The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

11 lives. But the acts which tend to produce complete virtue are those of the acts " according to law " which are prescribed with reference to the education of a man as a citizen.

As for the education of the individual as such, which tends to make him simply a good man, we may reserve the question whether it belongs to the science of the state or not ; for it is possible that to be a good man is not the same as to be a good citizen of any state whatever.*

* The two cliaracters coincide perfectlj only in the perfect state : cf. Pol. m. 4, 1276 "16 f.

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But of justice as a part of virtue, and of that 12 which is just in the corresponding sense, one kind is that which has to do with the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other things that are divided among the members of the body politic (for in these circumstances it is possible for one individual to share unfairly or fairly with another) ; and another kind is that which has to give redress in private transactions.

The latter kind is again subdivided ; for private transactions are (1) voluntary, (2) involuntary.

" Voluntary transactions or contracts " are such as selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, hiring : these are called "voluntary contracts," because the parties enter into them of their own will.

" Involuntary transactions," again, are of two kinds : one involving secrecy, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, corruption of slaves, assassination, false witness ; the other involving open violence, such as assault, seizure of the person, murder, rape, maiming, slander, contumely. Of what is 3. The unjust man [in this limited sense of the just in . .

distribution, word], WO Say, is unfair, and that which is uniust is unfair.

Now, it is plain that there must be a mean which lies between what is unfair on this side and on that. And this is that which is fair or equal ; for any act that admits of a too much and a too little admits also of that which is fair.

If then that which is unjust be unfair, that which is just will be fair, which indeed is admitted by all without further proof.

2, 12-3, 7.] JUSTICE. 145

But since that which is fair (or equal) is a mean between two extremes, it follows that what is just will be a mean.

But equality or fairness implies two teims at least*

It follows, then, that that which is just is both a mean quantity and also a fair amount relatively to something else and to certain persons — in other words, that, on the one hand, as a mean quantity it implies certain other quantities, i.e. a more and a less; and, on the other hand, as an equal or fair amount it involves two quantities,! and as a just amount it involves certain persons.

That which is just, then, implies four terms at least : two persons to whom justice is done, and two things.

And there must be the same " equality " [i.e. the same ratio] between the persons and the things : as the things are to one another, so must the persons be. For if the persons be not equal, their shares will not be equal ; and this is the source of disputes and accusations, when persons who are equal do not receive equal shares, or when persons who are not equal receive equal shares.

This is also plainly indicated by the common phrase " according to merit." For in distribution all men allow that what is just must be according to merit or worth of some kind, but they do not all adopt the same standai'd of worth ; in democratic states

* If this amount be equal, it most be equal to something else ; if my share is fair, I must be sharing with one other person at least, t A'a share and B's.

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thev take free birth as the standard * in oligarchic states they take wealth, in others noble birth, and in the true aristocratic state virtue or personal merit.

We see, then, that that which is just is in some sort 8 proportionate. For not abstract numbers only, but all things that can be numbered, admit of proportion ; proportion meaning equality of ratios, and requiring four terms at least.

That discrete proportion f requires four terms is 9 evident at once. Continuous proportion also requires four terms : for in it one term is employed as two d h and is repeated ; for instance, r — -. The term b be then is repeated ; and so, counting b twice over, we find