The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

by «voi(l» which signification the term has in common life, but not as a technical term in philosophy. That the term sunya is in Mahayana a synonym of dependent existence (pratitya - samutpada) and means not something void, but something «devoid» of independent reality (svabhdva-sunya), with the implication that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality, and with the further implication that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (nisprapanca), since they can only bifurcate ( vikalpa) reality and never directly seize it — this is attested by an overwhelming mass of evidence in all the Mahayana literature . 1 That this term never meant a mathematical void or simple non - existence is most emphatically insisted upon. Those who suppose that sunya means void are declared to have mi¬ sunderstood the term, they have not understood the purpose for which the term has been introduced. 2 «We are Relativists, we are not Negativists!» insists Candrakirti . 3 The text book of the Madhyamika school opens by something like a hymn in honour of Dependent Origination, or Relativity. It can be rendered thus:

The perfect Buddha, the foremost of all Teachers I salute!

He has proclaimed the principle of Relativity,

The principle that nothing (in the Universe) can disappear,

Nor can (anything new) appear,

Nothing has an end,

Nor is there anything eternal,

Nothing is identical (with itself),

Nor is there anything differentiated,

Nothing moves, neither hither, nor thither.

It is (Nirvana), the blissful Quiescence
Of every (possible) Plurality . 4

but as implicated with all the categories (cp. G. Grote, Aristotle ed. Bain2. p. 88) and although he does not maintain that the relative is unreal, but he declares it to be Ens in the lowest degree (ibid. p. 85). The question whether Ens is itself relative he leaves unsolved.

1 Ibid. 491,1 — niravaSesa-prapanca-ujmSamartham Sunyatd upadisyate: XXlV,is— yah pratitya-samatpddcih Sunyatdm 1am pracaksmahe; p. 503,12 — yo'yam pratitya-samutpado hetupratyayan apeksya rupa-vijhdnddinam pradur-bhavah sa svabhavena anutpadah... sd Sunyatd; p. 504,3 — yah jrrutyaya-adhinu sa Sunya ukto; 403,l — aSunyam... apratitya-samutpannam: p. 591,6 — iha sarva-bhavanam pratitya-samutpannatvdc chunyatvam sakalena Sastrena pratipdditam, etc. etc.

2 Ibid. XXIV.7, p. 490n — na cdpi Sunyatdydm yat prayojanam tad vijandsi.

3 Ibid. 368.7.

4 M. vr., p. 11. 13.

NIRVANA

XV. The real eternal Buddha cognised in mystic intuition

Applying this method to the Hinayanist conception of an extinct Buddha, representing nevertheless an eternal lifeless substance (svabhava or dharma ), Nagarjuna flatly denies the reality of the latter, notwith¬ standing all the reverential feelings which the idea must have evoked. Buddha is conceived in the Hinayana as the ultimate goal of the world’s progress, realised in a continuous stream of existences (bhavosamtati ). 1 He can really exist so far this progress really exists, but an independent existence of both is impossible, because, being interde¬ pendent, they are correlative and hence not absolutely real. Just as a man suffering from an eye - decease perceives a double moon 2 in the sky, just so does the inveterate ignorance of mankind dychotomise every reality. Only ignorance 2 can imagine that the Hinayanistic Buddha has any real existence of his own . 3 Never did the Buddhas declare that either they themselves or their elements really did exist . 4 But, of course, it is not for the unsophisticated simple man that the Hinayanistic Buddha is devoid of any existence. Not being able to withstand the lion’s roar of Relativity , 5 the Hinayanist, the man of a poorly religious enthusiasm , 6 runs away, like an antelope, into the dark forest of Realism. But the Mahayanist’s denial does not mean that every hope of salvation must be given up , 7 because that Buddha who is above every possible determination ( nisprapanca ) is not denied . 8 The Mahayanist, when maintaining that the Buddha, as conceived in Hinayana, is not absolutely real ( nihsvabhava ), if he wishes to state the whole-truth ( aviparitdrtha ), 9 must confess that he cannot even assert so much. Strictly >peaking he can assert neither that the Buddha is relational, nor non-relational, nor both at once, nor neither . 10 Such characteristics are also conventional (prajnapti ). They are imputed characteristics (dropito vyavaharah ). 11 The real Buddha must be perceived directly by intuition. The reserved questions, the impossibility to answer whether the world is finite