Timaeus — Plato

The nature of courage. 1 19 courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the Republic iv. name of courageous to the State. » Socrates, How do you mean? Glaucon. Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or ^^> ^,l!^?""'" cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes makes the city out to war on the State's behalf. courageous is found chieny No one, he rephed, would ever think of any other. in the soldier.

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either the one or the other. Certainly not.

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of her- it is the self which preser^^es under all circumstances that opinion pre^s^J^e^ "^ about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared right opinion in which our legislator educated them ; and this is what you \^ beVeare? term courage. and not to be I should like to hear what you are saymg once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation. Salvation of what? Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education ; and I mean by the words * under all circumstances ' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration? If you please.

You know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool illustration for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white ^^"^^^^n^^^ colour first ; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds ; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes or without them can take away the bloom.

But, when the ground has not been duly prepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any other colour. Y|s, he said ; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

I20

Te7nperance, or the mastery of self.

Repiiblic IV. Socrates, Glaucon. Our soldiers must take the dye of the laws.

Two other virtues, temperance and justice, which must be considered in their proper order.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and 430 gymnastic ; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure — mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye ; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other solvents.

And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity ^vith law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree. But I agree, he replied ; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave — this, in your opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have another name. Most certainly.

Then I may infer courage to be such as you describe? Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words * of a citizen,' you will not be far wrong; — hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice ; and for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough. You are right, he replied.

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State — first, temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search. Very true. Now, can we find justice without troubhng ourselves about temperance? I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of ; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.

Certainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request. Then consider, he said. Yes, I replied ; I will ; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding. How so? he asked.