The Serpent Power — Arthur Avalon (Sir John Woodroffe) (1924)
2 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” 94-114. This is the Sāngkhyan and Vedāntic definition. According to the Vaisheshika, Manas is that which gives knowledge of pleasure, pain, and Jīvātmā (I am So-and-so).
Its function is said to be Sangkalpa-Vikalpa. That is, selection and rejection from the material provided by the Jnānendriya. When, after having been brought into contact with the sense-objects, it selects the sensation which is to be presented to the other faculties of the mind, there is Sangkalpa. The activity of Manas, however, is itself neither intelligent result nor moving feelings of pleasure or pain. It has not an independent power to reveal itself to the experiencer. Before things can be so revealed and realised as objects of perception, they must be made subject to the operation of Ahangkāra and Buddhi, without whose intelligent light they would be dark forms unseen and unknown by the experiencer, and the efforts of Manas but blind gropings in the dark. Nor can the images built up by Manas affect of themselves the experiencer so as to move him in any way until and unless the experiencer identifies himself with them by Ahangkāra—that is, by making them his own in feeling and experience. Manas, being thus an experience of activity in the dark, unseen and unrevealed by the light of Buddhi, and not moving the experiencer until he identifies himself with it in feeling, is one in which the dark veiling quality (Tamas guna) of Shakti Prakriti is the most manifest.¹ This Guna also prevails in the Indriyas and the subtle objects of their operation (Tanmātra).
Ahangkāra the “I-maker” is self-arrogation²—that is, the realisation of oneself as the personal “I” or self-consciousness of worldly experience, in which the Jīva thinks of himself as a particular person who is in relation with the objects of his experience. It is the power of self-arrogation whereby all that constitutes man is welded into one Ego, and the percept or concept is referred to that particular thinking subject and becomes part of its experience. When, therefore, a sensation is perceived by Manas and determined by Buddhi, Ahangkāra says: “lt is I who perceive it.”
1 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” p. 116, where the author cites the dictum of Kant that perceptions (Anschauung) without conceptions are blind.
2 Abhimāna. Abhimāno’hangkārah. See Sāngkhya Tattva Kaumudi, 24 Kārikā, and Bk. II, Sūtra 16, Sāngkhya Pravachana Sūtra.
This is the “I” of phenomenal consciousness as distinguished from “this” the known. Buddhi functions with its support.¹ Buddhi considered with relation to the other faculties of experience is that aspect of the Antahkarana which determines (Adhyavasāyātmikā buddhih).² “A man is said to determine (Adhyavasyati) who, having perceived (Manas), and thought, ‘I am concerned in this matter’ (Ahangkāra), and thus having self-arrogated, comes to the determination, ‘This must be done by me’ (Kartavyam etat mayā).”³ “Must be done” here does not refer to exterior action only, but to mental action (Mānasīkriyā) also, such as any determination by way of the forming of concepts and percepts (“It is so”) and resolutions (“It must be done”). Buddhi pervades all effects whatever other than itself. It is the principal Tattva because it pervades all the instruments (Indriya), is the receptacle of all the Sangskāras or Kārmic tendencies, and is in Sāngkhya the seat of memory.⁴ It is the thinking principle which forms concepts or general ideas acting through the instrumentality of Ahangkāra, Manas, and the Indriyas. In the operations of the senses Manas is the principal; in the operation of Manas
1 Tam ahangkāram upajīvya hi buddhir adhyavasyati (Sāngkhya-
Tattva-Kaumudī, supra).
2 Sāngkhya-Pravachana, II. 13. The Sūtra has Adhyavasāyo buddhih; but, the Commentator points out that Buddhi is not to be identified with its functions. Buddhi is thus called Nishchayakārinī.
3 Sāngkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī, 23rd Kārikā: Sarvo vyavaharttā ālochya mattvā aham atrādhikrita ityabhimatya kartavyam etat mayā iti adhyavasyati.
4 Sāngkhya-Pravachana, II. 40–44.
Ahangkāra is the principal; and in the operation of Ahangkāra Buddhi is the principal. With the instrumentality of all of these Buddhi acts, modifications taking place in Buddhi through the instrumentality of the sense functions.¹ It is Buddhi which is the basis of all cognition, sensation, and resolves, and makes over objects to Purusha —that is, Consciousness. And so it is said that Buddhi, whose characteristic is determination, is the charioteer; Manas, whose characteristic is Sangkalpavikalpa, is the reins; and the Senses are the horses. Jīva is the Enjoyer (Bhoktā)—that is, Ātmā conjoined with body, senses, Manas, and Buddhi.² In Buddhi Sattvaguna predominates; in Ahangkāra, Rajas; in Manas and the Indriyas and their objects, Tamas.
2 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” 94-114. This is the Sāngkhyan and Vedāntic definition. According to the Vaisheshika, Manas is that which gives knowledge of pleasure, pain, and Jīvātmā (I am So-and-so).
Its function is said to be Sangkalpa-Vikalpa. That is, selection and rejection from the material provided by the Jnānendriya. When, after having been brought into contact with the sense-objects, it selects the sensation which is to be presented to the other faculties of the mind, there is Sangkalpa. The activity of Manas, however, is itself neither intelligent result nor moving feelings of pleasure or pain. It has not an independent power to reveal itself to the experiencer. Before things can be so revealed and realised as objects of perception, they must be made subject to the operation of Ahangkāra and Buddhi, without whose intelligent light they would be dark forms unseen and unknown by the experiencer, and the efforts of Manas but blind gropings in the dark. Nor can the images built up by Manas affect of themselves the experiencer so as to move him in any way until and unless the experiencer identifies himself with them by Ahangkāra—that is, by making them his own in feeling and experience. Manas, being thus an experience of activity in the dark, unseen and unrevealed by the light of Buddhi, and not moving the experiencer until he identifies himself with it in feeling, is one in which the dark veiling quality (Tamas guna) of Shakti Prakriti is the most manifest.¹ This Guna also prevails in the Indriyas and the subtle objects of their operation (Tanmātra).
Ahangkāra the “I-maker” is self-arrogation²—that is, the realisation of oneself as the personal “I” or self-consciousness of worldly experience, in which the Jīva thinks of himself as a particular person who is in relation with the objects of his experience. It is the power of self-arrogation whereby all that constitutes man is welded into one Ego, and the percept or concept is referred to that particular thinking subject and becomes part of its experience. When, therefore, a sensation is perceived by Manas and determined by Buddhi, Ahangkāra says: “lt is I who perceive it.”
1 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” p. 116, where the author cites the dictum of Kant that perceptions (Anschauung) without conceptions are blind.
2 Abhimāna. Abhimāno’hangkārah. See Sāngkhya Tattva Kaumudi, 24 Kārikā, and Bk. II, Sūtra 16, Sāngkhya Pravachana Sūtra.
This is the “I” of phenomenal consciousness as distinguished from “this” the known. Buddhi functions with its support.¹ Buddhi considered with relation to the other faculties of experience is that aspect of the Antahkarana which determines (Adhyavasāyātmikā buddhih).² “A man is said to determine (Adhyavasyati) who, having perceived (Manas), and thought, ‘I am concerned in this matter’ (Ahangkāra), and thus having self-arrogated, comes to the determination, ‘This must be done by me’ (Kartavyam etat mayā).”³ “Must be done” here does not refer to exterior action only, but to mental action (Mānasīkriyā) also, such as any determination by way of the forming of concepts and percepts (“It is so”) and resolutions (“It must be done”). Buddhi pervades all effects whatever other than itself. It is the principal Tattva because it pervades all the instruments (Indriya), is the receptacle of all the Sangskāras or Kārmic tendencies, and is in Sāngkhya the seat of memory.⁴ It is the thinking principle which forms concepts or general ideas acting through the instrumentality of Ahangkāra, Manas, and the Indriyas. In the operations of the senses Manas is the principal; in the operation of Manas
1 Tam ahangkāram upajīvya hi buddhir adhyavasyati (Sāngkhya-
Tattva-Kaumudī, supra).
2 Sāngkhya-Pravachana, II. 13. The Sūtra has Adhyavasāyo buddhih; but, the Commentator points out that Buddhi is not to be identified with its functions. Buddhi is thus called Nishchayakārinī.
3 Sāngkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī, 23rd Kārikā: Sarvo vyavaharttā ālochya mattvā aham atrādhikrita ityabhimatya kartavyam etat mayā iti adhyavasyati.
4 Sāngkhya-Pravachana, II. 40–44.
Ahangkāra is the principal; and in the operation of Ahangkāra Buddhi is the principal. With the instrumentality of all of these Buddhi acts, modifications taking place in Buddhi through the instrumentality of the sense functions.¹ It is Buddhi which is the basis of all cognition, sensation, and resolves, and makes over objects to Purusha —that is, Consciousness. And so it is said that Buddhi, whose characteristic is determination, is the charioteer; Manas, whose characteristic is Sangkalpavikalpa, is the reins; and the Senses are the horses. Jīva is the Enjoyer (Bhoktā)—that is, Ātmā conjoined with body, senses, Manas, and Buddhi.² In Buddhi Sattvaguna predominates; in Ahangkāra, Rajas; in Manas and the Indriyas and their objects, Tamas.
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