The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

1 Wassilief, Buddhism, pp. 321 ff.

2 Ibid. p. 286.

3 Samaya-bheda-uparacana-cakra, trsl. for the first time by Wassilief in his Buddhism. A new english translation with copious and very instructive notes by J. Masuda appeared in Asia Major, II, 1, pp. 1—78 (Leipzig, 1925).

4 This is also known from tibetan sources, cf. Wassilief op. cit., p. 273.

ideas in philosophy, the Sautrantikas likewise interpreted it as a personifi¬ cation of their subtle consciousness. 1

X. The yogacaras

This was an idealistic school founded by Aryasanga in the IV-V century B. C.

Idealistic views (vijnana-vcida) have appeared in the history of Budd¬ hist philosophy several times and at different places. We have, first of all, kanonical works like the LankSvatara-sutra and others, which are wri¬ tten in imitation of the Upanishads, in a style intentionally averse to preci¬ sion. 2 And then we have the three systems of Asvaghosa, Aryasanga and Dignaga. As Makayanists they are all monists and believers in the Cosmical Body of the Buddha. But in the process of realisation of this uni¬ que substanse they all admit the existence of one initial or store conscious¬ ness ( alaya-vijnana ) in addition to that indefinite 3 consciousness (citta = manas = vijnana) which was admitted in the Hinayana, and they all deny

1 It thus appears that prof. H. Kern, Manual, p. 123, was right in maintaining that « among the old sects the Mahasamgbikas entertained views agreeing with the Mahayana». It is also clear that the Yatslputrlyas (Vajjiputtalcas) established their pudgalatada with no other aim than that of supporting the doctrine of a supernatural, surviving Buddha from the philosophical side. Indirectly this proves bow philosophic the genuine primitive Buddhism must have been. The very character of the argument of the Yatslputrlyas in favour of the pudgala is suggestive. It was neither a dharma — this they could not maintain, so fresh was its categorical denial by the Master in memory — but neither was it something different from a dharma. It was already inexpressible at that time. Had not the denial of the dtma been so categorical, the Yatsiputriya would have certainly invented another, not so twisted an argument in support of their belief in a supernatural Buddha. Cf. Ab. Kosa, IX, and my Soul Theory, p. 830.

2 In the Lankavatara, p. 182—6 (ed. Tokyo 1924) more than 20 different opinions about Nirvana are mentioned. The first evidently alludes to the opinion of the Hinayanists and the last looks like the opinion of the Yogacaras. All are rejected on the score that Nirvana is undefinable. It is the Madhyamika view. But the majority of the solutions there mentioned evidently never existed, and those that existed are so formulated that it is difficult to recognise them. It is a fanciful literary composition. Aryadeva’s comment, transl. by G. Tucci, T’oung Pao XXY, p. 16 ff., looks like a forgery by some incompetent pandit. The Tibetan Bstan-hgyur, as already noticed by Wassilief, is also full of forged tracts ascribed to Asvaghosa, Nagarjuna and Aryadeva. The last solution, p. 184, 1. 15 ff., which in the sutra is evidently mentioned pour la bonne bouche is not to be discovered at all in the enumeration of the comment. It has not escaped the perspi¬ cacity of E. Burnouf, Introduction 2 p. 462, that this last solution, although seemingly rejected, was the one favoured by the author. I find no mention of E. Burnouf’s translation and com¬ ment in the article of G. Tucci.

3 That vijhana-skandha is nothing else than nirvikalpakam jndnam and samjha-skandha nothing else than savikalpakam jilanam, as stated in my Central Conception, p. 18—19, is now corroborated by Udayana, Parisuddhi, p. 213—214 (B. I.).

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32 nirvana