10677 2-4. dduvatov To Grav... 7 etvar H ylyverOar ev Tr adtav. The reason seems to be given in |. 6 way yap peraBddrdre ef évavriov. It is said to follow from this that there cannot be (1) an ultimate ele- ment other than the four, or (2) an ultimate element which is one of the four. Aristotle takes it as self-evident that (1) an element like that of Anaximander cannot be contrary to all the four d7Ad owpara, and (2) that none of these can be contrary to the other three. Further, any one who represents x as the element of all things, without drawing Aristotle’s distinction between matter and privation, thinks confusedly of « as something that persists in the compounds (which is implied in calling it their element) and yet as something that is left behind when they come into existence.
4. &mavta ylyveoOat mote mip. Cf. Heraclitus, frr. 30, 64, 66, go. Zeller i.° 867 translates this ‘all things will sometime become fire’, and uses it as indicating Heraclitus’ belief in a series of universal con- flagrations. Professor Burnet corrects the mistranslation (Z. G. P. § 78) and shows that Aristotle refers only to the Heraclitean doctrine of ‘the upward and downward path’. The evidence for a Heraclitean doctrine of a general conflagration is late and untrustworthy; cf. Burnet, §§ 77, 78. Aristotle does not say that there is a time at which all things together become fire, but that there is nothing which does not sometime become fire.
5-6. 68 adrds ... puorkot, ‘the same argument applies to this one of the four elements which is the element of all the others, as applied to the one apart from the four elements which the physicists (Anaxi- mander) posited’—for which cf. 1066 35—1067? I.
8. 6 adtds Toros Shou kal popiov. Aristotle does not mean that the place (i.e. 76 rod repiéxovros 7épas, the inner limit of that which contains the thing, Phys. 212% 20) of a whole is identically the same as that of any of its parts, but that the region of the universe proper to a whole is also the region proper to each of its parts. A clod of earth tends to fall towards the region proper to the earth, i.e. the part of the universe next the centre. ;
The argument against an infinite body based on difficulties about its place discusses it under two alternative hypotheses, (a) that it is homogeneous throughout (Il. 9-15), (4) that it contains parts of different nature (ll. 15-23).
otoy tis yfjs- Bz. would add kai Bodov past rom the Physics. But the PAysics has an altogether fuller text, for it reads not only these
Na) Sh kas Pee BOR SE SRR Os
words but further xat rupds kal orivOjpos. otov ris ys is intelligible enough by itself.
8-15. The argument to show that there cannot be a homogeneous infinite body is difficult. Aristotle first states the general position, and then (11-15) illustrates it by taking a particular case. The general argument is:
(A) If the infinite body is homogeneous, it will be immovable or else always in motion.
(2) This is impossible.
(C) For why should it rest, or move, down, or up, or anywhere in particular, rather than anywhere else?
(Therefore (D) there cannot be a homogeneous infinite body.)
Here each of the first three propositions is difficult. (1) The justification for (A) seems to be as follows: Since the whole is homogeneous, there is no part of its place which is more appropriate to one part of the whole than to another. The natural conclusion then is that each part, and therefore the whole, should remain where it is. But if the whole should move, then since no part of its place is a more appropriate resting-place for any part of the whole than for any other, it will never cease moving.
(2) (B) and (C) (rotro 8% ddvvarov* ti yap paddXov KaTw 7) dvw 3) éovodr ;) look as if they referred only to the second alternative conse- quent (det oicfjoerar). But if that be so, the first alternative is never shown to be false, and the antecedent (ci éuoedés) is never refuted. rovro dé ddvvarov must be taken to set aside both alternatives. This it will do if ré yap paAAov Kdétw 7) avw 7) dzovoty be taken to mean ‘why should any part of the whole be resting unmoved, or be moving, in the downward or the upward or any particular region?’ The question is grounded on the fact that, the whole being homo- geneous, every part of its region is equally proper to every part of the whole. xdrw, avw, érovodv must refer to the place of rest, or motion, of the parts of the infinite whole; as applied to the whole itself they would be unmeaning. Accordingly Aristotle proceeds to illustrate his argument by the case of a clod of earth,
g. Simplicius points out that the opposition of dmuoedes to dvo- povoy is not identical with that of dzAoty to ovvOerov (1066 26). A oiv@erov is dmoedés if its elements so thoroughly coalesce as to lose their own nature, as happens in pigis as Aristotle conceives it.
10-15. Aristotle now comes to the particular case, that of a clod of earth. He considers and rejects various alternatives that present themselves. (1) Will the single clod occupy the whole region of earth? Obviously not. (2) How else can it rest, or move? (@) Sup- pose it to rest somewhere, it will equally well rest everywhere (all parts of the region of earth being alike to it), and so will never move. (4) Sup- pose it to move in one place, it will equally move everywhere, and so will never rest. That it should never move, and that it should never rest, Aristotle treats as alike absurd, in view of his experience of the fact that earth sometimes moves, viz. when it is not as near the centre
334 Commentary
of the universe as it can get, and sometimes rests, viz. when it is as near as it can get.
12. It is best to follow most manuscripts of the Physics in read- ing Tod cuyyevods airy odparos instead of airis Tod cvyyevods cwparos. The order in the latter reading is very improbable, and Aristotle seems always to use the dative with cvyyevjs except when it is used as-a noun,
17. taét, the parts of the infinite body.
18. temepacpeva prev obv obx oidy te. Light is thrown on the argu- ment by 1066 28-34. A finite number of kinds cannot make an in- finite whole, because some of them (i.e. at least one) would have to be infinite in quantity in order to make up an infinite whole, and these (or this one) would swamp and destroy the others, and prevent the whole from having the variety it is supposed to have. Aristotle tacitly assumes that a// the kinds could not be infinite in quantity ; they are limited by each other and thus cannot all be infinite.
20. xal dmha, ‘and if the parts which differ in species are themselves simple’. This is important with a view to both the conclusions that are drawn in |, 21.
21. ei 8€ toér aduvatov, sc. that there should be an infinite number of elements. ‘This has been proved impossible in P&ys. i. 6.
22. ot tTémot memepacpévor, i.e. there are only six regions, up and down, before and behind, right and left (Phys. 205» 31).
kal 75 wav dvdykn twetepdvOa, i.e. the universe must contain a finite number of kinds of part, and therefore (in view of the argument in Il. 18-20) be itself finite.
24. ei wav cdpa aicOntov 4 Bdpos exer } Koupdtyta. The heavenly spheres have neither ; but they are not aic6yrd.
29. témou Sé eld €€, cf. ]. 22 n.
35-37. otov Kivnots Kata Td péyeBos ... xpdvos Bé Bid Thy Kivnow, cf. A. 1020828. Time is dpibods kujoews, Phys. 219% 1.
Change and movement (ch. 11).
10671. That which changes may change (1) per acczdens ; or (2) because a part of it changes; or (3) directly fer se. That which moves another may be similarly divided. There is something that moves directly, something that is moved, a time in which it is moved, something from which and something into which it is moved.
9. The forms, affections, and places which are the termini of motion are themselves unmoved. Change er se does not take place between all things, but between contraries and their intermediates, and between contradictories.
14. Change must be from A to B, from not-A to not-B, from A to not-A, or from not-A to A (A and B standing for the positive terms), so that there are three kinds of change, since the process from not-A to not-B is not change, these terms being neither contrary nor contradictory.
21. Change from not-A to A is generation, simple or qualified ; that from A to not-A is destruction, simple or qualified.
25. If neither that which is-not in the sense that it is a false proposition, nor that which is-not in the sense that it is only potentially, can be moved (that which is not white may be moved per accidens, since the not-white may be a man; but that which simply is not a particular thing cannot in any sense be moved), that which is not cannot be moved (and therefore generation is not motion, for that which is generated is not, and therefore that which is not is—ger acctdens—generated) ; nor can it be at rest. :
34. A further difficulty is that that which is moved is in a place but that which is not is not in a place.
36. Nor, again, is destruction motion ; for the contrary of motion is motion or rest, but the contrary of destruction is generation,
1068" 1. Of the three kinds of change, generation and destruction (the changes from not-A to A and from A to not-A) are not motion ; motion must be the change from A to B. The termini are either contrary or intermediate (privative terms may be treated as contrary), and are indicated by positive terms such as ‘naked’.
Chapters 11, 12 contain a series of extracts from Pfys. vy. 1-3 on the nature of change and on the definition of certain general physical relations.
1067" 6. Bz. is certainly right in omitting 1, with Bessarion and the Physics. is due to the influence of gor: 8€ 7, Il. 5, 8.
7. Bz. inserts with Bessarion and the Aldine 76 pe before xaré. ovpB_eBnxos ; but the ellipse Of 76 wév before 75 8€ is not uncommon in Aristotle ; cf. Bz. Zndex 166 55.
8. 16 kiwvodv mpStov, the proximate mover.
15. €& SroKeypevouv. wtoxeipevov, aS Aristotle says in 1. 18, is here used not in the sense of substance but in the more general sense of anything denoted by a positive name, whether this be a substance or an attribute.
16. otk é§ Gmoxewpévou is idiomatically = e€ ovy tmoxepevov. CF. Bz. Index 5397 14.
19-20. 4 yap... petaBody. If there is a change from non-A to non-B we may be sure that the non-A-ness is merely a concomitant of B, which is the real starting-point of the change, or the non-B-ness a mere concomitant of A, the real terminus of the change.
336 Commentary
21. Bz. would place ot odk dytiBeors before ore |. 20, and this would give a reading corresponding more closely to that of Pays. 225%10 7 yep ovK et DroKELpEvov ets ra) DmoKelpevov OvK OTL peraBohn dua TO py civar Kar dvTiOeow" ove yap évavtia ovre dvripacis é €oTW. That order is the preferable one, but the order given in the manu- scripts yields a fair sense. ‘There carinot be change from non-A to non-B because they are not related as the terms of a change must be, as contraries or contradictories; they cannot be either, since they are not opposed at all.’
22. kat dvtipaow. I.e., the relation of the zermznus a quo to the terminus ad quem is in this case (as opposed to that of change eé trokeymevov eis U7oxKeipevov) One of contradiction, not of contrariety.