The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana — Th. Stcherbatsky (1927)

2 From thi3 and the following aphorisms it results that the fourth part of the quadrilemma, viz. that Nirvana is neither Ens nor is it non-Ens, represents the solution favoured by the Madhyamika. Indeed since Ens (in aphorism IV.) and non-Ens (in aphorism VIII.) are con¬ ceived empirically, as referring to such entities which conform to causal laws, it is evident that transcendental or absolute existence which is contrasted with both these Ens and non-Ens, can be nothing but their simultaneous negation. Since this kind of reality cannot be expressed in terms of our language, since it is anirvdeya, the fourth part of the quadrilemma is likewise denied, but in terms which are altogether different from those used in denying the three first parts of the quadrilemma. This especially appears from the comment upon aphorism XVI. It is explicitly stated above, under aphorism IX, comment p. 530. 3, that both in the Hinayanistic and in the Mahayanistic conception Nirvana is neither an Ens nor a nou-Ens, since it is transcendental and unexpressible in terms of human language.

8 nopapadyate.

533 . 8.

533 . 9 .

533 . 10 .

If it is imagined 1 that this Nirvana neither has the essence of a non- Ens, nor has it (the essence) of an Ens, where is the man (to understand this)? Who indeed can understand, who can grasp, who can proclaim the doctrine that Nirvana represents such a double negation?

(But if there is nobody to understand this here, in this world), perhaps there, in Nirvana, someone exists who is capable) to realize 2 it? Or is this also impossible? If you admit it, you will be also obliged to admit the exi¬ stence of an (eternal) Soul 3 in Nirvana. But this you do not admit, since the existence of a Soul, (or consciousness) without any substratum , 4 (independent from causal laws) you do not admit.

But if there is nobody (in the Nirvana-world, if Nirvana is altogether impersonal), by whom will it then be realized that there really is a Nirvana of such description? If it is answered that those who remain in the pheno¬ menal world 6 shall coguize it, we will ask, shall they cognize it empiri¬ cally 7 or metaphysically . 8 If you imagine that they will cognize Nirvana empirically, this is impossible. Why? Because empirical consciousness ap¬ prehends (separate) objects . 9 (But Nirvana is the whole). There are no sepa¬ rate objects in Nirvana. Therefore, first of all, it cannot be cognized by

1 kalpyate.

2 pratipaitd.

3 dtman.

4 nirupadana — asamslcrta — paramarthasat.

5 samsdrinah—prthagjand aryaS ca.

6 samsd r arasthil dh—prthagjand dr yds ca.

7 vijnanena.

• * jnanena. vijnana as vijnana-skandha is contrasted in Hinayana with samjfta. The first means pure sensation, and even something still more primitive, potential sensation, since sensation is spar&a. Sainjnd, as we have seen above, text p. 65. 5. can be replaced by jnana. We have then a contrast between vijnana aud jnana, the first meaning undeveloped and the second—developed cognition. The relation between these two terms is here, to a certain extent, similar to what it is in the Bhavadgita, whereas the early Upani?ads make no difference between them, cp. Bph. 3.
• 9. 2 8, Tait. 2. 5.1, 3. 5. I, Katha 3. 13, Tait. 2. 1. 1. In Buddhism, however, vijnana is not empi¬ rical cognition, but sensation, ind jnana , as is quite clear from the context, means transcenden¬ tal, or absolute knowledge, sarva-prapanca-atita. The Tibetans usually translate this kind of jnana not by their ordinary Ses-pa, but by ye-Ses, i. e. «highest knowledge*. Vijnana again, in this context, does not mean pure sensation, but empirical knowledge, knowledge founded upon pure sensation.

9 The definition nimittalambana or nimittagrahin , or nimitta-udgrahanam is given to samjnd, and not to vijAana, whose definition is prativijAaptih, cp. my Central Conception, p. 16. But here this difference does not matter, since both vijnana aud samjnd are equally nimitta-grahin when contrasted with the transcendental or direct knowledge of the absolute; nimitta has here the meaning of «a mark», or «a particular object», nimitta-udgrahanam means abstraction, or synthesis.

appendix: candrakIrti’s comment on relativity, xxv 203