The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
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The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
But each man can form a judgment about what he £ knows, and is called "a good judge " of that — of any special matter when he has received a special education therein, " a good judge " (without any qualifying epithet) when he has received a universal education. And hence a young man is not qualified to be ay student of Politics; for he lacks experience of thef affairs of life, which form the data and the subjectmatter of Politics.
Further, since he is apt to be swayed by his e feelings, he will derive no benefit from a study whose aim is not speculative but practical.
But in this respect young in character counts the same as young in years; for the young man's disqualification is not a matter of time, but is due to the fact that feeling rules his life and directs all his desires. Men of this character turn the knowledge
* The expression ret ws cttI rh troXv covers botli (1) what is generally though not universally true, and (2) what is probable though not certain.
3, 5-4, i] THE END. 5 they get to no account in practice, as we see with those we call incontinent ; but those who direct their lesires and actions by reason will gain much profit from the knowledge of these matters.
So much then by way of preface as to the student, and the spirit in which he must accept what we say, and the object which we propose to ourselves.
4. Since — to resume — all knowledoje and aU. pur- Men agree
O _ ^ that tke good
ose aims at some good, what is this which we say f )a.ppinest,
O ' •/ but differ cu
the aim of Politics : or, in other words, what is the *" '"''^^ '*« iffhest of all realizable goods ?
As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed ; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to " live well " or to "do well " is the same as to be "happy."
But they differ as to what this happiness is, and the masses do not give the same account of it as the philosophers.
The former take it to be something palpable and plain, as pleasure or wealth or fame ; one man holds it to be this, and another that, and often the same man is of different minds at difierent times, — after sickness it is health, and in poverty it is wealth; while when they are impressed with the consciousness ' of their ignorance, they admire most those who say \^ grand things that are above their comprehension.
Some philosophers, on the other hand, have thought that, beside these several good things, there is an " absolute " good which is the cause of their goodness.
As it would hardly be worth while to review all the opinions that have been held, we will confine ourselves to those which are most popular, or which seem to have some foundation in reason.
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We must But we Hiust not omit to notice the distinction I fTctTai-^'' that is drawn between the method of proceeding froin
^mtlu^tion your starting-points or principles, and the method of of trai^d working up to them. Plato used with fitness to raise this question, and to ask Avhether the right way is from or to your starting-points, as in the race-course you may run from the judges to the boundary, or vice versa.
Well, we must start from what is known.
But " what is known" may mean two things :
" what is known to us," which is one thing, or " what
is known " simply, which is another.
I think it is safe to say that we must start from what is known to us.
And on this account nothing but a good moral training can qualify a man to study what is noble and just — in a word, to study questions of Politics. For the undemonstrated. fact is here the startingpoint, and if this undemonstrated fact be sufficiently evident to a man, he will not require a " reason why/' Now the man who has had a good moral training either has already arrived at startingpoints or principles of action, or will easily accept them when pointed out. But he who neither has them nor will accept them may hear what Hesiod says * —
" The best is he who of himself doth know ;
Good too is he who listens to the wise ;
But he who neither knows himself nor heeds
The words of others, is a useless man. "
77,g good 5. Let us now take up the discussion at the point i i^&asure, nor from wliich wc digresscd.
honour, nor
^" '"«• * " Works and Days," 291-295.
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