The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

simply intelligible, and is of that allotment ; but is said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has out its own nature un mingled with the intelligible. But intellectual intellect alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellectual itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of inlelligibles, is* primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which wc denominate the one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellectual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses the summit, but intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature. And the intelligibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect according to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligible according to participation ; and the natures that are collective of these, conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since, therefore, Timaeus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and neither denominates him life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his peculiarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should be established at the end of the intellectual Gods.

For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incor-

CHAP. XV.

OF PLATO.

S47

ruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals, transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the dcmiurgus is simply intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles, so that which is simply intellect, is the last of intellectuals. For all things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect preexist ; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures, intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, and life according to essence.

ording to cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures, intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, and life according to essence. As therefore, that whjch is most vital in life is the middle, and as that which is especially intelligible is the summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intellect, and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timsus says. For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe. Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all other things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect. Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives subsistence to participated intelligible, is that winch is primarily being, so since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be imparticipable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timasus.

S4S

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK V.

CHAPTER XVL

Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the peculiarity of the dciniurgus, receiving from the Timaeus the principles of thearguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that Timaeus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning of what he says concerning him. For lie says, " It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Hence, he does not think fit to call him either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two, father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what respect fabricator and father differ from each other ; and in the next place, in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fabricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus.

ther differ from each other ; and in the next place, in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fabricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus.

If therefore, Ave divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the Gods, and tliis is the same thing as to divide them into superessential monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed will be generative of the Gods and superesseutial unities ; but fabricator will give subsistence to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timaeus says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to the Gods ; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential peculiarity. Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with respect to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the

CHAP. XVI.

OF PLATO.

p. 349

intellectual deraiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures.

But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father indeed, •will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are generated ; J but the latter proximately. And the former, produces indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis ; but the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpetual and mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual natures to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the fabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that which is generated from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior to himself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being, and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but the latter of the production of forms.