Timaeus — Plato

I say, always in existence and without beginning? or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible ; and all sensible things are apprehended by opinion and sense and are in a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must, as we affirm, of necessity be created by a cause.

But the father and maker of all this universe is past finding out ; and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible. And there is still a question to be asked about him : Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world, — the pattern of the unchange- 29 able, or of that which is created?

If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, it is manifest that he must have looked to that which is eternal ; but if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must have looked to the eternal ; for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of causes.

And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the likeness of that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must therefore of necessity, if this is admitted, be a copy of something. Now it is all-important that the beginning of everything should be according to nature.

And in speaking of the copy and the original we may assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe ; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and, as far as their nature allows, irrefutable and immovable — nothing less. But when they express only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be likely and analogous to the real words.

As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised.

Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others ; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the tale which is probable and enquire no further. Soc. Excellent, Timaeus ; and we will do precisely as you VOL. III. — 44

Tinmetis. SOCRATKS, TlMAKlS

God was the cause of it, and he fashioned it after the eternal pattern.

The eternal pattern can be spoken of with certainty ; the created copy can only be described in the language of probability.

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The idea of the perfect animal.

Tintaeus. Socrates, TiMAEUS. God made the world good, •wishing everything to be like himself. To this end he brought order into it and endowed it with soul and intelligence.

The original of the universe is a perfect animal, which comprehends all intelligible animals, just as the copy contains all visible animals.

bid US. The prelude is charming, and is already accepted by us — may we beg of you to proceed to the strain ? Tim. Let me tell you then why the creator made this world of generation. He was good, and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as they could be.

This is in the truest sense the origin of creation and of 30 the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men : God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was in every way better than the other.

Now the deeds of the best could never be or have been other than the fairest ; and the creator, reflecting on the things which are by nature visible, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the inteUigent taken as, a whole ; and that intelhgence could jiQt be present in anything which was devoid of soul.

For which reason, when he was framing the universe, he put intelhgence in soul, and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by nature fairest and best. Wherefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a hving creature truly endowed with soul and inteUigence by the providence of God.

This being supposed, let us proceed to the next stage : In the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? It would be an unworthy thing to liken it to any nature which exists as a part only ; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing ; but let us suppose the world to be the very image of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions.

For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For the Deity, intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending within itself all other animals of a kindred nature. Are we right in saying 31 that there is one world, or that they are many and infinite? There must be one only, if the created copy is to accord with