The Nicomachean Ethics — trans. F. H. Peters (1881)

6, 2-10.] MORAL VIRTUE. 45

6 which is neither too much nor too little for us ; and this is not one and the same for all

For instance, if ten be larger (or too large) and two be smaller (or too small), if we take six we take the mean relatively to the thing itself (or the

7 arithmetical mean) ; for it exceeds one extreme by the same amount by which it is exceeded by the other extreme: and this is the mean in arithmetical proportion.

But the mean relatively to us cannot be found in this way. K ten pounds of food is too much for a given man to eat, and two pounds too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order him six pounds : for that also may perhaps be too much for the man in question, or too little; too little for Milo, too much for the beginner. The same holds true in running and wrestling.

8 And so we may say generally that a master in any art avoids what is too much and what is too little, and seeks for the mean and chooses it — ^not the absolute but the relative mean.

9 Every art or science, then, perfects its work in this way, looking to the mean and bringing its work up to this standard ; so that people are wont to say of a good work that nothing could be taken from it or added to it, implying that excellence is destroyed by excess or deficiency, but secured by observing the mean. And good artists, as we say, do in fact keep their eyes fixed on this in aU that they do.

Virtue therefore, since like nature it is more exact and better than any art, must also aim at the mean —

10 virtue of course meaning moral virtue or excellence ;

46 NIOOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. [Bk. II.

for it has to do with passions and actions, and it is these that admit of excess and deficiency and the mean. For instance, it is possible to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and generally to be affected pleasantly and painfully, either too much or too little, in either case wrongly ; but to be thus affected at the 11 right times, and on the right occasions, and towards the right persons, and with the right object, and in the right fashion, is the mean course and the best course, and these are characteristics of virtue. And 12 in the same way our outward acts also admit of excess and deficiency, and the mean or due amount.

Virtue, then, has to deal with feelings or passions and with outward acts, in which excess is wrong and deficiency also is blamed, but the mean amount is praised and is right — both of which are characteristics of virtue.

Virtue, then, is a kind of moderation (jueaoTrig tiq)* 13 inasmuch as it aims at the mean or moderate amount {to fxiaov).

Again, there are many ways of going wrong (for 14 evil is infinite in nature, to use a Pythagorean figure while good is finite), but only one way of going right ; so that the one is easy and the other hard — easy to miss the mark and hard to hit. On this account also, then, excess and deficiency are characteristic of vice, hitting the mean is characteristic of virtue :

" Goodness is simple, ill takes any shape."

Virtue, then, is a habit or trained faculty of choice, 15

* jueffJrijs, the abstract name for the quality, is quite untranslatable.

6. 11-20. MORAL VIRTUE. 47

the characteristic of which lies in observing the mean relativel}' to the persons concerned, and which is guided by reason, i.e. by the judgment of the prudent man.

And it is a moderation, firstly, inasmuch as it comes in the middle or mean between two vices, one on the side of excess, the other on the side of defect ; and, secondly, inasmuch as, whUe these vices fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling and in action, it finds and chooses the mean, middling, or moderate amount.

Regarded in its essence, therefore, or according to the definition of its nature, virtue is a moderation or middle state, but viewed in its relation to what is best and right it is the extreme of perfection.