The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

We have already explained the relation which requital bears to that which is just. But we must not fail to notice that what we are seeking is at once that which is just simply [or without any qualifying epithet], and that which is just in a state or between citizens.* Now, this implies men who associate together in order to supply their deficiencies, being free men, and upon a footing of equality, either absolute or proportionate.

Between those who are not upon this footing, then, we cannot speak of that which is just as between citizens (though there is something that can be called just metaphorically). For the term just cannot be properly applied, except where men have a law to appeal to,t and the existence of law implies the existence of injustice; for the administration of the law is the discrimination of what is just firom what is unjust.

But injustice implies an act of injustice (though an act of injustice does not always imply injustice), which is taking too much of the goods and too little

•lie words van ixfv ovi/, cap. 6, § 3, thongh it has no connection with 5 2, comes naturally enongh after the end of cap. 5, rh arXm SiKaiov corresponding to tov SiKaiov koI aS'iKov Kad6\.ov. We have, then, two discussions, both growing out of and attached to the discussion which closes with the end of cap. 5, bat not connected with each other. If the author had revised the work, he would, no doubt, have fitted these links together ; bat as he omitted to do so, it is useless for us to attempt, by any rearrangement of the links, to secure the close connectiou which could only be effected by forging them anew.

* These are not two distinct kinds of justice ; justice proper, he means to say, implies a state.

t Only the citizen in an ancient state could appeal to the law in his own person ; the non-citizen could only sue through a citizen.

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162 NIOOMAOHEAN ETHICS OF AKISTOTLB. [Bk. V.

of the evils of life. And so we do not allow an indi- 5 vidual to rule over us, but make written laws; for an individual is apt thus to take more for himself, and to become a tyrant.

The magistrate's function, then, is to secure that which is just, and if that which is just, then that which is equal or fair. But it seems that he gets no 6 advantage from his office, if he is just ; for he does not take a larger share of the good things of life, except when that larger share is proportionate to his worth. He works, therefore, in the interests of others (which is the reason why justice is sometimes called "another's good," as we remarked before).* Some 7 salary, therefore, must be given him, and this he receives in the shape of honours and privileges ; and it is when magistrates are not content with these that they make themselves tjTants.

That which is just as between master and slave, 8 or between father and child, is not the same as this, though like. We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards what is part of one's self— and a man's chattels and his children (so long as they are of a certain age and not yet separated from their parent) are as it were a part of him — for no one deliberately chooses to injure himself; so that a man cannot be 9 unjust towards himself

We cannot speak in this case, then, of that which is unjust, or of that which is just as between citizens; for that, we found, is according to law, and subsists between those whose situation implies law, i.e., as we found, those who participate equally or fairly in governing and being governed.

* Supra, 1, 17.

6, 5-7, 4] JUSTICE. 163