The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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We thus see that an appeal to the mystical power of yoga is a common feature of many Indian philosophical systems. It is needed to fill up the place of the four main subjects which are another general feature of the Indian systems. The originality of each system lies in its ontology, its theory of cognition, its conception of the Absolute, and the details of its construction of a path leading to Final Release. The Nyaya-Vaisesika system assumes a limited number of substances with their changing qualities. The Soul of the individual is here represented as an eternal substance, it is ubiquitous and conterminous with space. Knowledge is produced in it by a special contact with an internal organ of a physical nature. When the body is removed from one place to another, feelings and ideas are produced in a new part of this same motionless 1 substance by its occasional contact with the internal organ which follows the movement of the body. Soul is thus a semi-material ubiquitous substance similar to space and time which in this system are equally conceived as separate ubiquitous substances. This con¬ struction facilitates the transition out of phenomenal life with its feelings and cognitions into the Absolute, which is the absolutely senseless and lifeless state of this very substance. By the power of absorption the internal organ is kept back from all contact with the Soul and the senses. No con¬ sciousness is then produced, all life is annihilated, but the substance of the Soul reverts in Nirvana to its original and natural condition ( svarupavastha ).
The Nyaya and Vaisesika were at an early date engaged in a contro¬ versy with the Vedantins about the condition of the liberated Soul. The YaiSesikas maintained that it was simply a- cessation of all life, just as a cessation of fire when all fuel is exhausted. 2 What is this eternal bliss
1 Faddegon, Vaisegika System, p.272—3, thinks that this Soul was imagined «as really moving». Thi3 is quite impossible since it represents a unity (Vais. S. HI, 2, 19) and is omni¬ present (vibhu, parama-niahat, ibid. VII. 1, 22). Cf. also NySyabindutika ed. B. B., p. 65, ni*kriya$ catma... sarvagatah.
2 In his vindication of a substantial Soul Faddegon, op. cit., p. 276 ff., apparently and what is this e'ernal consciousness, they ask, which constitutes the essence of the eternal spiritual principle according to the Vedantins? Since all objects of knowledge have entirely disappeared for ever in Nirvana, it is a joy without something to be enjoyed, and it is knowledge without knowing anything. Such feeling and such knowledge, even if they existed, would be as good as if they never existed at all ( sthitopy asthitan na visisyate)} «But then», asks an objector, «your Soul would be as lifeless as a stone?» 2 The Vaisesika concedes the argument, although he seems to prefer, as a sort of image mediatrice, the comparison with space. 3 A question is next asked which gives expression to that feeling of estrangement which is so strong when we think of annihilation as an ultimate goal. «No wise men will ever strive to attain Final Deliverance (moksa-nirvana) if, after all consciousness and life have been annihilated, it becomes similar to a piece of rock (sila-sakala-kalpa),* if it is undistinguishable from a stone ( pdsdna - nirvisesah), if it is inanimate (jada).y> «But, says the author, wise men do not exert themselves for bliss alone. Experience shows that they also exert them¬ selves to escape pain, like when they, e. g, «avoid being stung by thorns». 5 Phenomenal life being here comparable to pain, the result is that the annihila¬ tion of it alone is the ultimate aim of man on earth. This ultimate annihilation and this lifeless substance receive the epithet of the place of Immortality ( amrtyu-padam ), 6 the same epithet wlich final annihilation receives in Early Buddhism. Its eternal unchanging character is thereby emphasized.