1. 2, but TO yuyvopevov seems to be needed rather than yuyvépevoy, as the anti- thesis to te yuyvdmevov yeyvopevov:

(4) The balance of evidence is strongly in favour of 75 as against ei dy in 1. 3. The sentence which Bz. gets by reading «i dy, viz. ei dy) Kal todr’ eyiyverd mote, bot ovK Hv Tw TOTE dy ey: is a more violent instance of dare 2 apodost than any in Aristotle, more violent even than Phys, 232® 12-14, with which he compares it (Avras/. Studien Il. III. 109).

I-2. kat Td yryvopevov... yryvduevoy | # | yeyvduevoy, ‘that which comes to be something (by the simple yéveous) was itself at one time coming to be, so that there was not yet that which simply comes to be something, but there was already something coming to be coming to be something’.

3. Kat Todt eylyvetd Tote, dot’ ok fy Tw tdTe yryvdpevov. There is the same ambiguity in ycyveoOou here as in 70 yryvopevov éylyvero in ], 1. ‘And this was at one time itself coming to be, so that it was not yet at that time coming to be something else’, i.e. coming to be coming to be something, which it was described in |. 2 as being. Cf. 1. 9, where yyvéuevov must from the context be interpreted as meaning yvyvopevov yyvdpevov.

6-7. é...0opd. ‘Further, what is capable of one movement is capable of the contrary movement, and of resting, and what is capable of being generated is capable of being destroyed.’ Philoponus understands % évavria with jpeuyors as well as with «ivyous, and takes Aristotle to mean that what is capable of one sort of rest is capable also of the contrary rest, i.e. of rest in the opposite region of the uni- verse. More probably Simplicius is right in taking jpéuynous to mean the rest which is contrary to the original movement. According to this view Aristotle means that what can move from A to B can also move from B to A or rest at A. In any case kat jpéuyors is paren- thetical, since the possibility of the opposite movement is alone what concerns the argument.

8-10. dote ... POerpduevov. In accordance with the principle just laid down, that which comes to be must also cease to be; the question is, when? Not as soon as it is coming to be coming to be (we must interpret eds yvyvduevoy as opposed to dray yévnra:, so that another yeyvopevov is to be understood—or read—after it), nor after it has come to be (verepoy must apparently mean dray yévyras, as Opposed to drav yevyrat yryvopevov). For what is perishing must exist ; and the yvyvd- pevov does not exist at either of those times; at one of them there is only a yuyvopevoy yeyvdpevov, at the other only a YEVOVOS. It follows, then, that it perishes when it has become, and is, Yeyropevor 5 i.e. it ceases to be while it is coming to be, which i is absurd.

344 Commentary

II, tis ovv éotat domep ... oUTw TU KTA. is an instance of Riddell’s ‘binary structure’ (Apology of Plato, 198, § 209).

14. The reading of the ‘manuscripts, 2 xivyow, is unsatisfactory. The words will hardly bear Bz.’s rendering ‘Denn Bewegung muss Bewegung sein aus diesem bestimmten Etwas in dies bestimmte Etwas, nicht blosse Bewegung’. To get this‘meaning, one would have with Lasson to insert dads after pu xivnow, and this might easily have dropped out before was. But it is better to adopt the reading which Alexander preferred (Simpl. 854. 21) and which is found in most manuscripts of the Physics, } yéveow. ‘For it must be the move- ment or becoming of something from something to something.’

18-19. Aéyw Be 7d movdy od 7d ev TH ovia .,. AAAG TO TaOnTLKOY, Cf.

A. 10207 33, » 8, Change with respect to a zo.dv which is év 77 ovate would be not kivnows but yéveois or pOopd. _ 22. Bz, seems to be right in preferring the reading of the PAysics (confirmed by Simpl. and Them.) kat 8uvdpevov ph Kwvodpevoy 8€ to that of the manuscripts of the JZe/aphysics, pi Svvépevov dé. The essential, in the meaning of a privative word, is not that the sub- ject cannot, but that it does not, have the positive attribute when it might be expected to have it. Cf. Ca/. 12829, A. 1022) 27, ©. 10462 32.

25. The stress is on tod Sextikod. Rest is privation of movement in that which is capable of movement, and therefore not in things which are rather non-movable than immovable (76 dAws ddvvarov kweioOa.).

26—106914. The terms whose relations Aristotle is mainly in- terested in working out are darecOa, é&fjs, éxouevov, ovvexés. apa is introduced as implied in the definition of contact, peragv as implied in the definition of é&js, and évayriov xara Té7ov as connected with the definition of peraév.

The relations between the four main terms are not altogether clear. Aristotle begins by defining contact (éardmevov) and succession (és) quite independently of one another, and says that both attributes must be united to make an éyopuevoy (10691). Thus, to take Simplicius’ examples, two successive numbers are not éyoueva be- cause they are not in contact; and a coat in contact with the body is not éxdpevoy to it because it is not successive to it, not being of the same kind (cf. the definition of succession, 1068” 31); but two suc- cessive houses which touch are éydueva. Later, however, Aristotle implies (1069 g) that €éjs is a wider term including dropevov. 76 yap fs ovx amrerat (‘is not necessarily in contact’), rotro 8’ éfjs. If this be so, if the dréuevov be necessarily é&js, then éyouevov is a mere synonym of dmrémevov and ll. 1, 2 are misleading.

Finally, the continuous is described indifferently as a species of the éxdpevoy (1. 5), or of the daropevov (1. 10). It is the species in which the extremities are not merely together but are one.

Thus there is a confusion between two arrangements of the concep- tions, which may be represented thus: