The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

er, how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude should be without the monad ? For it is necessary that the paradigm being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of union to the universe than the demiurgic cause. And as the paradigm being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be comprehensive of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begotten subsistence from the paradigm, but through the demiurgus, the demiurgus also is indeed entirely one.

Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account of tliis we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellectual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied, and divided prior to the indivisible monad ? For it is necessary that as all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended from one fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods ? Forp. 344 forms indeed, liavc their hypostasis mingled with multitude ; but the Gods are defined according to union itself. If therefore all the multitudes of forms arc the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which through monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the case, it is necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause of the generation of the universe.

Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many.

the multitude of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause of the generation of the universe.

Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many. But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same cause without a medium ? For all the natures that proceed from the one fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only, whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude, if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the good, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause is one. But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it belongs indeed to partial genera, how is it extended to the first and intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally ? For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial nature ; but it belongs to a partial principle, to produce parts either totally ' or partially, as we before observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it is necessary that it should either be intelligible or intellectual, or intelligible and intellectual. If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is

' c\ix»f b emitted in the original.

p. 345

it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures? How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being does it produce soul, and the natures posterior to soul ? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligiblcs, viz. figure, the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world.

sterior to soul ? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligiblcs, viz. figure, the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How docs he divide the pai ts, or the circles that are in them ? For that which is generative of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And that which has the power of dividing multitude .will not [on this hypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the Gods. And in short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called byTiimeus intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same time intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, divide all things triad ically. But the demiurgus, at one time indeed, divides the world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things sufficiently apparent at present.

Proc.

Vol. I.

2X

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK V.

CHAPTER XV.

Bett Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this- God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that he sees intelligible*, but admitting that they are visible to him according to nature, for that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself according to this hypantis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intellect also, is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment ; but is said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has out its own nature un mingled with the intelligible.