The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

y some one in the demiurgic order, and he denominates it the plenitude

CHAP. XXXII.

OF PLATO.

of forms, and the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, it will thus have intellectual number, as being arranged near the intellectual end. But if he should call intelligible animal number, in this case there will be separation and difference in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be established above the whole of things, according to supreme union. For all section and division originate from the intellectual Gods; since here difference proceeds, adorning things in conjunction with the one and being. How therefore, does the division of the unities into minute parts, or the multiform nature of beings pertain to intelligibles? And how can the multitude of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the tetrad was there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind being adapted to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the one being is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is conjoined with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triad. Since however, it comprehends in itself the cause of all number, Timoeus denominates it the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four firsteffective causes. For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the production of forms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triad subsist unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner.

Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with separation. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the peculiar form of the natures that exist prior to them.' Hence, the first multitudes proceed indeed from the one, but they are unical, without separation, and without number, imitating the one principle of the whole of things. Very properly therefore, does Parmenitles constitute multitude in intelligibles, according to the end [of the intelligible order]; but number in intellectuals accordiug to the beginning [of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order.] And these are conjoined with each other. Parmcnidcs also pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the cause of intellectual numbers. And Timneus shows that animal itself is only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of

• Instead of «««-<tXw y«j t« wgwrtrru rm t*pi«rafmwv, np> <£i«r w /w{fi|», it is necessary to read ■xxrrxxw yttf ra wjgutj<tt« ran vf fi/wwv, tw sfOu^wrajMWv, iltar rj^. fu>ff ir.

p. 296

cause of the whole of

• Instead of «««-<tXw y«j t« wgwrtrru rm t*pi«rafmwv, np> <£i«r w /w{fi|», it is necessary to read ■xxrrxxw yttf ra wjgutj<tt« ran vf fi/wwv, tw sfOu^wrajMWv, iltar rj^. fu>ff ir.

p. 296

things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, wc have abundant!/ shown.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

But Parmenides begins to speak about it as follows: " Proceed therefore, and still farther consider this. What? We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account the one being appears to be many." But he completes his discourse about the first monad thus : ** Are not three things odd, and two even ? How should they not ?' And about the second monad, as follows : " Hence there will be the evenly-even, and .the oddly-odd, and the oddly-even, and the evenly-odd." But he .completes his discourse about the third and all the succeeding triad, as follows : " The one being therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that the one which is distributed by being should be many. Entirely so." The first triad, therefore, of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, is through these things unfolded to us by Plato, and which possesses indeed, according to the first monad the first powers of numbers, I mean the odd and the even, and is completed through these principles which were in intelligibies occultly, viz. monad, duad, triad. But according to the second monad it possesses the second powers of numbers which subsist from these [i. e. from the first powers]. For the section of the forms of the even number, is allotted a second order. And the oddly-odd is subordinate to the first odd numbers. But according to the third monad, it possesses the more partial causes of divine numbers. Hence also, a separation into minute parts, infinity,

CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 297

all-perfect division, and unical and essential number are here ; receiving indeed, the unical and the essential from unity and being, but the separation of number from difference. For every where difference is in the three monads, but it particularly unfolds the multitudes of numbers, according to the third monad, generates more partial Gods, and divides being in conjunction with the Gods. For neither is deity in these imparticipable, because unity is not separate from being, nor is essence destitute of deity, because neither is being deprived of the one.

he third monad, generates more partial Gods, and divides being in conjunction with the Gods. For neither is deity in these imparticipable, because unity is not separate from being, nor is essence destitute of deity, because neither is being deprived of the one.

Since however, all things are in each of the monads, but unically and intelligibly in the first, generative!}', and according to the peculiarity of difference in the second, and intellectually, and according to being in the third ;— this being the case, Plato when unfolding to us the first monad, very properly begins from the monad, and proceeds as far as to the triad; but when teaching about the second, he begins from evenly-even numbers, and proceeds as far as to those that are evenly-odd, both which belong to the nature of the even number. Aud when he adds the third monad, he begins from being, and recurs through difference to the one* For having shown that being participates of number, he from hence leads us round to unical number, employing the mode of conversion in the conception of this monad.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

If, however, it be requisite to survey the unknown peculiarity of divine numbers, and how the first order of intelligibles and intellectuals, and number which subsists according to this order, is the most ancient of all numbers, in the first place, we should consider the infinity mentioned by Parmenides, and see whether he does not say that intelligible multitude is infinite on account of this number, in consequence of its being unknown Proc. Vol. I. 2 P

ON THE THEOLOGY

BOOK IV.

and incomprehensible by partial conceptions. For the all-perfect, and all-powerful peculiarity of divine numbers is exempt from the comprehension of partible natures, [such as ours]. They are therefore unknown, and on this account are said to be inexplicable, and not to be investigated. For number also in the last of things, and multitude, together with the known have likewise the unknown. And we are notable to comprehend the progression of every number iu consequence of being vanquished by infinity. The incomprehensibility therefore, of this power which is unknown according to a discursive energy, is comprehended according to cause, in intelligible numbers and multitudes. For there would not be a thing of this kind in the last of numbers, unless the unknown preexisted in intelligible numbers, and unless the former were ultimate imitations of the exempt incomprehensibility of the latter.