23. 1 pev ATAS Gh, 7 S€ TUds Tis, E.g. when a man is produced from what was not a man but a seed, this is drAq yeveors; when a particular kind of man (a man with a particular quality, of a particular size, in a particular place) becomes a man with a different quality, size, or position, this is yéveots rus (Phys. 186214, 225214, 15). Any dAXoiwos, avenos OF POicis, OF hopa is yeveois Tis, and can equally well be called ¢Oopa tis (1. 24). Thus all the kinds of change recog- nized by Aristotle are included under the headings of change ovx é& trokeymevov eis troxelevov and e€ troxeysevov eis pr) UToKElpeEvov. Nothing is left for the third kind, change é€ ioxeipévov eis troxelpevov (Il. 15), and in fact Aristotle mentions it no more except very briefly in 106844. The fact is that change of quality, size, or place may be regarded under either of two aspects. Take for instance change of quality. Aristotle first intends to bring it under the head of change e& trroxeipévov eis Uroxeipevov. It is change from X which is A to X which is B, where A and B are positive and contrary qualities. He meant to treat only generation as change ovx e& troxeiévov eis brokeiwevov, but by an after-thought brings qualitative change also under this heading. It may be described not only as it has beenabove, but also as change from X which is not B to X which is B. Or again it may equally well be described as #@opa tis, the destruction of X which is A.
25. To kata otvOeow 7 Staipeow. This is what is in N. 1089%28 (cf. A. 10174 31, E, 1026735, @. 1051» 1) called 7d ws Weddos put Ov. 7O py ov TO Kata oivOeow is an untrue affirmative, ro px) dv TO KaTa dvaipeoiy an untrue negative proposition. Untrue propositions might be thought to change (Aristotle remarks) when they become true, but they do not really themselves change; they become true by a change in the facts (Ca. 4% 23 ff.).
26-27. pyre To kata Sivapiw ... dvtikeipevoy. 7d xara Svvapuy pH év, that which is not, in the sense that it is potentially but not actually so-and-so, is subdivided into (1) that which is opposed to 76 axAds ov, and which is dads pa 70d (I. 29), i.e. the a) dv of which ‘not-man ’ is an instance, and (2) that which is opposed to 76 71 éy, i.e. the pa dv of which ‘not-white’ is an instance (1. 27). These two, with the px dy as Weddos, are the three kinds of not-being here recognized.
go. The common reading ddvvarov yap To pi) dv Kiveto bau leaves the sentence without a principal clause, and further does not agree with its general meaning. Aristotle has said that ro pi) ov has several senses, and that in two of its senses it cannot be moved while in the third it can be moved but only per accidens. That that which is not cannot be moved is evidently not the reason for any of the previous statements but is the summing up of what results from them. ydp should therefore be omitted, with JT and Christ. This is confirmed by Themistius’ words (in Phys. 169. 18) ddvvarov totvuy Ta ovTw pul) dvTa kweto bar.
32. ci yap kat ori pddiora, Kata cupPeByKds yiyverar, i.e. even if it is only in virtue of the matter that accompanies it that the privation can be said to be the /ermznus a quo of generation.
34. Spotws Sé kal 7d Hpepety, i.e. Spuolws ddvvarov Kal Npewely TO uA) Ov (cf. 1. 30), the words in ll. 30-34 being parenthetical. Rest, being the privation of movement, is equally inappropriate to that which is not.
34-35. Taird . . . Sucyep. M. 10856, De Caclo 304% 22 lend support to Jaeger’s emendation, but the sense is rather against it.
35-36. ei... o0x. i here practically = (duoxepées cvp,Baiver) dt, SO that ov« is not irregular. Cf. Kiihner ii. § 511. 4 by.
10682 2, ai eipnpevar, sc. in 1067) rg.
4. kivyows is sometimes used as synonymous with peraBoAn, includ- ing all four kinds of change (cf. 106514), more often as including the three kinds of change other than generation and destruction, as here.
5-7. The terms between which movement (as opposed to genera- tion and destruction) takes place are not contradictories but contraries or intermediates between contraries. Privative terms, though not strictly contraries (since only the extreme degree of privation is con- trariety, @, 1046 14, I. 1055 35), may be classed with contraries since they stand not for the mere absence of a quality but for its absence from a subject which is in some degree qualified to have it. The termini of movement are, unlike the “ermznus a quo of genera- tion and the ¢ermznus ad quem of destruction, expressed by a positive word (dydodrau karapdoer), such as ‘naked ’, ‘toothless’, ‘ black’.
‘Naked’ and ‘toothless’ are typical privative terms, but ‘black’ is for Aristotle a typical contrary. kat dyAoctrar katapdoret, otoy 75 yupvov kal vwdov Kat éAav therefore follows in sense not on kal yap 7 orépyors xetoOw éevayriov (which must be treated as parenthetical), but on ra & brokeipeva 7) évayTia i) meracv.
338 Commentary
7. Bz. in Artst, Stud. i. 37 points out that Aristotle displays great constancy in his choice of examples, and that he nowhere else cites yupvdy as an instance of a privative term. He thinks either ruddAov (cf. Cat. 10 passim, A. 1022” 26) or Wuypov (cf. Cat. 12634, De Caelo 286226, De Gen. e¢ Corr. 318” 17) preferable. But yupvov is quite appropriate, and it would be a mistake to-emend it when the evidence of all the manuscripts both of PAyszes and of AZelaphysics, and of Simplicius and Themistius, is in its favour.
Denial of change of change (ch. 12).
106828. There are three kinds of movement—of quality, quantity, and place; not of substance, because substance has no contrary; nor of relation, for change of relation is accidental to the terms that undergo it; nor of agent and patient, since there is no movement of movement, nor generation of generation, nor, in general, change of change.
16. For (A) change of change would imply (1) that change is a subject of change, which it clearly is not; or (2) that some other subject changes from change into some other mode of existence.
22. But this could only be per accidens. For change is from oppo- site to opposite. Hence the subject would be changing at the same time from health to disease and from this change to another, i. e. into the opposite change, convalescence ; but this can only be per accidens, just as there is a change from recollecting to forgetting only because the subject changes into a state of knowledge and then into a state of ignorance.
33. (2) There will be an infinite regress if there is to be change of change. If coming to be was sometime coming to be, that which comes to be something was itself sometime coming to be, so that there was not yet that which simply comes to be something, but there was already something coming to be coming to be something. But this was sometime itself coming to be, so that it was not yet coming to be something else. Now in an infinite series there is no first and there- fore no subsequent term, so that there would be no change at all.
»6. (C) Generation and destruction belong to the same subject, so that that which comes to be is being destroyed when it has come to be coming to be; it must be then that it is being destroyed, for it cannot be before or after.
10. (D) What can be the nature of the underlying matter of change
or becoming, and what can it be that they change into? The change must be change of something from something into something.
15. Since there is no change of substance, of relation, or of action and passivity, change must be in respect of quality, quantity, or place, each of which contains a contrariety ; quality meaning not that which is included in the essence but that which is a mere affection of its subject.
20. The unchangeable means (1) in general, that which cannot change; (2) that which changes with difficulty or slowly; (3) that which is capable of changing but does not change when, where, and as it might; this alone of unchanging things is said to be at rest, rest being the contrary of motion and therefore presupposing the same gubject.
Sundry definitions.
26. Those things are fogether in place which are in the same proxi- mate place; those things ouch whose extremities are together; those things are Jefween at which that which continuously changes arrives before it arrives at the extremes. Those things are contrary in place which are at the greatest distance in a straight line; that is successive to another which comes after the beginning and has nothing of the same kind between it and that which it succeeds. That is contiguous which is successive and touches.
1069* 2. Since all change is between opposites, i.e. between either contraries or contradictories, and the latter have no intermediates, what is between must be between contraries.
5. The continuous is a species of the contiguous ; it is found when the boundaries of the touching things are one.
8. ‘Successive’ is evidently the first of these terms; for what touches must be successive but not vce versa, and the continuous must touch but not wece versa. Therefore the point is not the same as the unit; for points have contact but units only successiveness, and points have intermediates but units have not.
1068°8. In this list of categories qoré, keto Oar, and éxew are omitted The omission of the latter two is regular; they occur only in Caz, 1b 27, 2%2 f., Top. 103 23. It seems probable that Aristotle had come to regard them not as categories but as sub-categories—perhaps (as Mr. Collingwood has suggested to me) merging them respectively in dudes and é£is, two of the sub-forms of zowy (Caz. 8 26—g* 13). moré occurs in the common text of the corresponding passage in
340 Commentary
the Physics (225 6), but is omitted by EH and by Simplicius (and in the summary in 22623), and its absence is required by the logic of the sentence. Aristotle shows that there are four cate- gories in which there is no movement, and concludes that there are only three in which there is movement._ He must, then, have a list of only seven in his mind, Such a list occurs nowhere else in his writings. Simplicius quotes a discussion by Alexander of the question why there is no movement in the category of time, and discusses the subject himself (829. 29—832. 25). The reason for Aristotle’s omission of time here is probably that he saw that time, having the peculiar relation to a movement of being its number (Phys. 219>1), could not also be related to it as either subject or terminus.
10. kat’ ovaiavy 8 ov. There is change (ueraPody) in respect of substance, but it is not movement (xivyois) but generation and de- struction, being between contradictories, not between contraries. Cf. 1067» 21, 1068 25.
Sid 7d pybev etvar odcia evartiov, cf. Caz. 3% 24.
II. od8€ tod mpds 1. There is no movement of, i.e. in respect of, relation, because A may change in respect of its relation to B when A itself does not change at all but only B. Then the movement of A in respect of relation is only incidental to a change of B in some other respect—in size, quality, or place.
12. Schwegler’s emendation petaPBdddovtos py is required by the sense and is strongly confirmed by Alexander (as quoted by Simpl, 834. 27—835. 2) and by Them. 170. 21~24, as wellas by N. 10884 34.
IZ. o08€ movodvros Kai mdoxovtos. I.e. there is not, besides move- ment in size, quality, and place, another kind of movement in respect of action or passivity. Movement from one activity to another or from one passivity to another or from activity to passivity or vzce versa is, as Aristotle will try to show in ll. 22-33, merely incidental to alteration, increase or diminution, or locomotion.
It is true that acceleration or retardation, or change of direction of movement, is incidental to locomotion, but that is no reason why these should not be viewed as belonging to a distinct class of move- ments, i.e. movements from one movement to another.
14. ktvodvTos Kal Kivounevou, variant names for the categories of roeiy and wdoxew. Cf. Z. 1029) 25.
16. There might be supposed to be ‘change of change’, says Aristotle, in either of two senses. (1) Change might be thought of as a subject that changes from one state into another. But this is absurd.