The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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8. 5- Now, if we take 'pratitya-samutpada as meaning «relative existence» (then it will cover both cases, wliere the generalised meaning is wanted and w T here a single case is meant). When it takes into account all possible things then the generalised meaning is applied in the following way, «in every case, dependent upon a correspondiDg complex of causes and conditions, something exists, i. e., it arises, in coordination with them)). 1 But when a single thing is referred to, then there is no need for applying the genera¬ lising meaning, (we then understand it to mean that, e.g., some visual con¬ sciousness has arisen) in coordination with (some momentary flash) of the faculty of vision and some colour. But the Master (Bhavaviveka in main¬ taining that we assume generalisation in all cases) has betrayed his incom¬ petence to quote the opinions (which lie combats).
VI. BhAVA VIVEKA’S CRITICISM OF BUDOHAPALITA’S COMMENT
8. io. The following (criticism of our definition by Bhavaviveka) is likewise unfounded. (He thinks that our interpretation of the sentence) «visual consciousness arises w hen coordinated with the sense of vision and some colour» is wrong, (because w r e have expressed this interdependence by the word «reaching», pratitya—prapya, one thing springs up when ((reaching» the other). «There are here (says he) no two things («reaching» one an¬ other)!)) We cannot understand this criticism! What is the reason adduced? He says that if one thing is not attained, not ((reached)), how r is (the other) to originate? There is no argument. It is mere begging the question. 2
9. l. But perhaps his real argument is the following one. Consciousness being mental (and the sense of vision physical), the first cannot be reached by the second. Experience teaches that only material things can be reached by the sense of vision. But this is a trivial (objection). The term ((reaching)) is used (in Scripture when the attaining of spiritual aims is in question), e. g., «this recluse has reached the goal®. Others reject the criticism upon the score that ((reaching® is synonymous with «being dependent®. Our
1 This is also mentioned by Vasubandhu loco. cit. and Yasomitr a, as the interpretation of Srllabha. The interpretation pratitya=prapya is also criticised in the Ab. Kosabh. ad III. 28, but on different grounds. It is supposed to suggest a consecution of elements, and to leave out of account the interdependance of simultaneously existing elements.
2 Lit., p.8.10-9.1. «And this is wrong (on the part of Bhavaviveka. He says,) „and more¬ over it is not right to maintain that in relation to ( = in reaching) the eye and the colours, visual sensation arises, because two things (reaching one another are here) impossible “. Just the incri¬ minated fault is nonsense. Why? Because «how is it that (one thing) will arise when (the other)
(common) Master Nagarjuna has himself used it in this sense (in his Yuktisastika), «if something springs up after having reached this or that, (i.e., if something is dependent upon this and that), it is not really produced (by these conditions).®
VII. The DEFINITION OF THE TERM BY BHAVAVIVEKA
As to the opinion pleaded by (Bhavaviveka) himself it is also not (quite) 9. 7 . correct. Indeed he gives the term pratUya-samutpada the meaning «of being re¬ lative to something else® in the sense of (a disjunctive judgment), «if this is, that appears®, ((because this has appeared, that will appear®. 1 Although the w r ord ((dependent, origination® consists of tw r o w r ords, it is not right to sup¬ pose that each part refers to a different object. 2 The (parts) are only men¬ tioned with a view r to etymological explanation.
(Bhavaviveka) further says, « pratltya-samutpcida is thus named (wit- 10 . 3. hout any regard to its being composed of two words), we can take it as a conventional expression (for Relativity) just as the expression «the forest ornament® (is used to designate something utterly useless, without any connection either with forest nor with ornament)®.
This also misses the mark, since our Master admits the term to have a meaning which harmonises with the meaning of its parts. (Indeed he says), ((whatsoever appears as relative to this and that is not really existent®.
At last (Bhavaviveka) explains the term to mean (mere Relativity), io. 6. «this being, that becomes, e. g., as far as there is something short, there is also something long®. Does he not admit exactly the same meaning as w r e do, i.e., (the meaning of Relativity)? The long exists (not independently, but) as far as it is coordinated to the short, as relative to the short, as dependent upon the short. Thus Bhavaviveka rejects (with one hand) w T hat he accepts with the other. This is not right, but w r e will not insist upon this point.
is not attained, not reached))?—(these words of Bh.) are a bare postulate without any argument)).