The Serpent Power — Arthur Avalon (Sir John Woodroffe) (1924)
Sensations aroused by sense-objects are experienced by means of the outer instruments (Bāhyakarana) of the Lord of the body, or senses (Indriya), which are the gateways through which the Jīva receives worldly experience. These are ten in number, and are of two classes: viz., the five organs of sensation or perception (Jnānendriya), or ear (hearing), skin (feeling by touch), eye (sight), tongue (taste), and nose (smell); and the five organs of action (Karmendriya), which are the reactive response which the self makes to sensation—namely, mouth, hands, legs, anus, and genitals, whereby speaking, grasping, walking, excretion, and procreation, are performed, and through which effect is given to the Jīva’s desires. These are afferent and efferent impulses respectively.
The Indriya, or sense, is not the physical organ, but the faculty of mind operating through that organ as its instrument. The outward sense-organs are the usual means whereby on the physical plane the functions of hearing and so forth are accomplished. But, as they are mere instruments and their power is derived from the mind, a Yogī
1 So it is said Tāni vastūni tanmātrādīni pratyaksha-vishayāni (that is, to Yogīs).
2 Whereby the thermal quality of things is perceived.
3 In a general way the last four correspond with the Vaisheshika Paramānus. There are differences, however. Thus, the latter are eternal (Nitya) and do not proceed from one another.
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may accomplish by the mind only all that may be done by means of these physical organs without the use of the latter.
With reference to their physical manifestations, but not as they are in themselves, the classes into which the Indriyas are divided may be described as the sensory and motor nervous systems. As the Indriyas are not the physical organs, such as ear, eye, and so forth, but faculties of the Jīva desiring to know and act by their aid, the Yogī claims to accomplish without the use of the latter all that is ordinarily done by their means. So a hypnotised subject can perceive things, even when no use of the special physical organs ordinarily necessary for the purpose is made.¹ The fact of there being a variety of actions does not necessarily involve the same number of Indriyas. An act of “going” done by means of the hand (as by a cripple) is to be regarded really as an operation of the Indriya of feet (Padendriya), even though the hand is the seat of the Indriya for handling.² By the instrumentality of these Indriyas things are perceived and action is taken with reference to them. The Indriyas are not, however, sufficient in themselves for this purpose. In the first place, unless attention (Ālochana) co-operates there is no sensation at all. To be “absent-minded” is not to know what is happening.³ Attention must therefore co-operate with the senses before the latter can “give” the experiencer anything at all.⁴ Nextly, at one and the same moment the experiencer is subject to receive a countless number of sensations which come to and press upon him from all sides. If any of these is to be brought into the field of consciousness, it must be selected to the exclusion of others. The process of experience is the selection of a special section from out of a general whole, and then being engaged on it, so as to make it one’s own, either as a particular object of thought or a particular field of operation.¹ Lastly, as Western psychology holds, the senses give not a completed whole, but a manifold—the manifold of sense. These “points of sensation” must be gathered together and made into a whole. These three functions of attention, selection, and synthesising the discrete manifold of the senses, are those belonging to that aspect of the mental body, the internal agent (Antahkarana), called Manas.² Just as Manas is necessary to the senses (Indriya), the latter are necessary for Manas. For the latter is the seat of desire, and cannot exist by itself. It is the desire to perceive or act, and therefore exists in association with the Indriyas.
1 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” by J. C. Chatterji, p. 120. Thus Professor Lombroso records the case of a woman who, being blind, read with the tip of her ear, tasted with her knees, and smelt with her toes.
2 Tantrasāra Āhnika, 8.
3 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” p. 112.
4 So in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, I. 3-27, it is said: “My Manas (mind) was diverted elsewhere. Therefore I did not hear.”
Manas is thus the leading Indriya, of which the senses are powers. For without the aid and attention of Manas the other Indriyas are incapable of performing their respective offices; and as these Indriyas are those of perception and action, Manas, which co-operates with both, is said to partake of the character of both cognition and action.
Manas, through association with the eye or other sense, becomes manifold, being particularised or differentiated by its co-operation with that particular instrument, which cannot fulfil its functions except in conjunction with Manas.
1 So, in the Text here translated post, Manas is spoken of as a doorkeeper who lets some enter, and keeps others outside.
Sensations aroused by sense-objects are experienced by means of the outer instruments (Bāhyakarana) of the Lord of the body, or senses (Indriya), which are the gateways through which the Jīva receives worldly experience. These are ten in number, and are of two classes: viz., the five organs of sensation or perception (Jnānendriya), or ear (hearing), skin (feeling by touch), eye (sight), tongue (taste), and nose (smell); and the five organs of action (Karmendriya), which are the reactive response which the self makes to sensation—namely, mouth, hands, legs, anus, and genitals, whereby speaking, grasping, walking, excretion, and procreation, are performed, and through which effect is given to the Jīva’s desires. These are afferent and efferent impulses respectively.
The Indriya, or sense, is not the physical organ, but the faculty of mind operating through that organ as its instrument. The outward sense-organs are the usual means whereby on the physical plane the functions of hearing and so forth are accomplished. But, as they are mere instruments and their power is derived from the mind, a Yogī
1 So it is said Tāni vastūni tanmātrādīni pratyaksha-vishayāni (that is, to Yogīs).
2 Whereby the thermal quality of things is perceived.
3 In a general way the last four correspond with the Vaisheshika Paramānus. There are differences, however. Thus, the latter are eternal (Nitya) and do not proceed from one another.
p. 60
may accomplish by the mind only all that may be done by means of these physical organs without the use of the latter.
With reference to their physical manifestations, but not as they are in themselves, the classes into which the Indriyas are divided may be described as the sensory and motor nervous systems. As the Indriyas are not the physical organs, such as ear, eye, and so forth, but faculties of the Jīva desiring to know and act by their aid, the Yogī claims to accomplish without the use of the latter all that is ordinarily done by their means. So a hypnotised subject can perceive things, even when no use of the special physical organs ordinarily necessary for the purpose is made.¹ The fact of there being a variety of actions does not necessarily involve the same number of Indriyas. An act of “going” done by means of the hand (as by a cripple) is to be regarded really as an operation of the Indriya of feet (Padendriya), even though the hand is the seat of the Indriya for handling.² By the instrumentality of these Indriyas things are perceived and action is taken with reference to them. The Indriyas are not, however, sufficient in themselves for this purpose. In the first place, unless attention (Ālochana) co-operates there is no sensation at all. To be “absent-minded” is not to know what is happening.³ Attention must therefore co-operate with the senses before the latter can “give” the experiencer anything at all.⁴ Nextly, at one and the same moment the experiencer is subject to receive a countless number of sensations which come to and press upon him from all sides. If any of these is to be brought into the field of consciousness, it must be selected to the exclusion of others. The process of experience is the selection of a special section from out of a general whole, and then being engaged on it, so as to make it one’s own, either as a particular object of thought or a particular field of operation.¹ Lastly, as Western psychology holds, the senses give not a completed whole, but a manifold—the manifold of sense. These “points of sensation” must be gathered together and made into a whole. These three functions of attention, selection, and synthesising the discrete manifold of the senses, are those belonging to that aspect of the mental body, the internal agent (Antahkarana), called Manas.² Just as Manas is necessary to the senses (Indriya), the latter are necessary for Manas. For the latter is the seat of desire, and cannot exist by itself. It is the desire to perceive or act, and therefore exists in association with the Indriyas.
1 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” by J. C. Chatterji, p. 120. Thus Professor Lombroso records the case of a woman who, being blind, read with the tip of her ear, tasted with her knees, and smelt with her toes.
2 Tantrasāra Āhnika, 8.
3 See “Kashmir Shaivaism,” p. 112.
4 So in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, I. 3-27, it is said: “My Manas (mind) was diverted elsewhere. Therefore I did not hear.”
Manas is thus the leading Indriya, of which the senses are powers. For without the aid and attention of Manas the other Indriyas are incapable of performing their respective offices; and as these Indriyas are those of perception and action, Manas, which co-operates with both, is said to partake of the character of both cognition and action.
Manas, through association with the eye or other sense, becomes manifold, being particularised or differentiated by its co-operation with that particular instrument, which cannot fulfil its functions except in conjunction with Manas.
1 So, in the Text here translated post, Manas is spoken of as a doorkeeper who lets some enter, and keeps others outside.
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