The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)
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We will now shortly refer to the main lines of the philosophy of the Hinayana in order better to show the radical change produced by the spirit of Mahayana and thus to elicit the real aim of its philosophy.
XII. The doctrine of causality in the hinayana
In a previous work 1 we have characterized Early Buddhism (Hina¬ yana) as a system of metaphysics which contained an analysis of existence into its component elements, and established a certain number of ultimate data ( dharma ). Every combination of these data was then declared to repre¬ sent a nominal, not an ultimate, reality. A substantial Soul was thus trans¬ formed into a stream of continuously flowing discreet moments of sensation or pure consciousness ( vijnana ), accompanied by moments of feeling, of idea¬ tion, volition (i vedana-samjnd-samskara ) etc. Matter ( rupa ) was conceived on the same pattern, as a flow of momentary flashes without any continuant stuff, but characterised by impenetrability, and representing the senses {ayatana 1—5) and sense-data (ayatana 7 —11). The world was thus trans¬ formed into a cinema. The categories of substance, quality and motion — for momentary flashes could possess no motion — were denied, but the reality of sense data and of the elements of mind, was admitted. All these ele¬ mentary data were conceived as obeying causal laws. But the conception of causality was adapted to the character of these entities which could neither move nor change, but could only appear and disappear. Causation was called dependently-coordinated-origination (jpratUya-sam-utpdda ), or depen¬ dent existence. The meaning of it was that every momentary entity sprang into existence, or flashed up, in coordination with other moments. Its formula was «if there is this, there appears that». 2 Causality was thus assumed the vyavahdru or samvrtti. Against M. Walleser’s, Der altere Vedanta p. 43, opinion that the objectivity of our ideas themselves is meant, it must be pointed out that the Buddhists did not deny the jilandkdra, and Sankara clearly states that external objects, not ideas, are meant — tasmdd artha-jridnayor bhedah.
1 The Central Conception of Buddhism.
2 The same formula in the Pali Kanon (Majjh. II. 32, Samy. II. 28 etc.), in the Ab. Kosa, III. 18 and 28 and Madhy. vr., p. 10. In the latter instance — asmin sati idam bhavati , hrasve dirgham yaihd sati, the formula clearly refers to coordination, not to causation.
NIRVANA
XIII. THIS DOCTRINE MODIFIED IN MAHAYANA