Timaeus — Plato

The third trial. 295 Very true, he said. Republic ix. Twice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the Socrates, unjust in this conflict ; and now comes the third trial, which ^^^"^o"- is dedicated to Olympian Zeus the savioiu- : a sage whispers ^ '^'^ p'*^*" •' ... sure IS not in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite relative but true and pure — all others are a shadow only ; and surely ^^^^o^"'^ this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls? Yes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself? I will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions. Proceed. Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain? True. And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain? There is. A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either — that is what you mean? Yes. You remember what people say when they are sick? What do they say? . That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill. Yes, I know, he said. And when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must The states have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to '"'ermediate ■' ox between get rid of their pain? pleasure and I have. P^^'" ^7 , termed plea- And there are many other cases of suffering in which the sures or pains mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoy- °"'^ '" y^'^' r •> J f J J t,ori to their ment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure? opposites. Yes, he said ; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest. Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful? Doubtless, he said. Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain? So it would seem.

p. 296

The greater or less reality of pleasure.

Republic IX. Socrates, Glaucon.

Pleasure and pain are said to be states of rest, but they are really motions.

All pleasures are not merely cessations of pains, or pains of pleasures ; e. g. the pleasures of smell are not.

But can that which is neither become both? I should say not. And both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not? Yes. But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest 584 and not motion, and in a mean between them? Yes. How, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain? Impossible.

This then is an appearance only and not a reality ; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant ; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition? That is the inference.

Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. ♦ What are they, he said, and where shall I find them? There are many of them : take as an example the pleasures of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains ; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said. Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure. No. Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort — they are reliefs of pain. That is true. And the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature? Yes. Shall I give you an illustration of them? Let me hear.