The Theology of Plato, in six books — trans. Thomas Taylor

ls. And the genera indeed, that bind through similitude, are divided among supermundane natures ; but those that are both exempt and distributed, are divided among the liberated Gods. And the celestial ' and sublunary genera, are divided among the mundane Gods. And in short, all the coordinations of beings receive their distinction and separation from this order. From these things therefore, it is evident what the peculiarities are which intelligible and at the same

' For wnv^tyw, it »eepu to be nocemry that we should read wpmu..

CHAP. XXX. OF PLATO.

p. 289

time intellectual number possesses, and of what it is the cause to the Gods.

CHAPTER XXX.

•

Iw the next place, we must likewise assert that the first number ' is of a feminine nature. For in this, difference first shines forth, separating the •one from being, and dividing the one into many unities, and being into many beings. What therefore is the difference which is the cause of these things to the Gods? For if we should call it a genus of being, in the first place indeed, how is it prior to being? For separating being and the one, it is arranged between both of them. But existing as a middle, it calls forth indeed Me one into generations, but it fills being with generative cause. If therefore, it is prior to being, how will it be one certain genus of being ? And [in the second place, after this, the different which is a genus of being, is every where essential, and is by no means inherent in superessential natures. But difference itself is primarily present with the unities themselves, and separates and produces many unities from one. Plow iherefore, can superessential difference ever come to be the same with the difference which gives completion to essences?

In the third place, that different [[which is a genus of being,] presents itself to the view in intellectuals, according to the demiurgic order. But difference itself is the intelligible summit of intellectuals. And the former indeed, subsists together with sameness ; but the latter has by itself a subsistence in the intclligibles of intellectuals. To which also may be added, that in Avhat follows, Plato as he proceeds makes mention of difference, and generates it in conjunction with sameness. How therefore, does he effect the same conclusion twice? For he does not employ such

' In the original «* omitted.

Proc. Vol. I. ,20

p. 290

ON THE THBOLOGY

BOOK IV.

a repetition as this in any one of the other conclusions.

sameness. How therefore, does he effect the same conclusion twice? For he does not employ such

' In the original «* omitted.

Proc. Vol. I. ,20

p. 290

ON THE THBOLOGY

BOOK IV.

a repetition as this in any one of the other conclusions. For whole, which he seems to assume twice, is not the same whole, viz. the intellectual is not the same with the intelligible ; but these, as we have said, differ from each other. For how could he unfold to us the different progressions of divine natures, if he collected the same conclusions? According to all these conceptions, therefore, we must separate the difference which is generative of numbers from the genus of beings.

But if difference itself is not the nature of the different, but a power generative of beings, it will be collective of being and the one. For every where power is allotted an hyparxis of this kind. For through power the otie participates of being, and being of the one. Power therefore was the cause, not of division, but of communion, of contact without separation, and of the habitude of the one to being, and of being to the one. Hence it is necessary that it should neither be arranged according to intelligible power, nor according to the intellectual difference of beings ; but that being the middle of both, it should subsist analogous to intelligible power, but should generate in the extremities of intellectuals the portion of the different. What else therefore is it than the feminine nature of the Gods? Hence also it imitates intelligible power, and is prolific of many unities, and of many beings. And how could it otherwise separate number from itself, and the forms and powers of number, unless it was the cause of the divine progressions in a feminine manner. Multitude therefore is paternally in intelligibles, but maternally in intellectuals. Hence, in the former indeed, it subsists inouadically, but in the latter according to number. Very properly therefore, in the second genera of the Cods also, union is derived from the male, but separation from the female divinities. And bound indeed proceeds from the males, but infinity from the females. For the male is analogous to bound, but the female to infinity. The female, however, differs from infinite power, so far as power indeed, is united to the father, and is in him ; but the female is divided from the paternal cause.

infinity from the females. For the male is analogous to bound, but the female to infinity. The female, however, differs from infinite power, so far as power indeed, is united to the father, and is in him ; but the female is divided from the paternal cause. For power is not only in the female divinities, but is also prior to them, since the intelligible powers are in the male divinities, according to Timaeus, who says that the power of the demiurgus is the cause of the generation

CHAP. XXXI.

OF PLATO.

p. 291

of perpetual natures. For [the demiurgus says to the junior Gods] 44 imitating my power, produce and generate animals." Power therefore, is prior to the male and the female, and is in both, and posterior to both. For it pervades through all beings, and every being participates of power, as the Elean guest says. For power is every where. But the female participates in a greater degree of its peculiarity, and the male of union according to bound. That the first number therefore, which presents itself to the view from intelligibles, is of a feminine nature, is through these things evident

CHAPTER XXXI.

It remains then, that we should speak concerning the triadic division of it, following Parmenides. These three things therefore, have appeared to us from the beginning, according to the separation of the one from being, viz. the one, difference, and being ; difference not being tha same either with the one or being. For though the one and being were in intelligibles, yet difference first subsists here. Since however power above [i. e. in intelligibles] was collective, but here is the separator of the extremes, there are not only three monads, but also three duads, viz. the one in conjunction with difference, difference in conjunction with being, and the one in conjunction with being. For difference also is the cause of a separation of this kind, not preserving the union of the one being with genuine purity. There arc therefore three monads, and three duads. But these likewise may become three triads, when we begin, at one time from the one, at another time from being, and at another from difference. Hence this triad subsists monadically, and triadically. But this is the same thing as to assert that difference and the first feminine nature generates in itself, monads, duads, and triads.