The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)
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The translator’s English as printed (F. H. Peters). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Since, then, a thing is said to be chosen or pur- 19 posed when, being in our power, it is desired after deliberation, choice or purpose may be defined as deliberate desire for something in our power; for we first deliberate, and then, having made our decision thereupon, we desire in accordance with deliberation.
Let this stand, then, for an account in outline of 20 choice or purpose, and of what it deals with, viz. means to ends. We wish for 4. Wish, we have already said, is for the end ; but l nature of an act is determined by its relation to happiness, when it is desired as a means to that end it is really desired for itself.
3, 17-4, 5.] THE WILL. 73
whereas some hold that the object of wish is the good, tAeend,tke others hold that it is what seems good. apparau
Those who maintain that the object of wish * is the good have to admit that what those wish for who choose wrongly is not object of wish (for if so it would be good ; but it may so happen that it was bad) ; on the other hand, those who maintain that the object of wish is what seems good have to admit that there is nothing which is naturally object of wish, but that each wishes for what seems good to him — different and even contrary things seeming good to different people.
As neither of these alternatives quite satisfies us, perhaps we had better say that the good is the real object of wish (without any qualifying epithet), but that what seems good is object of wish to each man. The good man, then, wishes for the real object of wish ; but what the bad man wishes for may be anything whatever ; just as, with regard to the body, those who are in good condition find those things healthy that are really healthy, while those who are diseased find other things healthy (and it is just the same with things bitter, sweet, hot, heavy, etc) : for the good or ideal man judges each case correctly, and in each case what is true seems true to him.
For, corresponding to each of our trained faculties, there is a special form of the noble and the pleasant,
- * Pov\rir6y. This word hovers between two senses, (1) wished for, (2) to be wished for, jnst as alperoy hovers between (1) desired,
- (2) desirable. The diflBculty, as here pnt, tarns entirely upon the equivocation; bat at bottom lies the fundamental question, whether there be a common human natue, sach that we can say, " This kind of life is man's real life."
p. 74
and I think there is nothing so distinctive of the good or ideal man as the power he has of discerning these special forms in each case, being himself, as it were, their standard and measure.
What misleads people seems to be in most cases pleasure ; it seems to be a good thing, even when it is not. So they choose what is pleasant as good, and shun pain as evil.
Virtue and 5. We havc seeu that, while we wish for the end, voluntary: wc deliberate upon and choose the means thereto.
our acts are » • i i • i i -n our own; for Actions that are concerned with means, then, will we are punishedfor be ffuidcd bv choicc, and so will be voluntarv.
them: if this ^ . . . " .
6« oitr But the acts in which the virtues are manifested character, we have made it are conccmed with means.* oy repeated acts: even Therefore virtue depends upon ourselves : and bodily vices J- i wLn'ihus'^^ vice likewise. For where it lies with us to do, it cZI-T^iead'^ lies with us not to do. Where we can say no, we ^wuZlf c^^ ^^y y®^- ^^ then the doing a deed, which is om^om/''*'"^* noble, lies with us, the not doing it, which is dis- (i)vice' "^""^ graceful, lies with us ; and if the not doing, which is beal'^wiuL noble, lies with us, the doing, which is disgraceful, virLef also lies with us. But if the doing and likewise the ^^^make^mr- not doiug of uoblc or basc deeds lies with us, and if this is, as we found, identical with being good or bad, then it follows that it lies with us to be worthy or worthless men.
And so the saying —
" None would be wicked, none would not be blessed,"
* Each virtuous act is desired and chosen as a means to realizing a particular virtue, and this again is desired as a part or constituent of, and so as a means to, that perfect self-realization which is happiness : c/. 3, 15.
selves what we are.