ouveEXes pay ovvexes
(2) oe | |
drropevov = éxdoevov pn €xopevov
ovvexes pay ovvexes
The latter is the prevalent classification in Aristotle. In no pas- sage other than the present is there any attempt to distinguish exopevov from darropevov.
26. doa év évi témm mpdtw. ‘You are ev 76 ovpavG because you are ev TO dept, ev TO aepr because you are ev TH yp, év TH yy because you are in this place which contains nothing but you’ (P&ys. 2098 33- bi). The last is your rézos iSios, ev & pore (ib. * 33), in which you are directly or proximately.
It is evident, then, that two things cannot be dua xara rémov, for the place which includes nothing but A cannot include nothing but B, Yet Aristotle evidently means that in some sense two things can be dpa Kata torov. ‘Two suggestions may be made as to his meaning. (1) He may mean that two things are dua if they are in one place which includes nothing but the two, i.e. where there is nothing be- tween them. Or (2) he might mean that one thing, occupying one place, may be two things in the sense that it discharges two functions. E. g. the ends of two lines which meet may be said to be dua, but this only means that one point serves as the end of both lines.
But, since dpa is used in the definition not of continuity but of the less close relation of contact (1. 27), and in the PAyszcs the unity of the d«pa is expressly distinguished from their being dya (2277 22), it is evident that the former is Aristotle’s meaning,
33. oloy ypappal ypappjjs, ‘e.g. lines between the given line and the first line of the series’,
106922-5. émei , . . petagd. This section seems to be out of place in the manuscripts both of the Aefaphysics and of the Physics.
346 Commentary
The most appropriate place for it would be before évayriov in 1068? 30, where Prantl proposed to place it. In Themistius’ paraphrase it comes before peragév in 1068> 247 (Phys. 226.23), and 1068) 26— 27 dpa... dpa(Phys. 226? 21-23) are omitted, This position is, how- ever, less appropriate ; it is more likely thatthe sentence was originally a note appended to the mention of +6 jeraév, which has been inserted at the wrong point in the text.
II-12. év ois 8€... tovrors, This repeats in another form what has been already expressed by «i cuvexés, darera.
12. dot obk gor otryph povdd: tadtdév. Aristotle is probably attack- ing the view of Zeno, of whom we are told that ryv otypy os TO ev Aéyet (Simpl. 99. 10). Or it may be, as Philoponus says, the Pytha- goreans that Aristotle has in mind, cf. M. 1080 19, 1083? 14.
Tais pev yap (sc. orvypats) bmdpxet TO datecOar. This is inconsis- tent with the definition of contact in 106824, darecOau dv Tau aKpa. dpa, Sc. kata Torov (cf. 1. 26). Points have no d«kpa; and they have no térros, since they do not occupy space and therefore have no zrepiéxov.
13. kal‘tay pev petatd tu Tay 8 ov. Phys, 227% 30 states this more fully: kai rov pev évdéxerau etval re peradd (race yop ypappa peragd otvypav), Tov & odk dvéyKn’ ovdey yap petagd dvddos Kat povados. Ii there is to be any proper opposition between évdéyerar and ovdK dvdykn, evdexeras must mean dvdyxy evdexecOar, ‘it is always possible’, and odk dvdéyxn Must mean odk dvdyKn evdexerOa. Now every line is between points, and therefore there is sometimes a peragv between points; but if points ever touched, as Aristotle has (1. 12) said they can, there would be no peragév between them. And on the other hand, though successive units have not a peragv, non-successive units have. Thus the opposition is ill thought-out.
BOOK a
Jaeger (Arts. 229 ff.) has various arguments in favour of an early date for A.
(1) Metaphysics is here restricted to the study of non-sensible sub- stance; the study of sensible substance in chs. 1-5 is merely pre- liminary (1069 36—» 2). But Z contains equally explicit statements of this view, and //zs argument appears to have no force.
(2) A. 1071» 6 expresses like K (1060% 22) the view that if there were nothing apart from sensible things there would be no per- manence in the world. Contrast this with the more guarded state- ments of Z. 10335, H. 104315. Like K (1060% 12), A (1071? 20, 1073 4) treats the object of metaphysics as being that which is present in no sensible thing.
(3) There is a very close connexion between A and the early book N. 1072» 30-107323 is based on 1092*g-17, 1075” 37-1076*4 on
1090? 13-20, 10757 25-33 on 10872 29-) 6, 1075*% 34-36 on Iog1® 35-37, 30-32.
But the astronomical theory of Callippus mentioned in ch. 8 belongs to the period 330-325, quite near the end of Aristotle’s life (Jaeger, Arist. 365-367, Heath, Aristarchus of Samos, 197,198, 212). Jaeger points to the difference between the sketchy style of the other chapters, with its series of terse arguments introduced by such words or phrases aS pera Tadra Ort, eri, Kal, dua dé, dpolws Sé, 7) Kai (1069 35, 1070? 4, 1074” 21, 25, 36, 38, 1075* 5, 6, 34, © 14, 16, 28, 34), and the ample style of ch. 8. The astronomical detail of this chapter breaks harshly into the continuity of the speculative theology of chs. 7, 9.
Aristotle seems originally, in the Iept ®urocodias, to have replaced Plato’s notion of a world-soul by that of a separate first mover, but to have retained the notion that each star or planet is moved by a single star-soul. The doctrine of ch. 8 is due to the influence exerted on this early mode of thought by Eudoxus’ analysis of each planetary orbit into several distinct rotatory movements. But the two lines of thought are not satisfactorily combined ; there remain inconsistencies which were already pointed out by Plotinus (Zu. v. 1. 9). In particular the section 1074 31-38 is a fragment (in the curt style characteristic of A apart from ch. 8) representing the older doctrine, and inconsistent with the later doctrine of the ‘intelligences’. There is in this section nothing to which otro in > 3 can refer, but with this section removed ofrox is seen to refer to Oetwy cwpdrwv in * 30,
Ch. 8 then seems to represent a late venture of Aristotle’s in a field in which he was not really at home. He deserts here the path of metaphysical speculation and enters on that of astronomical observation and mathematical reasoning ; and his prentice hand betrays itself in the arithmetical mistake of 1074% 13.
Freudenthal’s careful study of the quotations made by Averroes, in his commentary on this book, from the commentary of Alexander has established the fact that Averroes had before him the genuine com- mentary of Alexander (or rather an Arabic translation of a Syriac version of it), while the commentary which passes under the name of Alexander is not genuine. He argues with great probability that the latter work is to be dated somewhere between a. D. 450 and 600. The same judgement must probably be passed on the commentary on Books E-K, M, N, which have long been thought to stand on a differ- ent footing from the admittedly genuine commentary on A-A. The fact that Averroes was dealing with a translation of a translation greatly diminishes the value of his citations from Alexander, but some important
348 Commentary
hints are to be got from him. Similarly the value of Themistius’ commentary is greatly diminished by the fact that we possess it only in a Hebrew translation of an Arabic translation ; but here again some- thing may be learnt of the text which Themistius had before him,
The three kinds of substance. Change implies matter as well as form and privaiion (chs, 1, 2).
106918. Our subject is substance. For (1) if the universe is a whole, substance is its first part, and (2) if it is only a series, sub- stance is prior to the other categories, Further, these others have not being in the unqualified sense, or we shall have to say that things like ‘the not-white’ have it also. Further, none of the other cate- gories can exist apart. It was of swdsfance, too, that the ancient thinkers investigated the causes. Modern thinkers owing to their abstract method make universals substances, but the ancients identi- fied substance with some particular body such as fire.
go. There are three kinds of substance :-—
(A) the sensible, including
(A 1) the eternal, and
(A 2) the perishable (which is recognized by all)—e. g. plants and
animals,
(&) the unchangeable, to which some thinkers assign separate exis-
» tence;
(a) distinguishing Forms and mathematical objects,
(4) identifying them, or
(c) recognizing mathematical objects alone.
(A) is discussed by physics, (2) by metaphysics.
» 3. Since change is from one contrary or the middle state to the other contrary, there must-be a substratum which changes (for the contraries do not change), and which remains when the contrary does not remain ; and this something is matter.
g. There are four kinds of change—
(1) in respect of the ‘ what ’—generation and destruction,
(2) in respect of quality—alteration,
(3) in respect of quantity—growth and diminution,
(4) in respect of place—locomotion.
14. The matter which changes must be capable of both states. All change is from the potential to the actual, from that which is not (actually), but also is (potentially).
20. Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Anaximander, and Democritus all pointed to matter in their view of the original state of the universe.
24. Different things have different kinds of matter; things that are
A. I. 1069% 19-23 349
not capable of being generated have matter for locomotion. We must not say with Anaxagoras ‘all things were together’, for if they had not differed in matter they would not have come to be different, the reason which was at work on them being admittedly uniform.
32. Thus there are three principles, form, privation, matter.
1069* 19-21. Aristotle states here two alternative ways in which the universe may be regarded, (1) as ddov 11, (2) as 7d edeés, i. €. as being a universe by virtue merely of forming a series. Bz. explains the meaning of dAoy 7c in opposition to this by reference to I, 1052222 76 drov Kal exov Twa poppy Kai eidos, A. 1016) 12 dv pH 71 GAov 7, TOdTO - de dy py 7 €ldos exy ev (cf: H. 10457 10, M. 10772 28, 1084? 30). One may regard the universe as being a unity of form and matter, as every individual substance (except those which are pure forms) is, and in this case, Aristotle says, substance, i.e. substance as form, is evidently the primary element in it. Cf. Z. 10295 70 eidos THs VAns mpdTepov Kat paddov ov. If on the other hand we regard the universe as consisting merely of the categories arranged in a series, substance is evidently the first member of the series.
Bz.’s explanation is, however, not satisfactory. Substance is here contrasted not with matter but with the other categories. The sub- stance which is the subject of study in these chapters (1-5) is not specially substance as form but substance in all the senses enumerated in A. 8, Z. 2, including substance as matter (1069225, 1070%9), as form (10707 rr), and as individual thing (1070412). The contrast is simply that between the view of the universe as a genuine unity, in which substance is the primary element, and the view of it as forming a loosely connected series (the view, in fact, of Speusippus, which is referred to in this book, 1075» 37)—in which case substance is at any rate the first member.
22. It is doubtful whether we should read aAX¢ with the manuscripts or otov with Alexander and Bz. The latter is the easier reading ; the former compels us to take zovéryres in a wider sense than roy, and to suppose that all the categories other than substance are summed up under the two headings zowryres and xwyces. Evidently it would be impossible to bring the categories of relation, time, and place under either heading ; but at any rate quality and quantity might be grouped under wowdryres, and roety and rdoyewv under kivyoes, and Aristotle may have meant the mention of zoidryres and kwyjoes to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. It would be hard to explain the origin of the vulgate reading 7adAAa adda from an original radra otov, while ratra é\Aa& makes the corruption natural enough. Themistius seems (1. 21-23) to confirm édXd.
23. heyowev your etvar kal Tata, otoy oti 0b NeuKov. ov Xevkdv is evidently regarded here as the subject of éorw. Aristotle treats a not- white exists’ as necessarily implied in the fact that, e.g., a man who happens not to be white exists (cf. A. 10172 18).